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Introduction 
Overview 
 
The year 2015 saw the end-date of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) come and go 
without the MDGs being met, and the drafting of a new set of 17 ambitious new Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 accompanying targets. If current trends persist, the world 
will see significant progress towards meeting some of the SDG targets but for others, we will fall 
short or, worse, regress.1 One of the targets the international community will fall short on if extra 
efforts are not made is the achievement of universal secondary education. It is our contention 
that making these extra efforts towards this target and the other educational targets is not only in 
keeping with people’s own priorities,2 but it also will contribute in significant ways to the 
achievement of the other SDGs. The purpose of this literature review is to attempt to give an 
overview of the current state of the evidence on education’s impact on other key sectors of 
development, including inclusive economic growth, inclusive social development, environmental 
sustainability, and governance and peaceful, just, inclusive societies. To contextualise these 
synergies, it begins with a snapshot of key global inequalities and population dynamics, and 
concludes with a discussion of the spatial dimensions of sustainable development. This review 
will contribute to the discourse around interlinkages between the different SDGs and also 
informs the development of our different scenarios as we attempt to project what progress will be 
made towards the other SDGs given the achievement of the different educational SDG targets. 
 
Background 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has been in the works for a number of years, 
once it became clear that the MDGs would not be met. A draft agenda and a number of 
accompanying documents, including reports, reviews, and analyses, were released throughout 
2015, but the SDGs were officially decided upon from 25-27 September when Heads of State and 
Government and High Representatives met at United Nations (UN) Headquarters for the UN’s 
70th anniversary. The 17 new goals and 169 accompanying targets officially came into effect on 
January 1, 2016. The UN describes the targets as “aspirational and global, with each government 
setting its own national targets guided by the global level of ambition but taking into account 
national circumstances. Each government will also decide how these aspirational and global 
targets should be incorporated in national planning processes, policies and strategies.”3 It is 
important to note the aspirational and relative nature of these targets, as it does suggest that 
success in one context may look different than in another. 
 
Rationale 
The recent report Review of Targets for the Sustainable Development Goals: The Science Perspective 
states that there is research evidence demonstrating the importance of education and learning 
when it comes to driving positive change in ensuring environmental and sustainable 
development and overall human well-being.4 According to the evidence, education programmes 
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(particularly non-formal programmes), when widely accessible to women and girls, have had far-
reaching positive impacts, including but not limited to, improved reproductive health, family 
planning, and mortality, social equity, social cohesion, and political stability, economic 
development, poverty reduction, food security, better health, and better management of natural 
resources. In fact, it is widely understood that there is a positive relationship between education 
and other dimensions of sustainable development,5 6 and yet education remains an under-
financed, under-prioritised sector, with many development experts dismissing it as less important 
than other sectors.7 
 
One possible reason for this neglect is that the pathways of impact for education on other sectors 
of development are not well understood – researchers know that there is a relationship, but there 
are few studies in the mainstream literature that demonstrate how that relationship works. 
However, as they point out, what is not really emphasised in the current goals and targets is how 
education can act as a driver of sustainable change, as change that is owned by the stakeholders 
themselves. Indeed, respondents consistently ranked “a good education” as the most important 
issue that would make a difference in their life, ahead of better healthcare and job opportunities, 
in a global survey by the United Nations,8 and this is true for both women and men, all age 
groups, at all levels of national development, and all levels of individual education. We do not, 
however, wish to take part in the unfortunate “jockeying for a central position” on the SDG 
agenda that is beginning to take place, pitching goals against each other in terms of their relative 
importance. Indeed, we show that education stands in a reciprocal relationship with many other 
goals. This is partly because education is intrinsically an intergenerational process, and partly 
because education affects other dimensions of sustainable development both directly (through 
increased awareness and capacity) and indirectly (through improved job opportunities). 
Education is both an end, a goal in itself, but also a means through which other goals are to be 
met. Part of reducing inequality is to reduce disparities in education; part of reducing poverty is 
to equip people with the skills for more productive livelihoods. Moreover, even with respect to 
initiatives that have no concern with learning, the education system is often the only feasible 
channel through which to reach mass populations. 
 
Below, SDG 49 (which relates to education) is reproduced in full, with its accompanying targets: 
 
SDG 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all. 
→ 4.1: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary 
and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes  
→ 4.2: By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood 
development, care and pre-primary education so that they are ready for primary 
education  
→ 4.3: By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality 
technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university  
→ 4.4: By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant 
skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and 
entrepreneurship  
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→ 4.5: By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all 
levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with 
disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations  
→ 4.6: By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and 
women, achieve literacy and numeracy  
→ 4.7: By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote 
sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable 
development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a 
culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural 
diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development  
→ 4.a: Build and upgrade education facilities that are child, disability and gender sensitive 
and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all  
→ 4.b: By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to 
developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing 
States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational 
training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and 
scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries  
→ 4.c: By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through 
international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least 
developed countries and small island developing States 
 
Conceptual Framework & the 5 Ps of Sustainable Development
According to the framing document for the SDGs, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development: 
 
 
This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to 
strengthen universal peace in larger freedom. We recognise that eradicating poverty in all its 
forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development. All countries and all stakeholders, 
acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan. We are resolved to free the 
human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet. We 
are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift 
the world onto a sustainable and resilient path. As we embark on this collective journey, we 
pledge that no one will be left behind. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 
targets which we are announcing today demonstrate the scale and ambition of this new 
universal Agenda. They seek to build on the Millennium Development Goals and complete 
what these did not achieve. They seek to realize the human rights of all and to achieve 
gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. They are integrated and 
indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, 
social and environmental. 
(UN, 2015, p.3) 
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The official release of the SDGs and accompanying targets has triggered much debate and 
discussion over if and how these targets will be attained. One emerging criticism of the agenda is 
that, in spite of the insistence that the SDGs are “integrated and indivisible and balance the three 
dimensions of sustainable development” (as indicated above), the way the agenda is set out 
encourages silo-thinking within the different goals rather than the building of reciprocal linkages 
between them. It is our contention that an analysis of the role education currently plays in 
relation to “the 5 Ps of sustainable development” – people, planet, prosperity, peace, and 
partnership – can contribute to a better understanding of how to build and strengthen linkages 
between the different SDGs, thus bringing us closer to realising the ambitious SDG vision. 
Methods 
The review conducted here is not a “systematic review” in the technical sense, with a fixed set of 
search and selection criteria applied to a defined set of potential sources. One of the aims was of 
this review was to capture insights from across a large range of disciplines, many of which use 
their own language and terminology for phenomena that are educational in fact but not in name. 
In addition, in the area of educational development itself, “grey” literature is common, which 
ordinarily would not be included in a scientific review. Accordingly, we proceeded through a 
combination of “snowball” sampling, starting from key studies or review articles, purposive 
searching to close specific gaps (or to verify the absence of evidence), and by consulting our 
extensive professional networks.1 This approach allowed us to identify a diverse range of 
important items, which would have been missed had we taken a more systematic, scientific 
approach.  
 
An important limitation is that a review of the present scope and ambition can never be fully 
comprehensive, and that the selection and choices made inevitably partly reflect our own 
particular areas of expertise and interest, as well as a certain amount of chance. In addition, the 
timing of the work relative to the SDG process means that only the draft targets were available 
when we began our review, and also that keeping up to date with other related efforts has been a 
“moving target”. Around the formal adoption of the SDGs, relevant documents, reports, and 
data were published almost on a daily basis. At the same time, one strength of our approach has 
been precisely to be able to take advantage of our networks and social media to learn of such 
publications almost immediately. 
 
  
                                                       
1 We sympathise with McGrath’s (2014, see Introduction Sources) observation of how this “requires an 
interesting traversing of the boundary between the institutional and the personal, with some of the blogs 
being written in personal capacities but being of potential importance because of the institutional positions 
of their authors; others being on official sites but ‘not official positions’ and others still officially 
representing organisational positions and identities. Such a process is necessarily about adopting a 
snowballing technique and hoping that rigorous pursuit of leads can bring about representative coverage of 
points and positions. However, scientific levels of representativity [sic] are not possible in such an 
approach.” (p. 5) 
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Part 1: Setting the scene – an unequal world 
1.1: Introduction 
 
The contribution of education, in particular formal schooling, to reducing inequality is a highly 
contested question. On the one hand, one of the prime arguments that has been made for mass 
education ever since the establishment of systems of public mass education has been precisely 
that education would raise people out of poverty (notwithstanding the other competing goals). 
This line of reasoning, and more strongly focused on ‘levelling the playing field’, repeated itself 
in the second half of the twentieth century when the first period of ‘massification’ of higher 
education occurred. More recently, Thomas Piketty, around whose book Capital in the Twentieth 
Century the re-emergence of inequality as a central notion in mainstream academic and policy 
debates has crystallised, emphasises education as one of the key strategies for more equitable 
social development. Indeed, given the strong correlation between education and overall 
socioeconomic status (SES), including income, it seems common sense that increasing 
participation of children from low SES backgrounds would improve their lot and therefore 
reduce overall inequality. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence that this relationship is 
rather complicated, operating through both direct and indirect channels, being strongly linked 
both to current cross-sectional inequality (comprising both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ dimensions) 
and the intergenerational reproduction of inequality, an being subject to a large variety of 
different interpretations. 
 
A fairly detailed discussion of inequality in the context of education and the SDGs is appropriate 
because explicit calls for lower inequality and equitable outcomes are a significant distinction of 
the SDGs over their precursors, the MDGs. In the lead-up to the new goals, their very credibility 
has been argued to depend on their treatment of inequality.1 The success of the MDG and 
Education for All (EFA) agenda in achieving equitable progress has been mixed at best, and this 
limitation of unequal progress partly blamed for the failure to meet the goals overall. The 
argument is that, rather than representing an equity-efficiency trade-off, ‘interventions targeted at 
marginalised groups and at areas characterised by intensive disadvantage – such as urban slums 
and remote rural regions – can accelerate overall progress’ [emphasis added].2 Indeed, inequality 
has received more prominent mention in the SDGs, but as an undefined qualifier. Further, the 
‘bottom 40%’ has been added as a target group, in addition to the absolutely poor (see also 
analysis of educational expansion in those terms later in this report). 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Conceptual distinctions between different notions of inequality, 
as well as important differences in how they apply to economic respectively educational 
inequality, are clarified. At some point, all definitions of inequality must be operationalised in 
order to be measured. With respect to inequality measurement, even seemingly minor technical 
details can have a large impact on the estimated values, and cannot be disentangled from the 
underlying philosophical questions. Subsequently, the direct effects on educational inequality of 
general socioeconomic inequality are outlined, and vice-versa. The perspective on the latter 
direction, the contribution of inequality in education to overall inequality, is then expanded to 
include indirect mechanisms. 
 10 
 
1.2: Concepts and measurement 
We must distinguish between the question of the dimension along which (in)equality is 
considered from the question of what inequality along a given dimension is taken to mean. 
Consideration of the first question results in distinctions between inequality between countries, 
cross-generational inequality, and inequality within a given cross-sectional population.a The 
second question concerns the exact distinctions between the concepts of poverty, inequality of 
outcomes, inequality of opportunity, and equity. 
 
In the present context, the first question is more straightforward. Strictly in terms of the SDGs, 
the time horizon of 15 years is too short for intergenerational considerations. Note that this does 
not mean that inequality among children according to parental resources is not considered, 
because it is, but that only the distribution of household resources from the perspective of the 
children matters, not the comparison between inequality in the parent and child generation 
(including non-parents!) at the same point in their lifecycle. Inequalities between countries also 
play only a minor role in the SDG agenda (with the exception of some of the ‘means of 
implementation’ goals), although arguably the EFA ‘Fast Track’ initiative and its successors 
represent an attempt at creating ‘equality of opportunity’ (in a narrow sense, see below) between 
countries. Finally, much educational development literature has been written about trends in 
educational disparities between and within different population groups, defined by gender, 
disability status, urban/rural residence, ethnicity, religion, migration status, socioeconomic 
status, or other characteristics. This is not the place to summarise this extensive literature, but 
salient points worth repeating are that examples of educational inequalities along all these 
dimensions are common and that disadvantages frequently intersect, and that the case can be 
made that educational disparities by socioeconomic status are emerging as some of the largest 
differentials that can be observed almost everywhere, and even where gender differences, that 
received by far the most attention in the MDG/EFA agenda, have been substantially reduced. 
 
The second question – what do we mean by ‘inequality’? – is more contentious, with added 
potential for confusion due to a mismatch between the usage of the term among educationalists 
and economists. A first distinction is that between poverty and inequality. The former term refers 
to falling below some defined threshold, while the latter refers to the entire distribution. 
Comparable to the poverty-reduction focus in development economics on the ‘absolute poor’ 
living below a certain daily income, educational development has a long tradition of examining 
which children do not benefit from even a minimal amount schooling (or, more recently, 
learning). In fact, falling below the threshold of four completed years of primary schooling has 
now become explicitly labelled as ‘education poverty’. In this sense, whether an individual is 
economically or educationally poor is an individual experience. 
 
By contrast, inequality can only be understood in relation to the distribution of resources across 
the population as a whole. With respect to education, inequality can be examined even before 
considering any of the background characteristics mentioned above, purely by studying the 
distribution of, for example, years of schooling in the population or a single cohort.3 While this 
approach is not uncommon in economic analyses, especially those examining the effects of 
education on economic performance at the aggregate level, it is rarely pursued in the field of 
                                                       
a Cross-sectional population is sometimes further divided into ‘vertical’ inequality along hierarchical status, 
and ‘horizontal’ inequality between different groups 
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educational development itself. The reason, presumably, is that there is little discussion and 
consensus around what an ‘ideal’ distribution of educational outcomes would be, over and above 
the principles of eliminating educational poverty and non-discrimination. To the extent that 
discussion does occur, it addresses the question of “What kind of education for whom?” and not 
the quantitative distribution of educational outcomes. Where the question of how many people 
‘ought’ to have secondary, or tertiary, education is addressed at all, it is by economists in terms 
of the economic returns (see below. 
 
In this sense, the notion of distributional inequality, in other words, of how ‘spread out’ 
educational participation is, is a relational indicator. The same can be said with regards to 
income, where there can be little debate that ‘perfect equality’ and ‘perfect inequality’ (i.e. a 
uniform distribution of incomes or complete concentration in the hands of a single individuum) 
could both in principle only be achieved with tremendous amounts of coercion, and arguably not 
even then. In between, there is little guidance to our thinking about what an appropriate absolute 
value would be. Instead, inequality measures, when applied to incomes, but also to wealth, are 
generally used to monitor changes over time, or to make comparisons between countries. 
Whatever one believes would provide a basis for equitable differences in incomes (say effort, for 
the sake of argument), if there is no reason to expect the distribution of effort in country A to 
differ dramatically from the distribution in similar countries, then observing a much larger 
inequality index is a cause for concern. Similarly, if there is a general consensus that income 
inequality is inequitably high (rather than inequitably low), then an upward trend in inequality 
indices is informative of the need for corrective policies. Neither case requires a commitment to a 
particular absolute level of distributional inequality that would be deemed desirable. 
 
More central to educational debates has been the relationship between disparities in outcomes 
and various background characteristics, framed as a discussion of inequality of outcomes versus 
inequality of opportunity. At this point, it is worth recalling that even strict meritocracy does not 
imply reduced distributional inequality. The opportunity to rise significantly in individual social 
status through education does not make society as a whole more equal, as the historic example of 
the rigorous exams for positions in Imperial China’s state bureaucracy illustrate (even leaving 
aside the fact that they were not open to all people, notably excluding women in particular). 
Indeed, the notion that ‘equality of opportunity’ should replace ‘equality of outcomes’ as the 
main standard of equity has been criticised as an attempt to blame the poor for their purported 
own failure to take advantage of their opportunities.4 However, this objection arguably applies 
only to equality of opportunity in a narrow sense, where the very fact of having been admitted to 
school, for example, is taken to represent the same opportunity to all in the classroom, and 
where the burden to compensate for a home disadvantaged through extra effort is placed on the 
disadvantaged individual. 
 
It is worth noting that operationalising the classical economic definition of equality of 
opportunity5 is much more demanding, and even defines equality of opportunity as only being 
achieved when there is equality of educational outcomes (!) between groups. In other words, it 
equates equality of opportunity with the situation where not only the same amount of effort 
yields the same rewards, irrespective of irrelevant background characteristics, but where even the 
observed amounts of effort do not differ between the groups. The way that ‘educational equity’ is 
operationalised in international educational development, namely that it is violated when 
educational outcomes depend on characteristics such as ethnicity, social status, gender, etc., 
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corresponds to equality of opportunity in this wider sense, then. Indeed, this operationalisation 
resonates with existing definitions of equity in health, as expressed by Whitehead (1992), for 
instance, who characterises health inequities as “differences … that are not only unnecessary and 
avoidable, but also unfair and unjust.”6 More generally, then, ‘equitable’ may be taken to also 
encompass unobserved (or, in any case, unmeasured) aspects of schooling, regardless of whether 
they affect the observed outcomes. Even if there is perfect gender parity in school participation, 
there may still be gender inequity if textbooks and/or teachers promote gender stereotypes, for 
example. In other words, educational equality of opportunity (in the wide sense) of outcomes is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for achieving equity. 
 
Settling on a conceptual notion of inequality does not uniquely define the specific measure used 
to assess or monitor it. With respect to educational inequality, it does not determine whether the 
undesirable link between, for instance, gender and education is best captured through ratios of 
indicators (such as the Gender Parity Index [GPI] for primary enrolment), absolute percentage 
point gaps, or odds ratios. While emphasising different aspects, this choice does not, typically, 
alter the overall conclusions. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the different 
measures of distributional inequality (i.e., of inequality ‘as such’, independently of individual 
characteristics). In particular, there is ample opportunity in this context to misapply inequality 
measures from economics to education without paying due attention to the match between their 
technical characteristics and the way education differs from income. With respect to the well-
known Gini coefficient, for example, it is at least questionable whether its property of greater 
sensitivity to changes in the middle of the distribution, compared to changes at the low or high 
ends, is a desirable property when applied to educational inequality. More importantly, while 
multiplicative invariance (where the value of the indicator does not depend on whether the 
outcomes are multiplied with a constant factor or not), is attractive when studying incomes (else 
‘inequality in cents’ would be different than ‘inequality in euros’, for example), the same cannot 
be said in the context of education. Part of the problem is the large number of ‘true zeros’ in the 
distribution of education in places where a significant proportion of children did not go to school 
at all: it seems unlikely that many development professionals would consider inequality to have 
remained ‘constant’ (as the Gini index would have it) in a setting where half of each cohort 
remained out of school and the other half completed four years of primary schooling, and now 
still half of each cohort remain out of school, but the other half all attain university degrees. This 
property is also shared by the Theil index, the only other inequality index to be reasonably 
common in research on educational inequality (e.g. Saccone, 2008).7 While the research 
boundary in the study of the mathematical properties of inequality indices is of a forbidding 
mathematical sophistication even for most economists, there is clearly room for applied research 
to examine educational distributions through the lens of some of the more straightforward 
alternative inequality measures. 
1.3: Education and economic inequality 
As mentioned above, socioeconomic inequalities in education may have seen less reduction over 
the past two decades than gender or other inequalities have. And while wealth or class disparities 
are not necessarily intrinsically more troublesome than educational inequality along other 
dimensions, they require special attention because socioeconomic status in turn is affected by 
education, potentially creating a feedback loop of persistent inequality. While there are cases 
where ethnic identities are reinforced or perhaps even created by the school system, there is 
generally less potential for such feedback effects with respect to other inequalities. 
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Links between economic inequality and educational inequality abound, at the aggregate, the 
institutional, and individual level. One line of research investigates the contribution of the 
distribution of educational capital, in addition to its overall level, to national economic 
performance. The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is considered to 
change during the late phase of economic development such that greater equality supports 
growth, largely because of the impact of income inequality and credit constraints on human 
capital investment, i.e. economic inequality affects economic growth via educational inequality.8 
The link between education inequality itself and growth confirms this pattern, in that higher 
inequality appears to dampen growth,9 10 11 except at the lowest levels of overall educational 
development (where a certain amount of educational inequality is intuitively unavoidable, since 
at least some highly-qualified individuals are necessary to build a mass education system). At the 
institutional level, there is a risk that large disparities in economic resources result in an 
expansion of private provision that starve public education of the resources and political support 
to effectively counter educational inequalities. Even without overt discrimination, regressive 
differences in school funding and quality may arise from interactions with property markets,12 or 
through local funding mechanisms, where all communities have the same opportunity in 
principle to improve the resources available to their children’s school, but these mechanisms 
results in large disparities in input. The same principle, without the spatial constraint, applies to 
private schooling, of course.13 While much has been written in recent years on the phenomenon 
of ‘low-cost private schools’ for the urban (but increasingly also rural) poor in developing 
countries, notably India, there is serious doubt that the optimism regarding their contribution to 
educational equity is well-founded. 
 
The effect of the overall level of income inequality on educational inequality does not appear to 
offer clear-cut, universally applicable conclusions. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that there 
are plausible mechanisms operating in different directions with respect to capacities and 
incentives. If there are high cost-barriers associated with higher levels of education, and 
economic resources are distributed with high inequality, this may contribute to inequality in 
educational outcomes. However, in institutional settings were either the dependence of incomes 
on education, or of education on incomes, is diminished, the dynamic could well reverse. 
Suppose income inequality is very low because incomes are not strongly associated with 
educational attainment; in this case participation in higher levels of schooling may be driven 
more by idiosyncratic tastes and preferences, resulting in higher diversity in outcomes. 
Conversely, if economic inequality is very high, but does not dictate access to schooling (even 
while it is likely to contribute to differential quality, content, etc.), everyone faces an incentive to 
seek similarly high levels of attainment. In the next generation, educational inequality purely in 
terms of formal attainment may well be lower in this case, even if the expectations of its 
economic rewards are likely to be disappointed for many. 
 
Indeed, as pointed out by Green (1980):14 whereas having some qualification carries a reward in 
the labour market and other social structures while it is no longer rare, but still in limited supply, 
by the time that the bottom SES groups catch up at said level it has ceased to be rewarded and, 
on the contrary, not having the qualification becomes an actual liability. In other words, 
disadvantaged groups must stay afloat of the rising tide of credentials simply to avoid falling 
further behind. Indeed, this expectation is borne out by the finding that the wage gap between 
those with higher education and workers with low levels of education has widened in the OECD 
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over the past decade, despite the fact that the wages of the former have stagnated, because those 
of the latter group have actually declined in real terms. 
 
This last observation reinforces the notion that the interplay of educational and economic 
inequality crucially depends on the economic returns to education. This issue is complicated by 
the fact that standard estimates of the ‘returns to education’ do not measure what many non-
specialists think they measure. Some of the measurement challenges are well-understood, such as 
the difficulties of including incomes from informal employment and the self-employed, and of 
equating the returns to different cohorts with those observed cross-sectionally at one point in 
time. That typically only wage returns, at best taking into account unemployment risks etc., are 
considered in these calculations, but not non-monetary benefits, is also well-understood, and 
often criticised. However, in addition, the routinely published returns for different education 
levels refer to the benefit of one additional year at the given level, not the benefit of completing the 
next-highest level of schooling. In other words, even if ‘the return to secondary schooling’ in this 
sense is higher (lower) than ‘the return to primary schooling’, it is still possible for ‘the return to 
completing secondary school’ is lower (higher) than ‘the return to completing primary school’, 
simply because their duration differs. The distinction is consequential, for the conclusion to 
prioritise (for greatest economic benefit) the expansion of, say, primary schooling over secondary 
schooling may be misunderstood as a call to prioritise the production of primary graduates over 
the production of secondary graduates. In addition, it is recognised, but not accounted for, that 
some of the returns to secondary education, say, should accrue to primary education, which 
created the opportunity for seeking returns to secondary.15 
 
Following this line of reasoning suggests that those with more education benefit more from 
additional education. It could also indicate some complementarity between home background 
and schooling is certainly plausible, i.e., that children from higher status families derive a greater 
benefit from a given school input. However, in addition to bringing more own resources to the 
table (reading lessons in school are likely to benefit from the availability of reading materials at 
home, for example), they may also benefit from discrimination. Content inequality that 
manifests in a ‘hidden curriculum’, whereby children from lower status backgrounds are 
systematically exposed to curricular content that provides fewer opportunities to learn skills 
required for further education. This phenomenon has long been observed,16 and unfortunately 
continues to be the case: Schmidt et al. (2015) have recently shown that even in mathematics, 
children from low-SES strata are exposed to different content and teaching styles than their peers 
from higher-status backgrounds, and that these differences in curriculum substantially increase the 
SES differential in outcomes and account for a large share of the performance gap.17 In general, 
however, tracking can reinforce18 or reduce socioeconomic inequalities in education, depending 
on context.19 
 
Indeed, one reason for the failure of education to decisively reduce income inequality may be 
poor quality, and the evidence suggests inequality in learning is at least as large as inequality in 
outcomes. However, the desire to focus on inequality of learning outcomes clashes with 
misgivings many educators have with respect to standardized assessments.20 
 
Unfortunately, this reinforcement of income inequality through a failure of education happens all 
too frequently, ranging from – at best – incidental ‘unintended consequence’, at least at the level 
of public policy, to being a characteristic or even a (tacit) function of the school system by design. 
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This need not be as overt as in colonial education. Indeed, South Africa provides an instructive 
example of how structural bias may carry (or be carried) over into a nominally equal system that 
is nevertheless far removed from offering a ‘level playing field. So many options exist for the 
middle classes to uphold their social advantage vis-a-vis disadvantaged social groups even as the 
latter increase their participation in education, that inequality tends to remain as large as 
possible. Indeed, not only do they enjoy greater opportunities for ’policy capture’ to benefit from 
given institutional settings (even ones that are intended to support disadvantaged groups), they 
also tend to enjoy greater leverage in influencing their design. Differences in streaming between 
general and vocational tracks are well-documented, as are other forms of ‘internal differentiation’ 
within nominally equivalent levels of schooling. As a result, intergenerational links between 
parental and child education tend to persist, so that in practice the disadvantaged mainly benefit 
from increasing overall levels of participation, not a reduction in inequality. Asserted as a 
tentative general principle by Raftery and Hout (1993),21 this pattern appears to hold in 
developing countries too.22 
 
In principle, educational inequality and overall level are independent (for example, Colclough, 
2007,23 cites the example of ‘progress’ towards gender parity having come about through larger 
enrolment declines for boys than for girls in some African countries during the 1990). However, in 
practice, poverty is affected both by redistribution and growth. An important difference between 
income inequality and education inequality is that inequality in the stock of education cannot be 
redistributed, so ‘redistribution’ can only take the form of an emphasis on different education 
levels. However, the effect of such redistribution of public resources on economic inequality is 
not straightforward: Adelman and Robinson (1989)24 cite an example from Brazil, where a policy 
shift towards primary education contributed to “a shortage of educated manpower, leading to [a] 
widening gap in wages between skilled and unskilled labor” (p. 954-5). 
 
The flip side to greater returns to higher levels of education are greater public expenditure on 
higher levels. Debates around the introduction and appropriate level of university tuition fees in 
many European countries in the past two decades have revolved—apart from the issue of the 
fundamental nature of higher education—not only around the balance between private and 
social benefits, but also around the key question whether public investment in higher education 
are actually socially regressive transfers to high-SES families. In higher education, despite the 
fact that the social returns are likely to be substantial enough to justify public funding as an 
investment,25 the private returns that provide an incentive to potential entrants are sufficiently high 
in general that public funding may not be necessary to ensure a high level of overall 
participation. From such a perspective, counteracting inequality in access is the only rationale for 
state involvement in higher education funding.26 
 
Some other ways in which biases or outright discrimination in the school system can contribute 
to inequality between cities and rural areas, between regions, or between ethnic or linguistic 
groups receive further mention in Section 2.2, and in Parts 5, 6, and 7 of this review. Another 
topic not developed further here is that of intergenerational equity in education. Despite the fact 
that the education of the young is more recent, and in many developing countries much greater, 
than that of their parent generation, youth unemployment is often higher. 
 
A different kind of intergenerational equity question has received more attention, namely the 
ways in which education directly and indirectly reproduces one generation’s inequalities in the 
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next. The direct contribution of family background to educational outcomes has already been 
mentioned above, but in addition there are indirect mechanisms contributing to persistent 
inequality. There is some evidence that where a closing of the gender gap in attainment is 
accompanied by greater sorting of the marriage market according to education (educational 
‘homogamy’), this can result in greater socioeconomic polarisation of households.27 28 29 This 
effect provides a striking example of how reducing inequality along one dimension (gender) can 
sustain, rather than help diminish, inequality along another dimension (socioeconomic status). 
Conversely, some research suggests that economic inequality encourages educational 
homogamy, and through this channel contributes further to educational inequality in the child 
generation, who then faces greater variation in home environments,30 31unless intergenerational 
mobility is sufficiently large.32 Differences in average fertility between education groups also 
potentially interact with intergenerational transmission of education between cohorts.33 If the 
more educated have significantly fewer children, the contribution of transmission to educational 
growth in the child generation is diminished. This effect will be the stronger, the greater the 
fertility gap, which can be very large in least developed countries. 
 
More could be said about additional aspects, notably the way that residential and school 
segregation implies that neighbourhood and peer effects create similar dynamics of reproducing 
existing inequalities (see Bowles et al., 200634 for example), and the way returns to education are 
driven by technological change.35 
 
1.4: Conclusions 
This discussion implies that educational expansion need not necessarily immediately lead to a 
reduction in educational inequality, or to lower socioeconomic inequality. Even the contribution 
to poverty reduction may be compromised if the universalisation of some school level reaches the 
poor too late to offer significant economic returns. Indeed, this may be one reason why the 
poverty-reduction effect of education is typically modelled (including in this project) as arising 
principally through its contribution to overall economic growth. In other words, education-
driven growth is not assumed to be more ‘pro poor’ per se. 
 
At the same time, the example of increasing returns to education acting as a disincentive to further 
education mentioned above, as well as the example of how targeting educational expansion to 
benefit the least well educated may increase income inequality, suggest that balanced educational 
expansion may stand the best chance of making a positive contribution to poverty reduction and 
economic equality. From this perspective, the SDG approach of including secondary schooling 
on the agenda without ‘waiting’ for the universalisation of primary education makes 
considerable sense. 
These sobering caveats notwithstanding, educational expansion, and certainly greater 
educational equality, remain a key strategy of reducing other inequalities, notably health-related 
ones (WHO 2008).36 Educational growth has not, on the whole, diminished the statistical health 
and survival advantages of the more educated and their children. This provides the rationale for 
focusing strongly on health outcomes in our projections. Moreover, even where education does 
not improve the observed economic conditions, it may make them more secure. In the case of 
micro-level shocks that are relatively frequent, and independent across individuals, such as the 
risk of unemployment, it is possible to observe and account for such differences. In other words, 
even if higher education came with a relatively small direct wage premium, but significantly 
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reduced the risk of unemployment, this can be observed in cross-sectional survey data. However, 
inequalities in the vulnerability to rare events, will often remain invisible in standard household 
surveys, even in cases where SES status, including education, may literally determine the odds of 
life or death. An example might be where low status neighbourhoods are crowded in a flooding 
zone, while high status neighbourhoods hug the safe hills. 
 
Against the backdrop of all the above, it is of crucial importance that the key targets for SDG 4 
on education are for universal completion of education that is free, equitable, and of sufficientb 
quality. This means that in thinking through (and modelling) the potential benefits of meeting 
SDG 4, by assumption it is the kind of education that does reduce rather than increase 
inequality. It is not only a best case in terms of quantitative expansion, therefore, but also in 
terms of the nature of its impacts. 
  
 
  
                                                       
b We presume, since the call for ‘high’ quality in the draft SDG targets got dropped in the final version 
adopted. 
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Part 2: People 
 
2.1: Maximising Health and Wellbeing 
2.1.1: Health, nutrition, and wellbeing 
Given the ‘within-sector’ thinking that has dominated the development agenda to date, health 
professionals, researchers, and policymakers often fail to recognise that education can itself be a 
key health intervention.1 
 
2.1.1.1: Common pathways for education to impact health and contribute to the health SDG targets 
To better understand the different pathways through which education impacts the health sector 
and can contribute to the SDG targets, it is important to first have an understanding of the health 
sector as a whole in relation to equity, as conceptualised by one of the early architects of SDG 
#3, Carla AbouZahr, in the figure below: 
 
 
Figure A: Health Systems Equity (AbouZahr, n.d.)2 
People 
We are determined to end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to 
ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy 
environment. 
(UN, 2015, p.3) 
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Though notably absent from the figure, indirect and direct educational interventions at the level 
of health determinants, health system inputs and processes, and health system outputs and 
outcomes have been shown to have positive impacts in terms of health status. First, at the level 
of health determinants, numerous studies have shown that education impacts lifestyle and 
behaviours, as well as occupation choice and success,3 4 and that it can also have a positive 
impact on socioeconomic status (in the long-term) and care of the environment.5 Second, at the 
level of health system inputs and processes, education primarily has an impact on human 
resource development (which will be discussed below) and production and dissemination of 
information (which will be discussed below). Third, at the level of health system outputs and 
outcomes, early childhood centres, schools, and other educational institutions can ensure better 
coverage of health services by providing useful delivery platforms for vaccination programmes, 
sexual and reproductive health services, counselling and other mental health programmes, etc. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated a strong link between poor mental and physical health in 
adolescence and the disruption of educational attainment and employment pathways.6 What is 
under-researched and consequently less well understood is how lack of access to education (or 
access to education of poor quality) impacts mental and physical health. 
 
Globally, healthy life expectancy (HALE) is increasing, though more slowly than life 
expectancy, with number of healthy years lost to disability on the rise in most countries. While 
substantial progress has been made in the reduction of mortality in the last 20 years, little 
progress has been made combatting the overall effect of non-fatal disease, injury, etc. on the 
health of populations. HALE will be a useful indicator for monitoring health gains in relation to 
the SD agenda.7 More and better research is needed, therefore, to demonstrate more concretely 
how education can contribute to an increase in HALE. 
 
2.1.1.2: Promising educational interventions for improving health service delivery 
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that there is a critical shortage of 7.2 million 
doctors, nurses, midwives and other health professionals around the world today. As our current 
health workforce is ageing, and advanced practitioners, midwives, and auxiliaries remain 
underutilised, by 2035, the world will be short of 12.9 million health-care workers unless drastic 
measures are taken.8 This human resource crisis has been called one of the most pressing health 
issues facing the world today,9 with over 60% of countries below the threshold of 59.4 skilled 
health professionals per 10,000 people.10 The crisis is truly global in nature: while it is much 
more pronounced in Africa and parts of South-East Asia (where most countries with a density of 
skilled health professionals of less than 22.8 per 10,000 people and a coverage of births by skilled 
birth attendant coverage below 80% are located), high income countries are also affected, with 
the European Commission estimating a shortage of 2 million by 2020, and Japan and Australia 
both reporting problems with health systems staffing. Further, these shortages in HICs will 
compound problems with the health systems in LMICs through the so-called ‘brain drain’ 
phenomenon, where health workers choose to practice in a country other than their own, 
because they perceive there to be better working conditions in the destination country.11 
Currently, there are no medical schools in 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa,12 which means 
individuals from those countries who wish to train as health professionals have to move abroad, 
and once there, very few return to practice medicine in their home countries. Within countries 
such as South Africa, disparities exist too, with rural areas bearing the brunt of shortages, and 
facing the challenge of brain drain of skilled workers to the urban areas.13 
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The education sector has a key role to play in countering this crisis and the other obstacles to 
meeting the sustainable development targets in a number of direct and indirect ways. First, the 
tertiary education subsector needs to engage with health sector, ensuring not only that higher and 
further education and training opportunities in health are available in all countries, in both urban 
and rural areas, but also that essential pedagogical and curricular reforms occur to improve the 
quality of health professional education, including community health worker training 
programmes.14 15 Second, according to the WHO, there is a shortage of trained researchers 
working in the area of health systems research, so new and innovative approaches to research 
training will need to be explored.16 Third, the access to and quality of secondary education needs 
to be expanded to ensure that students leave secondary school with the necessary knowledge and 
skills to pursue further education as health professionals. Finally, schools and educational 
institutions can prove to be valuable partners in attempting to reach universal health coverage.17 
Examples of some of these types of promising educational innovations are discussed below. 
 
Intervention 1: Innovative Partnerships for Health Professional Education 
According to recent research by key health experts, health professional training initiatives in 
LICs have had limited impact for a number of reasons, including inefficient use of funding, lack 
of scale up, too little emphasis on practical skills acquisition, a lack of alignment with local 
priorities, and limited coordination. A more in-depth analysis of the educational component of 
these initiatives reveals some troubling findings: Many initiatives are dominated by more 
traditional pedagogies, such as short-term lectures and seminars, which do little to teach the 
diversity of skills necessary for health professionals today. Further, health curricula have tended 
to privilege individual learning over collabourative learning, which runs counter to the actual 
situation on the ground, where teamwork is essential. Finally, many initiatives focus on the 
training of clinicians, neglecting to educate other health professionals, including community 
health workers, midwives, public health professionals, health managers, and, importantly, 
researchers.18 These health experts identify four recent innovative training initiatives in Africa, 
funded by the U.S. government: Medical Education Training Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the 
Nursing Training Partnership Initiative (NEPI), the Rwanda Human Resources for Health 
Program (HRH Program), and the Global Health Service Partnership (GHSP). They argue that 
the best practices adopted by these initiatives include country ownership and alignment to local 
priorities, institutional capacity strengthening and competency-based training through 
pedagogical and curricular reform, and sustainable partnerships with international stakeholders. 
 
Of these initiatives, the Human Resources for Health Programme in Rwanda (launched in 2012) 
deserves special mention for the reciprocal nature of the partnership between a lower income 
country and a higher income country. It deploys approximately 100 faculty members from 
different schools in the United States to Rwanda every year to partner with Rwandan faculty-
member counterparts in direct academic and clinical teaching through a ‘twinning’ model, which 
facilitates curriculum development, clinical pedagogy, service delivery, and research capacity.19 
This model enables scholarly collaborations between Rwanda and the United States, which 
creates a space for learning on both sides for clinical innovation and service delivery. 
 
Intervention 2: Curricular and Pedagogical Reform 
South Africa faces serious health worker shortages, particularly in the rural areas and public 
sectors and there are major problems with health sciences education. According to Burch and 
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Reid (2011),20 a number of key reforms within health education would ensure that rural health 
care centres are staffed by well-qualified health professionals. One such reform is replacing short 
placements with longitudinal placements, a strategy which has proved successful according to 
emerging evidence from Australia, Canada and the United States. Such placements are an 
important pedagogical tool, allowing students to integrate their knowledge and skills.21 Further, 
general education research has demonstrated the importance of coherence between curriculum 
(what is taught), pedagogy (how it is taught), and assessment (how learning is measured).22 In 
South Africa (and in health education programmes around the world), there is often a disconnect 
between what is taught (skills in district-level facilities) and how it is assessed (assessments are 
conducted tertiary teaching hospitals), which undermines the overall learning experience.23 
 
Problem-based learning (PBL) is becoming increasingly popular in medical schools around the 
world.24 Typically, PBL involves small-group tutorials facilitated by tutors/experts who 
emphasise not only subject knowledge, but skills such as teamwork, communication, critical 
thinking and reasoning, and information literacy. PBL has proven effective in improving medical 
student results in a number of contexts, there is definitely a need for further research to determine 
the most effective pedagogical approaches for health professional education. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the growing field of Health Literacy Studies, a field which aims to 
support health professionals aiming to improve the quality of health care services by helping to 
empower patients (and prospective patients) to make informed decisions about their own and 
their families’ health. This area will be discussed further below, but one key resource in this 
burgeoning field is the Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) Health Literacy website, which 
was the first academic site to provide support for health professionals interested in this line of 
study.25 
 
Intervention 3: Training Community Health Workers & Midwives 
There is a dearth of evidence about what types of Community Health Worker (CHW) training 
strategies are most effective, and a number of key scholars have called for different approaches to 
pre-service and in-service training of CHWs to be included in effectiveness trials, which aim to 
shed light on the relationship between CHW education and performance improvement.26 
However, WHO does describe a number of key initiatives to expand the health workforce by 
training community health workers and midwives, including a Health Extension Program in 
Ethiopia, a hub-and-spoke programme for training midwives in Bangladesh, eLearning initiatives 
in Rwanda, and a stepladder curriculum for health professional education in the Philippines.27 
 
The Health Service Extension Program in Ethiopia was launched in 2003. It deployed over 
30,000 government-salaried female health extension workers who focused on outreach, including 
organising communities to participate in expanding health services, conducting household visits, 
and educating families to adopt healthy lifestyles and serve as model families. A study conducted 
in 2013 found that the Program was effective in improving knowledge of and practices in 
maternal and newborn healthcare at scale. 
 
BRAC University’s innovative hub-and-spoke diploma Midwifery Programme at the James P. 
Grant School of Public Health in Bangladesh is an example of an attempt to scale up education 
for midwives to practise in underserved areas. This model involves a University-based hub that 
provides faculty training, educational support, and a standardised curriculum to seven training 
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sites in remote areas. Through this model, 200 midwives per year can be trained locally and be 
awarded diplomas, thus increasing services in remote areas. 
 
The School of Health Sciences at the University of the Philippines attempts to address health 
workforce shortages in the country through a competency-based and community-based single, 
sequential and continuous stepladder curriculum. Each student starts at the same point but exits 
with varying competencies (first as a community health worker/midwife, then as a nurse, then as 
a nurse practitioner, and finally as a doctor). There are scholarships for deserving secondary 
school leavers from rural communities, who are bound by contract and committed to returning 
to their communities. This model has been used by a number of community-based training 
programmes worldwide. 
 
Finally, the Government of Rwanda is currently using eLearning initiatives to attempt to build 
capacity of health workers through an eLearning Portal for nurse training (and ultimately 
physicians) and a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC), which is available free of charge via 
the internet and aims to encourage large-scale participation. While these initiatives show 
promise, as with all aspects of CHW training, more research is needed to determine effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness. 
 
Intervention 4: Building Research Capacity 
There are some exciting initiatives aimed at building research capacity at higher education 
institutions of health in low and middle income countries. Examples include the Malaria 
Capacity Development Consortium (MCDC), a consortium of five African and four European 
universities, aiming to improve malaria research capacity in Africa28 and the Royal Society-
DFID Africa Capacity Building Initiative, a scheme which aims to strengthen the research 
capacity of universities and research institutions in sub-Saharan Africa by supporting the 
development of sustainable research networks.29 Such interventions will play a key role in 
combating the brain drain discussed earlier. 
 
Intervention 5: Health Promoting Schools 
There is a recent, growing body of evidence suggesting that Health Promoting Schools (HPS) are 
an effective, low-cost way to improve health outcomes among school-age populations and their 
families and communities.30 The WHO strategies for HPS in 32 African countries are based on 
the premise that schools are one of the most effective and efficient ways to reach large portions of 
the population with positive health messages and health and nutrition interventions (ibid). 
Further, new research from Uganda suggests that HPS can play a key role as a training area for 
health workers to learn health advocacy, particularly when it comes to health promotion and 
disease prevention.31 Relationships between HPS and health training facilities are mutually 
beneficial: as health workers learn health advocacy, they promote better health behaviours and 
resilience among students. 
 
2.1.1.3: Early Childhood Programmes as centres of health and education provision 
A number of studies have demonstrated that cognitive delays in early childhood caused in part 
by poor nutrition during the first 1000 days (the 1000 days between a woman’s pregnancy and 
her child’s second birthday) which leaves children prone to health risks, can quickly accumulate 
among the most vulnerable children, including the poorest.32 Conversely, researchers (most 
notably Nobel Prize winning economist, James Heckman) have shown that high quality early 
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childhood services have very high rates of return, particularly for the most disadvantaged, 
because they target the most sensitive periods of child development and consequently set strong 
foundations for childhood, adolescence, and ultimately adulthood.33 Some of the most effective 
early childhood policies and practices (targeting children from birth to age 8) over the past few 
decades have been guided by a number of theoretical models, which take into account the 
dynamic interplay between risk factors and protective factors at different societal levels – 
individual, family community, and the wider socioeconomic and cultural context.34 According to 
the literature, well-designed programmes recognise the reciprocal relationship between children 
and adults, and develop the capacity of both primary caregivers and the children themselves to 
play an active role in children’s development (ibid). Further, they are based on the idea that 
learning begins at birth.35 In the United States, a number of early intervention programmes for 
children from disadvantaged circumstances (mostly living in poverty), which provide enriched 
learning opportunities for children, and support services and education on parenting for 
caregivers in community-based centres (and/or the family home) have had positive impacts on 
long-term outcomes, including a reduction in referrals to special education, and increase in 
secondary school completion and adult income, and decreases in welfare dependence, 
incarceration, etc., all of which have important impacts on overall health.36  
 
However, while early childhood development is considered by many to be a powerful entry point 
for interventions that support the holistic development and wellbeing of children and their 
families, there is currently no common fiscal or policy space for early childhood issues, and very 
weak data systems.37 38 In fact, unfortunately, the current SDG agenda does little to lay the 
groundwork for a common space for early childhood. The only explicit reference to early 
childhood development is target 2 of SDG 4, which calls for “quality early childhood 
development, care and pre-primary education.” Across the remainder of the SDGs, there are 
references to children under five, infant mortality, birth registration, etc. but no overt 
acknowledgement of the importance of taking a holistic approach to early childhood issues.39 
 
2.1.1.4: Relationship between education and undernutrition over time 
According to Nicolai et al. (2015), unless special measures are taken, the international 
community will fall short of the SDG target to end world hunger by 2030,40 meaning that many 
of the world’s children are in danger of facing the consequences of undernutrition and 
micronutrient deficiency: wasting, stunting, poor health, and death. Research has demonstrated 
that the health problems associated with undernutrition lead to problems with concentration, 
motivation, and overall cognitive development, which have obvious consequences for 
education.41 In fact, undernutrition has been identified as one of the key reasons that there are 
130 million children in school who are failing to learn the basics of numeracy and literacy.42 
What is perhaps less well understood is how education can contribute to combatting 
undernutrition, though there is significant evidence showing that there is a positive correlation 
between maternal education and the health and nutritional status of children: better educated 
mothers have healthier, well-nourished children.43 44 Later in this section, the role of nutrition 
education in encouraging healthy behaviours and promoting overall wellbeing will be discussed. 
 
Early childhood centres and primary and secondary schools are often convenient delivery 
platforms for nutrition-specific interventions, including school feeding, micronutrient 
supplementation, and deworming.45 According to UNICEF (2014), numerous studies have 
demonstrated that the preschool years are the most effective (and cost-efficient) time to attempt 
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to address the impact undernutrition has had on children’s learning: if stunted children have 
access to quality nutrition, care, and stimulation in a formal educational environment, they can 
catch up to peers in social and analytical skills, and in IQ level.46 According to Grantham-
McGregor and Olney (2006), school feeding programmes (when carefully planned and of high 
quality) can benefit school performance for high-risk populations. Further, they found that the 
most frequent benefit of school feeding programmes worldwide is increased enrolment and 
attendance.47 Recent research from South Africa indicates that well-run school food gardens can 
help to address food insecurity and undernutrition, while increasing students’ interactions with 
nature, developing skills, and improving school performance and overall wellbeing.48 
 
Regular deworming of children in schools in areas where helminth-infection is common has long 
been recommended by the WHO as an intervention with key health, nutrition, and societal 
benefits beyond worm removal.49 However, a recent Cochrane review, analysing 45 trials on 
deworming through schools, found that while treating children known to be infected may have 
some nutritional benefits, there is now substantial evidence that mass treatment of all children in 
endemic areas does not improve average haemoglobin, nutritional status, survival or school 
performance (ibid). 
 
2.1.1.5: Relationship between education and over-nutrition over time 
Today, over-nutrition is becoming an increasing global problem, with more than 10% of school-
age children currently categorised as overweight or obese.50 These children risk a range of 
chronic diseases in adulthood, and are likely to have their work productivity, quality of life, and 
overall life expectancy severely compromised. Without access to key health messages (and 
nutritious meals) through schools, children and their families are learning unhealthy behaviours. 
 
While there appears to be a negative correlation between educational attainment and obesity, the 
relationship is a complex one. According to research from the European Region, high levels of 
obesity and overweightness tend to be more common among countries with lower income, 
education levels and access to care, though in some countries, including Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan, obesity is a greater burden for people from higher socio-economic status levels.51 
Further, it found that socioeconomic status, gender, and national characteristics sometimes 
interact. In the Czech Republic, less educated men are more prone to obesity, while in the 
Russian Federation, the reverse is true. However, in both of these countries, less educated 
women are more prone to obesity (ibid). 
 
Research on childhood obesity in Germany revealed high levels of obesity in some communities 
of recent immigration. These communities were found to exhibit a number of known risk factors 
for overweight, including low levels of education among mothers and watching more television. 
52 In spite of emerging evidence of obesity risk among certain sub-groups, including recent 
immigrants to high income countries, there is a lack of targeted anti-obesity programming for 
these groups.53 
 
Around the world, schools are putting more and more emphasis on academic tasks rather than 
physical activity. A systematic review of decades of research on the linkages between school-
based activities and academic achievement found that physical activity can be added to the 
curriculum (by taking time from other subjects) without negatively impacting academic 
achievement and that adding time to more academic subjects (by taking time from physical 
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education) does not improve academic achievement.54 Further, participating in physical activity 
in school settings seems to have a positive impact on physical and mental health, and may result 
in small absolute gains in academic performance. 
 
Schools do have the potential to mitigate overweightness and obesity. According to Peel (2015), 
while obesity is on the rise worldwide, Japan is one of the few countries that has been able to 
reduce its obesity rates since 2003, largely because the government was an early adopter of food 
education that emphasised the building of knowledge, skills, attitudes and healthy behaviours 
among schoolchildren.55 What is clear is that there is a need for further research on how to 
maximise the effectiveness of anti-obesity interventions in terms of delivery platform and 
context-specificity. 56 
 
2.1.1.6: Role of education in encouraging healthy nutrition and healthy behaviours and in containing non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) 
One of the key roles education can play in encouraging healthy nutrition and healthy behaviours 
is by building health literacy among children and adults. Health literacy is functional literacy 
which “focuses on the skills adults need in order to make use of health resources, make health 
decisions, and take actions for their own and their families’ wellbeing.” As such, it is a broad 
concept that extends beyond an ability to read and follow medical instructions to choosing 
between different health options, communicating problems and needs effectively to a health 
professional, and advocating for safe work and school environments and dignified treatment.57 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that health education interventions that focus on increasing 
access to information about health risks that potentially lead to NCDs (such as over-eating, 
smoking, alcohol consumption, etc.) are an effective way to prevent NCDs. However, recent 
research suggests that health education campaigns are not effective on their own, and that more 
consideration needs to be given to other socio-economic and behavioural factors when designing 
interventions.58 59 
 
According to some key health education experts, current dominant approaches to health 
education focus on promoting fear of poor health and disease and a sense of individual 
responsibility and self-surveillance. They argue that what is needed for effective health education 
is a more critical and nuanced socio-cultural approach. Such an approach prioritises sustainable 
education-based outcomes over health-based outcomes, such as fitness, healthy diet, etc. In other 
words, health education should improve learners’ knowledge and skills about key health issues 
and how they relate to their own lives, thus empowering them to make healthy, informed 
choices.60 Emerging research suggests that the relationship between education and healthy vs. 
unhealthy behaviours is much more complex than originally thought, for example, there are a 
number of educated (sometimes highly educated) people who now engage in unhealthy 
behaviours, including smoking and unprotected/high risk sex, in spite of knowing the risks.61 62 
This research demonstrates the importance of a critical health education. One recent study on 
obesity prevention in schools for Hispanic adolescents in the United States found that 
community-based participatory research (CBPR) has the potential to promote healthy behaviours 
by engaging communities in identifying barriers to and opportunities for healthy living 
themselves in a way that is culture-specific.63 
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It is interesting to note that there is an indirect way to encourage healthy behaviours. Researchers 
have found that ‘liking school’ has been identified as a protective factor against bullying, sexual 
risk-taking, tobacco, alcohol and drug use, and other health-compromising behaviours.64 Thus, 
turning schools into positive, welcoming environments for all students, increases the likelihood 
of students liking school, which is associated with positive health behaviours. 
 
2.1.1.7: Enhancing the protective and psychosocially supportive dimensions of education to ensure wellbeing 
Research from the WHO’s Regional Office for Europe emphasises the key role schools play in 
students’ overall wellbeing.65 According to this research, children and young people attend 
school during crucial developmental periods and thus positive school experiences can have 
powerful positive impacts on students’ psychosocial health, while negative experiences can 
become a major risk factor. A review of Australian HPS suggests that benefits are derived for 
students and for the whole school community, particularly in terms of building resilience through 
the building of self-esteem, self-efficacy, peer relationships, intergenerational relationships and a 
sense of belonging.66 There is good reason to believe that these lessons can be transferred to lower 
income contexts, enhancing the protective dimensions of schools. 
 
In 2004, the IRC launched the Healing Classrooms action research-based initiative, which was 
intended to serve as a global initiative on promoting teacher development for overall student 
well-being in crisis and post-crisis contexts.67 It has had some success in promoting psychosocial 
recovery and supporting the wellbeing of both children and teachers. Currently, refugee and 
internally displaced people (IDP) populations are on the rise, and a large proportion of these 
groups are children and young people, who are extremely likely to be at risk for mental health 
problems.68 A study exploring the problems, strengths, and help-seeking behaviours of Bhutanese 
and Somali Bantu refugees and establishing how mental health problems are expressed locally 
found that often these refugees leveraged support from their communities to overcome 
challenges, identifying health facilities, government assistance programmes, and school 
personnel as support agents.69 
 
According to Dryden-Peterson (2011), the landmark report by Graça Machel on the Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Children presented to the UN Secretary General in 1996 emphasised the key role 
that education plays in the protection of refugees and other children and young people impacted 
by crisis, by providing safe and secure spaces that promote well-being (of students, teachers, and 
other school personnel).70 Since the early 2000s, therefore, UNHCR has officially emphasised the 
importance of “education as a tool for protection”. However, research has shown that education 
only fulfils this protective function if it is of high quality – all too often, schools are sites of 
physical and symbolic violence or vulnerability to natural and/or manmade disasters (ibid). 
 
Finally, while it is outside of the scope of this report to do a full review of types of education, it is 
worth noting that there is a tendency to focus on the type of education which leads to easily 
quantifiable learning outcomes in more so-called ‘academic’ and ‘functional’ subjects, such as 
mathematics, literacy, science, and engineering. However, a burgeoning body of research 
demonstrates the importance of humanities and arts education for overall individual and 
community wellbeing, which will have important implications for peaceful and inclusive 
societies (see Part 5 of this report). Many arts education programmes the world over are facing 
limited budgets and/or budget cuts, which places the potential gains to be made from these types 
of intervention under threat. 
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2.1.2: Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) 
2.1.2.1: The absence of adequate WASH services in health centres 
Recent research from WHO drawing from data from 54 LMICs (representing 66,101 facilities) 
found that 38% lack an improved water source, 19% lack improved sanitation, and 35% lack 
soap and water for handwashing.71 In other words, the ability to prevent and control infections 
and to provide basic, routine services is seriously compromised. The WHO report also found that 
in several countries, simple measures, including improving toilet cleanliness and installing low-
cost handwashing stations, increase uptake of services and encourage members of the 
community to improve WASH practices at home. The report identifies schools as one important 
delivery channel for pro-WASH messages, and recommends adapting approaches used to 
improve WASH in schools for national advocacy to promote WASH in health care facilities. 
While there are numerous examples of successful WASH programmes in schools throughout the 
world, much remains to be done to ensure sustainable sanitation systems in schools (both in 
terms of hardware, such as toilet and handwashing facilities, and software, such as sensitisation, 
training, advocacy, and hygiene practices).72 
 
2.1.2.2: Effective school WASH programmes 
Researchers in Kenya attempted to determine what makes school WASH programmes effective 
and what the impacts of effective school WASH programmes are.73 As expected, they found that 
handwashing practices of children were significantly better in schools with adequate facilities 
than without facilities. However, there was no evidence that toilets were used more consistently 
or were cleaner in schools with all facilities than in other schools. According to researchers, 
therefore, the construction of facilities alone does not ensure good WASH practices in schools. 
Toilets that afforded more privacy were used more often, as were toilets that were kept clean. 
Schools thus need to prioritise plans that will ensure toilets are kept clean (ibid). In a study 
investigating the sustainability and impact of school WASH education interventions in Kerala 
four years after interventions had ended, researchers found that intervention schools had cleaner 
and better maintained facilities compared with non-intervention schools.74 Further, children in 
intervention schools practised handwashing more consistently, demonstrated more accurate 
hygiene knowledge, and were more satisfied with facilities than children in non-intervention 
schools. 
 
2.1.2.3: The role of children in promoting WASH practices 
Earlier research from Kenya has shown that children have the potential to serve as health change 
agents in rural communities.75 In a quasi-experimental study, 40 schoolchildren were given 
action-oriented and participatory health education about malaria, diarrhoea and hygiene over a 
period of 14 months. According to the researchers, there were significant improvements in 
knowledge in all groups, though behavioural changes were more apparent among children than 
adults. Thanks to the project, concrete changes in terms of WASH and health were seen in both 
school and home environments. In fact, a number of key organisations have come to recognise 
the key role children can play in promoting health and WASH, including the World Bank, 
UNICEF, WHO, and UNESCO Focusing Resources on Effective School Health (FRESH).76 
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2.1.2.4: Role of education in combatting open defecation and improving community sanitation 
Open defecation practices and unsafe water sources remain among the leading causes of 
childhood diarrhoea, stunting, and even death.77 78 A number of researchers have been working 
on Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS), an approach which attempts to mobilise 
communities to eliminate open defecation and improve WASH practices, facilitating them to 
appraise and analyse practices and ultimately take action.79 Education (in the form of 
encouraging behaviour change) is at the heart of the CLTS approach. As talking about 
defecation and hygiene practices is often taboo in most cultures, innovative approaches are 
required to promote CLTS. One example of such an approach is the Open Defecation Free 
(ODF) Malawi 2015 Strategy, which, among other things, attempts to trigger for handwashing 
with soap.80 
 
2.1.2.5: Menstrual Hygiene Management (MHM) and girls’ education 
There is extensive research indicating that investing in the education of girls has positive impacts 
on the overall health and wellbeing of communities for many reasons.81 Mothers with higher 
educational attainment tend to have fewer children, and their children are likely to be healthier 
and less stunted, even when controlling for wealth, urban versus rural residence and various 
child characteristics.82 Inadequate sanitation and hygiene facilities and lack of access to 
appropriate feminine hygiene products are often cited as being among the biggest barriers to the 
education of upper primary and secondary school aged girls.83 84 85 However, in spite of this 
recognition of the importance of adequate WASH facilities and resources for girls’ education, 
there is a dearth in quality research on menstrual hygiene management (MHM) and its 
relationship with girls’ school attendance and their overall reproductive health.86 MHM is often 
ignored in government policies, advocacy agendas, and donor strategies.87 While there is a 
discussion to be had about how to make the most cost-effective, hygienic, and culturally 
acceptable products available to girls and young women (and educating them about their use), a 
number of MHM experts have argued for more holistic approaches that provide girls with these 
products while simultaneously improving water, sanitation and disposal facilities at schools and 
in communities.88 Such approaches are seen as more sustainable in the long run. 
 
2.2: Disadvantage and Empowerment 
2.2.1: Introduction 
Part 1 of this review provided a brief snapshot of global inequalities in relation to education. In 
this section, we provide a more in-depth analysis of the relationship between education and these 
inequalities as presented in the literature, going beyond an understanding of education’s role in 
maximising the health and wellbeing of individuals, to considering the role education does (and 
can) play in combating social exclusion through empowerment. For the purposes of this review, 
we consider poverty, gender, disability, race, ethnicity and culture, and migration, though it is 
important to keep in mind that patterns of inequality and disadvantage are in a constant state of 
flux. 
2.2.2: Poverty 
The relationship between education and economic growth will be explored more deeply in Part 
4: Prosperity, but as poverty is one of the key factors that determines people’s access to and 
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participation in quality education and as combatting poverty is a priority in the SDG agenda, the 
relationship between poverty and education will be discussed briefly here. More specifically, this 
section will explore the relationship between a person’s poverty status and education. 
 
A large body of literature, originating in the 1960s in high income countries such as France, the 
UK, and the US, and spanning several decades, analyses the relationship between class or socio-
economic status (SES)1 and education. The landmark Coleman Report, Equality of Educational 
Opportunity, based on an extensive survey of educational opportunity at more than 3,000 schools 
in the US aiming to analyse the causes of the achievement gap between black and white students 
was published in 1966, and is noteworthy as the first social scientific study mandated by the US 
Congress specifically to inform education policy.89 The study found that variations in school 
quality were not really associated with educational attainment levels if students from similar SES 
backgrounds were compared. Further, it found that student achievement was related to family 
SES background, but also to backgrounds of others in the school. The unfortunate fallout from 
the Coleman Report findings was that the argument was misinterpreted as: “schools don't 
matter, only families matter”,90 so instead of investing in school improvement and teacher 
professional development in poorer schools, the government began a social engineering project 
that involved strategies of desegregation. 
 
Numerous studies since then (primarily undertaken in high income countries) have confirmed 
the tremendous impact a student’s SES background has on educational attainment, to the great 
frustration of educators around the world: 
 
Yet, no matter how often confirmed, the claim remains counter-
intuitive. Why should poverty mean a child can’t learn to read, 
write, and compute? Surely, a good teacher can guide any child, 
regardless of skin colour or family income, to do these things. 
(Rothstein, 2004, p.14) 
 
The Coleman Report helped to ignite the debate around educational achievement and class, a 
debate which spawned a number of influential studies seeking to gain a better understanding of 
why SES has such a huge impact on education, inspired by and building on Marxist ideas and 
critical theory. Bourdieu and Passeron (1977) in France argued that the education system played 
a key role in the reproduction of social class, by transmitting ideas about people's ‘rightful’ place 
in society through ‘symbolic violence’ which privileged the ideas and tastes (or cultural capital) 
of the upper classes over the lower classes.91 In the same year in the UK, Paul Willis published 
Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs,92 an ethnography which looked 
at cultural reproduction of class from below, trying to understand why working-class kids “let 
themselves” get working-class jobs. In other words, he demonstrated that the boys were actually 
deliberately failing themselves, largely because they had no belief in their own potential for 
upward mobility. 
 
                                                       
1 Class has been an important concept in social science for many years. The term exists to denote 
categories associated with the hierarchical social stratification of societies. Today, it is more common to 
speak about socio-economic status (SES) in research, because it is seen as easier to define and less of a 
loaded term than class, which is viewed by many to be an outdated term which has come to be used 
pejoratively when denoting individuals from a ‘lower’ class. SES refers to any measure which classifies 
people in terms of indicators, including occupation, income, and education, etc. 
 32 
 
A final study worth mentioning is the work of Jean Anyon who was interested in understanding 
what happened at the level of classroom practice and how this related to the reproduction of 
social class.93 Her research was set in New Jersey in the US and included two working class 
population schools, one middle class population school, one upper-middle class population 
school, and one “executive elite” population school. She found that teaching and the enacted 
curriculum looked different in the different schools, though they looked similar between subjects 
within the same school. She demonstrated how “school philosophy, the official curriculum and 
affiliated resources, staffroom and teacher understandings of the students’ communities and 
lives, and an enacted classroom curriculum together contributed to stratified versions of 
knowledge, with ramifications for students’ cultural capital”.94 Students at the lower SES schools 
tended to see knowledge as something that was transferred from their teacher (the expert) to 
them (the novices) in exchange for their good behaviour, whereas students at the higher SES 
schools tended to see knowledge as something that they would co-construct with their teacher 
and their peers. 
 
These studies (and others like them) suggest that something can be done at the curricular and 
pedagogical level in poorer schools to empower students to break out of poverty. Scholars and 
practitioners in the field of popular education and critical pedagogy have investigated how to 
practice education in poorer, disadvantaged communities so that it no longer follows a ‘banking 
model’ (where knowledge is ‘deposited’ by teachers) but instead builds on learners’ experiences 
and promotes a sense of agency and critical consciousness through participatory activities. With 
its roots among poorer communities in Latin America and in the United States, the field has had 
an enormous impact on education practice around the world, and, through its emphasis on the 
notion of praxis,2 provided inspiration for researchers using participatory action research (PAR) 
approaches in a range of fields, and often working with the poor. Key scholars include Paulo 
Freire, Henry Giroux, bell hooks, Peter McLaren, and Ira Shor. 
 
Of course, one thing that has become abundantly clear is that poverty, while spoken of in 
universal terms in the SDG agenda, is context-dependant, and the relationship between 
education and poverty thus looks different in different contexts. One powerful illustrative 
example is the work of Stephen P. Heyneman extending the Coleman Report to a low income 
country context (Uganda), which seemed to suggest that family background was less important 
in determining students’ academic achievement than in higher income countries.95 
 
Another key point to consider is that poverty itself is a complex phenomenon, and that within 
groups classed as ‘poor’, there are those who are more vulnerable than others. Currently, the 
Chronic Poverty Advisory Network is actively campaigning for the rights of chronically poor 
people, arguing that “Chronically poor people need to be at the centre of poverty reduction 
policies if we are going to achieve the goal of eradicating extreme poverty for good.”96 In the 
education sector, we have begun to see the problems with policies that target the poor, but do not 
consider the poorest of the poor, or the chronically poor. One striking example is the policy drive 
for free primary education. Research from Africa has shown that while introducing free primary 
education through nationwide abolishment of school fees has led to increased enrolments, there 
are still many people (among them, the poorest of the poor) who are unable to attend school 
                                                       
2 Praxis refers to a cycle of critically reflective practice, which allows the practitioner to connect theory and 
practice. 
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because opportunity costs are too high, or other essential resources (school uniforms, transport, 
etc.) are prohibitively expensive.97 
2.2.3: Gender equity and empowerment 
Most discussions about gender and human development take the role of girls and women as a 
starting point: women and girls have come to be seen as an ‘oppressed majority’, who, in spite of 
the fact that they make up slightly over half of the world’s population have traditionally been 
denied equal opportunities to participate in society as compared with men.98 Since Professor 
Lalage Bown uttered the words: “Without women, no development” in 1985, there has been an 
exponential increase in policy and programming around the topic of girls and women and 
human development, as evidenced by the creation of United Nations Girls’ Education Initiative 
(UNGEI), UN Women, and other organisations, networks, and agencies. Within education, 
governments and other stakeholders came to see education of ‘the girl child’ as the key to helping 
poor families improve their lives around the world.99 
 
Increased investment in the education of girls and women has led to some gains in their 
enrolment, attendance, and attainment. However, not only do girls continue to face challenges in 
accessing quality education, and the threat of gender-based violence, exploitation, and 
discrimination, they also have to contend with harsh social and economic realities once they 
enter the world of work, even if they do perform better than their male peers at school.100 101 
Unfortunately, the advances of some girls and women educationally, have led to a “backlash 
against feminism” and a phenomenon researchers refer to as the “boy turn”, where certain 
individuals in minority world countries feel that the pendulum has swung too far the other way 
and that we now need to look at raising boys’ achievement.102 In spite of the positive impact of 
feminism in the field of education, many feel that the feminist project is now complete (or has 
gone too far), and that boys are now the new ‘disadvantaged’ group in schooling. 
 
Of course, pitting girls against boys in this fashion seems to run counter to more inclusive 
philosophies of education. One major contribution feminist scholars have made in recent years is 
to allow us to move away from thinking about a purely biological division into discrete 
categories of male and female, to thinking about gender as a social construct, and that every 
culture has certain socially constructed norms about how women (and girls) should behave. In 
the words of Raewyn Connell (2010):103 
 
Gender is about how bodies enter history. Gender is a social 
structure, not a reflex of biology, though it’s a structure that relates 
to, and organizes, human reproduction. It’s a complex, changing 
structure, and the notion that it can be understood through simple 
dichotomies is sadly mistaken. 
 
The work of Vickers (2010) has demonstrated how schools have become gendered organisations, 
with gendered division of labour (men under-represented as teachers at the primary and early 
childhood level), unequal power relations (for both students and teachers), and assumptions 
around male subjects versus female subjects, etc.104 According to Theobald (1996), nineteenth 
century ideas about the female brain as more fragile, more emotional, and not suited to rational 
thought, have prevailed as mass schooling has developed. 105 This extends to the role of teachers, 
where women are assumed to be natural caregivers. Organisations such as Code First: Girls and 
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Girls Who Code have emerged, which challenge the notion that males are better suited to 
pursuing carriers in the STEM field. 
 
The last few years have witnessed the rise of a global Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender Queer 
Intersex (LGBTQI) rights movement, though participation in and reception of the movement has 
varied widely depending on individual country contexts. For example, while many countries 
have anti-discrimination laws which provide protection for LGBTQI individuals and legally 
allow marriage between same sex persons, in some countries homosexuality is illegal, with 
draconian punishments administered if people are found to be ‘practising’ homosexuality. It is 
clear that LGBTQI groups, wherever they reside, are still at significant risk of persecution, 
bullying, and sexually-motivated violence: Human Rights Watch continues to document and 
expose abuse based on sexual orientation and gender identity worldwide.106 LGBTQI rights are a 
highly politicised issue, and, consequently, many major international agencies working with 
education do not have an official specific policy on protecting individuals based on sexual 
orientation. Much advocacy and pedagogical work on LGBTQI issues is thus left to individuals 
and communities themselves,107 with support from rights-based organisations, such as Human 
Rights Watch and ActionAid.108 Instead of acting as safe spaces, schools are often sites of 
homophobic violence and bullying, even in countries with protective policy environments, such 
as Canada and Australia.109 Schools can be important sites for encouraging discussion of LGBTI 
rights, for example the documentary It’s Elementary – Talking about Gay Issues in School (1996) and 
the follow up film It’s STILL Elementary (2007).110 
2.2.4: Disability 
 
According to the WHO: 
 
The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and 
Health (ICF) defines disability as an umbrella term for 
impairments, activity limitations and participation restrictions. 
Disability is the interaction between individuals with a health 
condition (e.g. cerebral palsy, Down syndrome and depression) 
and personal and environmental factors (e.g. negative attitudes, 
inaccessible transportation and public buildings, and limited social 
supports).111 
 
In other words, disability is a complex phenomenon that involves the interaction of a person 
with their environment. While some form of ‘special’ educational provision for learners with 
disabilities has existed in a few countries for a number of decades, when it comes to 
development, disability and education has received very little attention until recently. It was not 
until 1994, that representatives from 92 governments and 25 organisations came together for the 
World Conference on Special Needs Education in Spain and committed to the Salamanca 
Statement and Framework for Action on Special Needs Education, which states that learners with 
special educational needs (including disabilities) should have access to regular schools with an 
inclusive orientation, as these are considered to be “the most effective means of combating 
discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, building an inclusive society and 
achieving education for all” (Article 2). Further, “they provide an effective education to the 
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majority of children and improve the efficiency and ultimately the cost-effectiveness of the entire 
education system” (ibid). 
 
In spite of the rapid growth of a number of organisations and networks working on inclusive 
education, it seems that our research on disability and education has not caught up: according to 
leading disability and education experts, we have come to vague conclusions that inclusive 
education is the most effective and cost-effective approach to reach all learners, but we have very 
little research about how to do inclusive education.112 Singal (2015) has pointed out that while 
many global declarations now make reference to people with disabilities (either explicitly or 
implicitly), including the SDGs, a review of the evidence should cause us to be concerned about 
several key issues:113 
 
• Access has increased but not equally 
• Participation and learning remain neglected 
• There is a lack of investment in structures and personnel 
• The “how” of inclusive education remains conspicuously absent 
• The upscaling and sustainability of small initiatives is a key challenge 
• There is growing dissatisfaction with the notion of “inclusive education” 
• Those working on disability issues tend to make the assumption that disability is a 
homogeneous phenomenon and there is very little research on the heterogeneity of 
disabilities and subsequently the heterogeneity of educational experiences for those with 
disabilities 
• As with the education agenda as a whole, research on disability and education has 
tended to focus on primary school settings without much consideration for other levels of 
education nor for improving transition rates 
• Intersectionality (which will be discussed below) is not always considered in research on 
disability globally, even though it is a widely occurring phenomenon (for example, a poor 
girl with a disability is triply disadvantaged) 
• There is burgeoning work on teacher and parental attitudes, but not much on capacity 
building and the enhancement of the quality of teaching and learning 
• There is very little research on the perspectives of people with disabilities themselves, 
particularly in majority world contexts 
• There is very little research on learning outcomes across disability groups 
 
2.2.5: Race, ethnicity & culture 
While multiple understandings of culture exist, a useful broad definition in social science is that 
it is “all in human society which is socially rather than biologically transmitted [. . .], the 
symbolic and learned aspects of human society”.114 A key component of the human experience is 
the forming and maintaining of a collective identity, where a group seeks to maintain its culture 
by identifying certain common characteristics that make them different from other groups.115 
According to Giddens (2009), an “ethnic group is one whose members share a distinct awareness 
of a common cultural identity, separating them from other groups around them.”116 
 
While many people use ethnicity and race interchangeably, race differs from ethnicity in that it 
can be defined as “a set of social relationships which allow individuals and groups to be located, 
and various attributes or competencies assigned, on the basis of biologically grounded 
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features”.117 However, recent research has demonstrated that racial groupings are not based on 
any valid genetic differences, and that there are more differences within a given racial group than 
between members of different racial groups.118 In other words, as with ethnicity, race is 
increasingly understood as a social construct. 
 
Race and ethnicity often play a huge role in an individual’s educational experience, as learners 
and teachers today continue to face discrimination based on the colour of their skin, their 
customs, etc. According to Fields (2001), racism refers to: “the assignment of people to an 
inferior category and the determination of their social, economic, civic, and human standing on 
that basis”.119 This assignment can happen at the personal level (e.g. racial slurs, hate speech, 
physical violence, unfair assessment, etc.) and the institutional level, where certain 
discriminatory structures are in place that put certain individuals at a disadvantages because of 
their race or ethnicity.120 121 Often, institutionalised racism is unconscious. A recent study 
published in the APA Journal of Personality and Social Psychology found that black boys as young as 
10 in the United States are perceived to be older and less innocent than their white peers, with 
obvious consequences for their educational opportunities.122 
 
2.2.6: Forced displacement/migration 
The Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD) defines forced displacement as “the 
situation of persons who are forced to leave or flee their homes due to conflict, violence and 
human rights violations.”123 Forcibly displaced persons include refugees, internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), asylum-seekers, returnees, and stateless peoples.3 Forced migration is a related 
term that tends to refer to the actual movements of these people. According to UNHCR (2014), 
we currently have the highest number of forcibly displaced persons ever recorded on the planet: 
 
 
Figure B: Forcibly Displaced People Worldwide in 2014 (Source: UNHCR, 2014, p.2)124 
Further, humanitarian crises are lasting longer. Research from the Refugee Studies Council 
identified 30 major protracted refugee situations around the world and determined that the 
average time spent in displacement in these situations was almost 20 years in 2011, up from 9 
years in the early 1990s.125 However, in spite of the burgeoning global forced displacement crisis 
                                                       
3 It is beyond the scope of this review to define these terms, but Forced Migration Online at the Refugee 
Studies Centre, University of Oxford is a useful resource for terminology on forced displacement:  
http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm 
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and its potential to throw a spanner in the works of sustainable development, the only reference 
to migration in the SDGs themselves is in SDG 10 target 7, which calls for stakeholders to: 
“Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including 
through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.”126 The framing 
document for the SDGs, Transforming Our World, does make special mention of refugees, IDPs, 
and migrants (along with other disadvantaged groups), stating that these “vulnerable” people 
“must be empowered.”127 The document goes on to say: 
 
We recognize the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable 
development. We also recognize that international migration is a multi-dimensional reality 
of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, 
which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. We will cooperate internationally 
to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights and 
the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of 
displaced persons. Such cooperation should also strengthen the resilience of communities 
hosting refugees, particularly in developing countries. We underline the right of migrants 
to return to their country of citizenship, and recall that States must ensure that their 
returning nationals are duly received. (ibid.) 
 
However, there is little guidance about how this should be done, and, given the lack of specific 
targets on migration, it seems a likely scenario that these groups are overlooked. 
 
While the right to education for forcibly displaced peoples is mandated through several key 
documents, education for refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and asylum-seekers, is in 
a state of crisis when it comes to access and quality. Refugees have called for education as they 
see it as “the key to the future”, but in reality, have been faced with “education for ultimate 
disappointment.”128 
 
2.2.7: Double disadvantage and intersectionality 
The inequalities described above seldom occur on their own. The concept of double 
disadvantage has been used to describe the situation when a person experiences social 
disadvantage due to more than one factor, e.g. an African American woman, an immigrant with 
a disability, etc. As often there might be more than two factors impacting an individual’s social 
and economic situation, researchers have begun using the terms triple disadvantage and 
intersectionality to describe these situations. The concept of intersectionality was developed by 
the feminist Kimberlé Crenshaw, who describes the concept as follows:129 
 
Cultural patterns of oppression are not only interrelated, but are 
bound together and influenced by the intersectional systems of 
society. Examples of this include race, gender, class, ability, and 
ethnicity. 
 
As chief sites of socialisation, education institutions are uniquely placed to begin to dismantle 
these oppressive structures, and to rid us of “the legacy of negative socialization”.130 The first 
means of implementation target for SDG 4 is to: “Build and upgrade education facilities that are 
child, disability and gender sensitive and provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective 
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learning environments for all.” If this target is met, then, it will not only improve educational 
environments, but also have a spill-over effect, as learners are socialised into more positive ways 
of knowing and being. 
 
  
 39 
 
Sources 
                                                       
1 UNESCO & EFA GMR. (2014). Sustainable Development Begins with Education. Paper in support of 
the Global Education First Initiative. Paris: UNESCO. Retrieved from: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002305/230508e.pdf 
2 AbouZahr, C. (n.d.) Health Systems Equity. In Bates-Earner, N., Carin, B., Ha Lee, M. & Lim, W., with 
Kapila, M. (2012). Post-2015 development agenda: Goals, targets and indicators. Special Report. Waterloo: Centre 
for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) & Korea Development Institute (KDI), p.9. Retrieved 
from: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/775cigi.pdf 
3 K.C., S., & Lentzner, H. (2010). The effect of education on adult mortality and disability: a global 
perspective. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, 201–235. 
4 Luy, M., Di Giulio, P., & Caselli, G. (2011). Differences in life expectancy by education and occupation 
in Italy, 1980--94: Indirect estimates from maternal and paternal orphanhood. Population Studies, 65(2), 
137–155. 
5 McMahon, W. W. (2009). Higher learning, greater good. The private and social benefits of higher education. 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press 
6 Hale, D. R., Bevilacqua, L., & Viner, R. M. (2015). Adolescent Health and Adult Education and 
Employment: A Systematic Review. Pediatrics, 136(1), 128–140. http://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2014-2105 
7 Salomon, J. A., Wang, H., Freeman, M. K., Vos, T., Flaxman, A. D., Lopez, A. D., & Murray, C. J. L. 
(2012). Healthy life expectancy for 187 countries, 1990-2010: A systematic analysis for the Global Burden 
Disease Study 2010. The Lancet, 380, 2144–2162. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61690-0 
8 World Health Organization. (2013). A universal truth: No health without a workforce. Geneva. Retrieved 
from http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/knowledge/resources/GHWA-
a_universal_truth_report.pdf?ua=1 
9 Aluttis, C., Bishaw, T., & Frank, M. W. (2014). The workforce for health in a globalized context – global 
shortages and international migration. Review Article. Global Health Action, 7(23611). 
http://doi.org/10.3402/gha.v7.23611 
10 World Health Organization. (2013). A universal truth: No health without a workforce. Geneva. Retrieved 
from http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/knowledge/resources/GHWA-
a_universal_truth_report.pdf?ua=1 
11 Aluttis, C., Bishaw, T., & Frank, M. W. (2014). The workforce for health in a globalized context – 
global shortages and international migration. Review Article. Global Health Action, 7(23611). 
http://doi.org/10.3402/gha.v7.23611 
12 Seed Global Health. (2015). Global health by the numbers. Retrieved from: 
http://seedglobalhealth.org/ 
13 Burch, V., & Reid, S. (2011). Fit for purpose? The appropriate education of health professionals in South 
Africa. South African Medical Journal, 101(1), 25–26. 
14 Cancedda, C., Farmer, P. E., Kerry, V., Nuthulaganti, T., Scott, K. W., Goosby, E., & Binagwaho, A. 
(2015). Maximizing the Impact of Training Initiatives for Health Professionals in Low-Income Countries: 
Frameworks, Challenges, and Best Practices. PLOS Medicine, 12(6), e1001840. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001840 
15 World Health Organization. (2013). A universal truth: No health without a workforce. Geneva. Retrieved 
from http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/knowledge/resources/GHWA-
a_universal_truth_report.pdf?ua=1 
16 World Health Organization. (n.d.). The World Health Report 2013: Research for Universal Health Coverage. 
Geneva. Retrieved from 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85761/2/9789240690837_eng.pdf?ua=1 
17 Macnab, A. J., Gagnon, F. A., & Stewart, D. (2014). Health promoting schools: consensus, strategies, 
and potential. Health Education, 114(3), 170–185. http://doi.org/10.1108/HE-11-2013-0055 
 40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
18 Cancedda, C., Farmer, P. E., Kerry, V., Nuthulaganti, T., Scott, K. W., Goosby, E., & Binagwaho, A. 
(2015). Maximizing the Impact of Training Initiatives for Health Professionals in Low-Income Countries: 
Frameworks, Challenges, and Best Practices. PLOS Medicine, 12(6), e1001840. 
http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001840 
19 Binagwaho, A., Kyamanywa, P., Farmer, P. E., Nuthulaganti, T., Umubyeyi, B., Nyemazi, J. P., … 
Goosby, E. (2013). The Human Resources for Health Program in Rwanda — A New Partnership. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 369, 2054–2059. http://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsr1302176 
20 Burch, V., & Reid, S. (2011). Fit for purpose? The appropriate education of health professionals in South 
Africa. South African Medical Journal, 101(1), 25–26. 
21 Irlam, J., Keikelame, M., & Vivian, L. (2009). Integrating the primary health care approach into a 
medical curriculum: a programme logic model. African Journal of Health Professions Education, 1(1). 
Retrieved from http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajhpe/article/view/49719 
22 Carr, M., McGee, C., Jones, A., McKinley, E., Bell, B., Barr, H. and Simpson, T. (2005). The effects of 
curricula and assessment on pedagogical approaches and on educational outcomes. Report to the Ministry of 
Education. Strategic Research Initiative Literature Review. Auckland: New Zealand Ministry of 
Education. Retrieved from: 
http://www.educationcounts.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/9273/The-Effects-of-Curricula-and-
Assessment.pdf 
23 Burch, V., & Reid, S. (2011). Fit for purpose? The appropriate education of health professionals in South 
Africa. South African Medical Journal, 101(1), 25–26. 
24 Garcia-Jardon, M., & Blanco-Blanco, E. (2010). Correlation between different PBL assessment 
components and the final mark for MB ChB III at a rural South African university. African Journal of Health 
Professional Education, 1 (1), 11–14. Retrieved from 
http://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajhpe/article/view/49721 
25 The Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health: Health Literacy Studies Web Site. Available at: 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/healthliteracy. Accessed September 23, 2015. 
26 Frymus, D., Kok, M., de Koning, K. and Quain, E. (2013). Community health workers and universal health 
coverage: Knowledge gaps and a need based Global Research agenda by 2015. Working Paper commissioned by 
Global Health Workforce Alliance. Retrieved from: 
http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/knowledge/resources/CHWsResearch_Agenda_by2015.pdf 
27 World Health Organization. (2013). A universal truth: No health without a workforce. Geneva. 
Retrieved from http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/knowledge/resources/GHWA-
a_universal_truth_report.pdf?ua=1 
28 MCDC. (2015). Malaria Capacity Development Consortium (MCDC) website. Retrieved from: 
http://www.mcdconsortium.org/ 
29 The Royal Society. (2015). Royal Society-DFID Africa Capacity Building Initiative. Retrieved from: 
https://royalsociety.org/grants-schemes-awards/grants/africa-capacity-building/ 
30 Macnab, A. J., Stewart, D., & Gagnon, F. A. (2014). Health promoting schools: initiatives in Africa. 
Health Education, 114(4), 246–259. http://doi.org/10.1108/HE-11-2013-0057 
31 Dharamsi, S., Woollard, R., Kendal, P., Okullo, I., & Macnab, A. J. (2015). Health promoting schools 
as learning sites for physicians in-training. Health Education, 114(3), 186–196. http://doi.org/10.1108/HE-
09-2013-0048 
32 Naudeau, S., Martinez, S., Premand, P., & Filmer, D. (2011). Cognitive development among young 
children in low-income countries. In Alderman (ed.), No Small Matter: The Impact of Poverty, Shocks, and 
Human Capital Investments in Early Childhood Development. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Retrieved 
from: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8677-4 
33 Penn, H. (2014). Understanding Early Childhood: Issues and controversies. Third Edition. Berkshire: Open 
University Press. 
34 Shonkoff, J. P. (2010). Building a new biodevelopmental framework to guide the future of early 
childhood policy. Child Development, 81(1), 357–367. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01399.x 
 41 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
35 UNESCO. (2013). Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE). Education Sector Technical Notes. UNESCO 
Assistant Director General – Education. Retrieved from: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002221/222118e.pdf 
36 Shonkoff, J. P. (2010). Building a new biodevelopmental framework to guide the future of early 
childhood policy. Child Development, 81(1), 357–367. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01399.x 
37 Ailwood, J. & Bengtsson, S. (2015). No development without care: Positioning Early Childhood Care & 
Education (ECCE) in the Sustainable Development Agenda. IDS Members Seminar. November 25, 2015. 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). 
38 Pelletier, D. & Neuman, M.J. (2014). Advancing the nutrition and early childhood development agenda: 
indicators and guidance. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, (Issue: Integrating Nutrition and Early 
Childhood Development Interventions): pp.232-244. doi: 10.1111/nyas.12288 
39 Ailwood, J. & Bengtsson, S. (2015). No development without care: Positioning Early Childhood Care & 
Education (ECCE) in the Sustainable Development Agenda. IDS Members Seminar. November 25, 2015. 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). 
40 Nicolai, S., Hoy, C., Berliner, T., & Aedy, T. (2015). Projecting progress: Reaching the SDGs by 2030. 
Flagship Report. London. Retrieved from http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/9839.pdf 
41 Naudeau, S., Martinez, S., Premand, P., & Filmer, D. (2011). Cognitive development among young 
children in low-income countries. In Alderman, H. (ed.), No Small Matter: The Impact of Poverty, Shocks, and 
Human Capital Investments in Early Childhood Development. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Retrieved 
from: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-0-8213-8677-4 
42 Crosby, L., Jayasinghe, D., & McNair, D. (2013). Food for Thought. Tackling child malnutrition to unlock 
potential and boost prosperity. London: Save the Children. Retrieved from: 
http://www.savethechildren.org/atf/cf/%7B9def2ebe-10ae-432c-9bd0-
df91d2eba74a%7D/FOOD_FOR_THOUGHT.PDF 
43 Alderman, H., & Ruel, M. (2013). Nutrition-sensitive Interventions and Programmes: How Can They 
Help to Accelerate Progress in Improving Maternal and Child Nutrition? The Lancet, 382, 536-551. 
44 Pamuk, E. R., Fuchs, R., & Lutz, W. (2011). Comparing relative effects of education and economic 
resources on infant mortality in developing countries. Population and Development Review, 37(4), 637–664. 
45 Thompson, S. & Holley, C. (2012). Education Interventions and their Impact on Nutrition. A Helpdesk 
Research Report. Sussex: HDRC. Retrieved from: http://www.heart-resources.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/Education-interventions-and-nutrition-October-2012.pdf 
46 UNICEF. (2014). Multi-sectoral approaches to nutrition. The case for investment by education 
programmes. UNICEF & EU. Retrieved from: 
http://www.unicef.org/eu/files/101322_000_Unicef_Brief_EducationNutrition_A4_v1r14.pdf 
47 Grantham-McGregor, S. & Olney, D.K. (2006). School Feeding, Cognition, and School Achievement. 
Pediatrics, 19 (4): 105-111. 
48 Beery, M., Adatia, R., Segantin, O., & Skaer, C.-F. (2014). School food gardens: fertile ground for 
education. Health Education, 114(4), 281–292. http://doi.org/10.1108/HE-05-2013-0019 
49 Taylor-Robinson, D.C., Maayan, N., Soares-Weiser, K., Donegan, S., & Garner, P. (2015). Deworming 
drugs for soil-transmitted intestinal worms in children: effects on nutritional indicators, haemoglobin, and 
school performance. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Issue 7. Art. No.: CD000371. DOI: 
10.1002/14651858.CD000371.pub6. Retrieved from: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/14651858.CD000371.pub6/abstract 
50 Lobstein, T., Baur, L., Uauy, R. (2004). Obesity in children and young people: a crisis in public health. 
Obesity Review, 5: 4–104. 
51 Branca, F., Nikogosian, H., & Lobstein, T. (eds) (2007). The challenge of obesity in the WHO European 
Region and the strategies for response. Summary. Copenhagen: World Health Organization (WHO). Retrieved 
from: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/98243/E89858.pdf 
 42 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
52 Branca, F., Nikogosian, H., & Lobstein, T. (eds) (2007). The challenge of obesity in the WHO European 
Region and the strategies for response. Summary. Copenhagen: World Health Organization (WHO). Retrieved 
from: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/98243/E89858.pdf 
53 Flynn, M.A.T., Mcneil, D.A., Maloff, B., Mutasingwa, D., Wu, M., Ford, C., & Tough, S.C. (2006). 
Reducing obesity and related chronic disease risk in children and youth: a synthesis of evidence with ‘best 
practice’ recommendations. Obesity Reviews, 7 (1): 7-66. 
54 Trudeau, F. & Shephard, R.J. (2008). Physical education, school physical activity, school sports and 
academic performance. International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity, 5 (10). Retrieved 
from: http://www.ijbnpa.org/content/5/1/10 
55 Peel, F., Sarr, B. & Fernandes, M. (2015). Why Schools should be on the Frontline in Combating 
Malnutrition. FAO Global Forum on Food Security and Nutrition. Retrieved from: 
http://www.fao.org/fsnforum/news/why-schools-should-be-frontline-combating-malnutrition 
56 Flynn, M.A.T., Mcneil, D.A., Maloff, B., Mutasingwa, D., Wu, M., Ford, C., & Tough, S.C. (2006). 
Reducing obesity and related chronic disease risk in children and youth: a synthesis of evidence with ‘best 
practice’ recommendations. Obesity Reviews, 7 (1): 7-66. 
57 Soricone, L., Rudd, R., Santos, M., & Capistrant, B. (2007). Health Literacy in Adult Basic Education. 
Designing lessons, units, and evaluation plans for an integrated curriculum. National Center for the Study of 
Adult Literacy & Learning/Health & Adult Literacy & Learning Initiative, Harvard School of Public 
Health, p.1. Retrieved from https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/135/2012/09/healthliteracyinadulteducation.pdf  
58 Luo, R., Shi, Y., Zhang, H., Miller, G., Medina, A. & Rozelle, S. (2012). The Limits of Health and 
Nutrition Education: Evidence from Three Randomized-Controlled Trials in Rural China. CESifo 
Economic Studies, 58 (2): 385-404. doi: 10.1093/cesifo/ifs023 
59 Branca, F., Nikogosian, H., & Lobstein, T. (eds) (2007). The challenge of obesity in the WHO European 
Region and the strategies for response. Summary. Copenhagen: World Health Organization (WHO). Retrieved 
from: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/98243/E89858.pdf 
60 Fitzpatrick, K. & Tinning, R. (Eds.) (2014). Health Education: Critical Perspectives. Routledge Research in 
Education Policy and Politics Series. London: Taylor & Francis. 
61 Luy, M. & Wegner-Siegmundt, C. (2014). The impact of smoking on gender differences in life 
expectancy: more heterogeneous than often stated. European Journal of Public Health, 25 (4): 706-710. 
62 Buber-Ennser, I. & Riederer, B. (2016). Realiserung von Kinderwünschen in Wien. Ein innerösterreichischer 
und internationaler Vergleich mit Ungarn und Tschechien. Forschungsbericht Nr. 38. Vienna: Wittgenstein Centre 
for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU); Vienna Institute of 
Demography/Austrian Academy of Sciences. Available at: 
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/fileadmin/subsites/Institute/VID/PDF/FB38.pdf  
63 Muturi, N., Kidd, T., Adhikari, K., Kumar, J., Lindshield, E., Li, Y. & Song, X. (2014). Formative 
research in a school-based obesity prevention intervention for Hispanic adolescents. Journal of Nutrition 
Education and Behavior, Poster Abstracts, 46 (4S): p.S182. 
64 Currie, C. et al., eds. (2012). Social determinants of health and well-being among young people. Health 
Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study: International report from the 2009/2010 survey. 
(Health Policy for Children and Adolescents, No. 6). Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe. 
Retrieved from: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/163857/Social-determinants-of-
health-and-well-being-among-young-people.pdf 
65 Currie, C. et al., eds. (2012). Social determinants of health and well-being among young people. Health 
Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study: International report from the 2009/2010 survey. 
(Health Policy for Children and Adolescents, No. 6). Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe. 
Retrieved from: http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/163857/Social-determinants-of-
health-and-well-being-among-young-people.pdf 
66 Stewart, D. (2014). Resilience: an entry point for African health promoting schools? Health Education, 
114(3), 197–207. http://doi.org/10.1108/HE-06-2013-0023 
 43 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
67 IRC. (2011). Creating healing classrooms: A multi media teacher training resource. New York: IRC. 
68 Rawlence, B. (2015). The Other Refugee Crisis. The Opinion Pages. The New York Times. October 9, 
2015. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/opinion/the-other-refugee-crisis.html?_r=0 
69 Betancourt TS, Frounfelker R, Mishra T, Hussein A, F. R. (2015). Addressing Health Disparities in the 
Mental Health of Refugee Children through Community Based Participatory Research: A Study in Two 
Communities. American Journal of Public Health, 10, 1–8. http://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2014.302504 
70 Dryden-Peterson, S. (2011). Refugee education: A global review. UNHCR. Retrieved from: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4fe317589.pdf 
71 WHO. (2015). Water, sanitation and hygiene in health care facilities: Status in low- and middle-income 
countries and way forward. WASH in Health Care Facilities for Better Health Care Services. WHO; 
UNICEF. Retrieved from: 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/154588/1/9789241508476_eng.pdf?ua=1 
72 Abraham, B., Fogde, M., von Munch, E. & Wendland, C. (2012). Sustainable sanitation for schools – 
Factsheet of Working Group 7a, Sustainable Sanitation Alliance (SuSanA). Retrieved from: 
http://www.susana.org/lang-en/library?view=ccbktypeitem&type=2&id=1188. 
73 Njunguna, V. et al. (2008). The sustainability and impact of school sanitation, water and hygiene 
education in Kenya. New York: UNICEF; IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre. Retrieved 
from: http://www.ircwash.org/resources/sustainability-and-impact-school-sanitation-water-and-hygiene-
education-kenya  
74 Kochurani, M. et al. (2008). The sustainability and impact of school sanitation, water and hygiene 
education in Kerala, Southern India. New York; Delft: UNICEF; IRC International Water and Sanitation 
Centre. Retrieved from: http://www.ircwash.org/resources/sustainability-and-impact-school-sanitation-
water-and-hygiene-education-kerala-southern 
75 Onyango-Ouma, W., Aagaard-Hansen, J. & Jensen, B.B. (2005). The potential of schoolchildren as 
health change agents in rural western Kenya. Social Science & Medicine, 61 (8): 1711-1722. 
76 Child-to-Child Trust (2005). Children for health: Children as partners in health promotion. Oxford: Macmillan 
Caribbean. 
77 Chambers, R. (2015). Health and Nutrition Seminar: How shit stunts – India’s tragedy and 
undernutrition’s blind spot. Presentation at the Institute of Development Studies, Thursday 8 October 
2015. Brighton: IDS. 
78 Personal communication with a founding member of mWater (http://www.mwater.co/about.html), 
October 6, 2015. 
79 CLTS Knowledge Hub. (2011). The CLTS approach. What is CLTS? Brighton: IDS. Retrieved from: 
http://www.communityledtotalsanitation.org/page/clts-approach   
80 Maulit, J.A. for UNICEF Malawi. (2014). How to trigger for handwashing with soap. Frontiers of 
CLTS: Innovations and insights, Issue 2. Brighton: CLTS Knowledge Hub at IDS. 
81 Pamuk, E. R., Fuchs, R., & Lutz, W. (2011). Comparing relative effects of education and economic 
resources on infant mortality in developing countries. Population and Development Review, 37(4), 637–664. 
82 Alderman, H., & Ruel, M. (2013). Nutrition-sensitive Interventions and Programmes: How Can They 
Help to Accelerate Progress in Improving Maternal and Child Nutrition? The Lancet, 382, 536-551. 
83 Kirk, J. & Sommer, M. (2006). Menstruation and body awareness: linking girls’ health with girls’ 
education. Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), Special on Gender and Health, pp. 1-22, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands. Retrieved from: http://www.susana.org/en/resources/library/details/1200 
84 Personal communication with a founding member of mWater (http://www.mwater.co/about.html), 
October 6, 2015. 
85 Njunguna, V. et al. (2008). The sustainability and impact of school sanitation, water and hygiene 
education in Kenya. New York: UNICEF; IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre. Retrieved 
from: http://www.ircwash.org/resources/sustainability-and-impact-school-sanitation-water-and-hygiene-
education-kenya 
 44 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
86 Sumpter, C. & Torondel, B. (2013). A systematic review of the health and social effects of menstrual 
hygiene management. PLoS ONE, 8 (4): e62004. Retrieved from: 
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0062004&represe
ntation=PDF 
87 Schechtman, L. (2015). Menstruation matters: Why menstrual hygiene management is core to our 
contract with the future. Impatient Optimists. Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Retrieved from: 
http://www.impatientoptimists.org/Posts/2015/05/Menstruation-Matters-Why-Menstrual-Hygiene-
Management-is-Core-to-Our-Contract-with-the-Future#.VjvOxyvWHGY  
88 Millington, K.A. & Bolton, L. (2015). Improving access to menstrual hygiene products (GSDRC 
Helpdesk Research Report 1280). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham. Retrieved from: 
http://www.heart-resources.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Improving-access-to-menstrual-hygiene-
products-FOR-WEB.pdf  
89 Rothstein, R. (2004). Class and schools: Using social, economic, and educational reform to close the black-white 
achievement gap. New York: Teachers College. 
90 Scott, J. & Marshall, G. (2009). Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.83 
91 Bourdieu, P. & Passeron, L. (1977). Reproduction in education, society and culture. London: SAGE. 
92 Willis, P. (1977). Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs. Farnborough: Saxon 
House. 
93 Anyon, J. (1980). Social class and the hidden curriculum of work. Journal of Education, 162 (1): pp.67-93. 
94 Luke, A. (2010). Documenting reproduction and inequality: revisiting Jean Anyon’s “Social class and 
school knowledge”. Curriculum Inquiry, 40 (1): 167-182. p.170 
95 Heyneman, S.P. (1975). The Influences on Academic Achievement in Uganda: A ‘Coleman’ Report 
from a Non-Industrial Society, PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago. Available at: 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/peabody/heyneman/PUBLICATIONS/dissertation.pdf  
96 Chronic Poverty Advisory Network. (2015). What is chronic poverty? Available at: 
http://www.chronicpovertynetwork.org/ 
97 Lesoli, M. K., van Wuk, C., van der Walt, J. J., Potgieter, F. J., & Wolhuter, C. C. (2014). The elusive 
goal of universal free primary education in Africa: The case of Lesotho. Journal of Third World Studies, 
31(2), 197-218. 
98 Kangas, A., Haider, H., and Fraser, E. (2014). Gender: Topic Guide. Revised edition with E. Browne. 
Birmingham: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, UK 
99 Robinson-Pant, A. (ed.) (2004). Women, literacy, and development: Alternative perspectives. London; New 
York: Routledge. 
100 Fine, C. (2011). Delusions of Gender: The Real Science behind Sex Differences. London: Icon Books Ltd. 
101 Kristof, N.D. & WuDunn, S. (2010). Half the Sky: How to Change the World. London: Virago Press. 
102 Jóhannesson, I., Lingard, B. & Mills, M. (2009.) Problems and possibilities in the boy turn: comparative 
lessons from Australia and Iceland. Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, 53 (2), 309-325. p.311. 
103 Connell, R. (2011). Confronting equality: Gender, Knowledge and Global Change. Cambridge; Sydney: Polity 
Press; Allen & Unwin. 
104 Vickers, M. (2010). Gender. In R. Connell, C. Campbell, A. Welch, D. Foley, & N. Bagnel, (Eds). 
Education, Change & Society (2nd Ed.) (pp. 205 - 234). Sydney: Oxford University Press 
105 Theobald, M.R. (1996). Knowing women: origins of women’s education in nineteenth century Australia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
106 Human Rights Watch. (2013). LGBT Rights. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/topic/lgbt-rights 
107 Russo Garrido, A. (2015). Unlearning Gender and Sexuality: The Pedagogical Work of Lesbian 
Organizations in Mexico City. In D. Dhar (ed.). Education and Gender. London, NY, Delhi, Sydney: 
Bloomsbury Group. 
 45 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
108 ActionAid. (2009). Hate crimes: the rise of ‘corrective’ rape in South Africa. Available from: 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/101756/press_release.html 
109 Ferfolja, T. (2015). LGBT Equity and School Policy: Perspectives from Canada and Australia. In L.D. 
Hill & F.J. Levine (eds.) World Education Research Yearbook 2015. New York; London: Routledge. 
110 http://groundspark.org/our-films-and-campaigns/stillelementary 
111 WHO. (2016). Disability and health. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs352/en/ 
112 Bengtsson, S. (2015). Forming Alliances in Education, Disability, and Development (BAICE Thematic 
Forum). Blog Post. July 28, 2015. Brighton: HEART. Available at: http://www.heart-
resources.org/blog/forming-alliances-in-education-disability-and-development-baice-thematic-forum/ 
113 Singal, N. (2015). Introductory Remarks. BAICE Thematic Forum: Forming Alliances in Education, 
Disability, and Development. July 2015. Cambridge, UK. 
114 Scott, J. & Marshall, G. (2009). Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.133 
115 Bennett, T., Grossberg, L., Morris, M. & Williams, R. (eds). (2005). New keywords: a revised vocabulary of 
culture and society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
116 Giddens, A. (2009). Sociology. Sixth Edition. Cambridge; Alden: Polity Press. 
117 Giddens, A. (2009). Sociology. Sixth Edition. Cambridge; Alden: Polity Press. 
118 Welborn, J. (2005). The accidental teacher. In S. Nieto (Ed.), Why we teach (pp.15-22). New York: 
Teachers College Press. 
119 Fields, B.J. (2001). Whiteness, Racism, and Identity. International Labor and Working-Class History, 60: 
48-56. p.48. 
120 Boske, C. (2015). Preparing School Leaders to Interrupt Racism at Various Levels in Educational 
Systems. International Journal of Multicultural Education, 17(1), 121-142. 
121 Taylor, D. L., & Clark, M. P. (2009). “Set up to fail”: Institutional Racism and the Sabotage of School 
Improvement. Equity & Excellence In Education, 42(2), 114-129. doi:10.1080/10665680902744220 
122 Goff, P.A., Jackson, M.C., Di Leone, B.A.L., Culotta, C.M. & DiTamasso, N.A. (2014). The Essence 
of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
106 (4): 526-545. 
123 GPFD. (2015). Overview. The Global Program on Forced Displacement. Washington D.C.: The 
World Bank. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/forceddisplacement 
124 UNHCR. (2014). World at War. UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014. UNHCR. Retrieved 
from: http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html 
125 Milner, J. & Loescher, G. (2011). Responding to protracted refugee situations: Lessons from a decade 
of discussion. Forced Migration Policy Briefing 6. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre. 
126 Luckham, R. & Justino, P. (2015). Whose Peace, Whose Security? A Conversation about Sustainable 
Development Goal 16. 12 October 2015. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
127 UN. (2015). Sustainable development goals and targets. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development. Retrieved from: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld 
128 Dryden-Peterson, S. (2011). Refugee education: A global review. UNHCR. Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/4fe317589.pdf 
129 Crenshaw, K.W. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black feminist critique of 
antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. Chicago Legal Forum, Special Issue: 
Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice and Criticism. University of Chicago.: 139-167. 
130 hooks, b. (1981). Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism. Boston: South End Press. 
46 
 
Part 3: Planet 
 
3.1: Introduction 
How societies succeed in responding to economic and environmental pressures depend largely 
on the behaviour of human beings acting individually or collectively. As individuals become 
better informed and equipped with better knowledge, and when it is in their interest to change to 
new forms of behaviours towards the environment, they start to use their power as consumers, 
and voters to adopt and support behaviours that are compatible with sustainable outcomes.1 In 
this regard, individual human capital accumulation, through formal education, can shape 
environmental attitudes and behaviours, and lead to pro-environmental actions. 
 
Indeed, education is found to encourage certain environmentally-friendly behaviours. Existing 
studies, mostly carried out in Europe and the United States, find that there is a positive 
association, if not causation, between environmentalism and higher education.2 3 For example, a 
cross-national study of European countries reported a positive association between education 
and mitigation behaviours in response to climate change such as avoiding car use, using energy-
efficient electrical appliances and recycling.4 Likewise, extension education for farmers is shown 
to be negatively correlated with the likelihood of using environmentally-unfriendly practices such 
as slash and burn in  Cameroon,5 and positively correlated with investment in sustainable 
agricultural practices in New Zealand (Jay, 2005).6 
3.2: Mechanisms through which education reduces vulnerability and 
enhances sustainable lifestyle and consumption 
Education is critical for climate change action both in terms of vulnerability reduction and 
promotion of sustainable lifestyle and consumption. At the individual level, barriers to the 
adoption of mitigation and adaptation measures include a lack of awareness and understanding 
of climate change risk, doubt about efficacy of one’s action, lack of knowledge on how to change 
behaviour and lack of financial resources to implement changes. Accordingly, there are many 
sound reasons to assume that education can contribute to overcome these barriers both in direct 
and indirect manners. 
 
First, directly formal schooling is a primary way individuals acquire knowledge, skills, and 
competencies that can influence their mitigation and adaptation efforts. Schooling provides a 
unique environment to engage in cognitive activities such as learning to read, write, and use 
numbers. As students move to higher grades, cognitive skills required in school become more 
Planet 
We are determined to protect the planet from degradation, including through sustainable 
consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural resources and taking urgent 
action on climate change, so that it can support the needs of the present and future 
generations. 
(UN, 2015, p.3) 
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progressively demanding and involve meta-cognitive skills such as categorization, logical 
deduction and IQ.7 8 9 This abstract cognitive exercise alters the way educated individuals think, 
reason, and solve problems likewise.10 Indeed, experimental studies have shown that higher-
order cognition improves risk assessment and decision making skills.11 12 These are relevant 
components of reasoning related to risk perception and making choices about mitigation and 
adaptation actions.  
 
Furthermore, education enhances the acquisition of knowledge, values and priorities as well as 
the capacity to plan for the future and efficiency in allocation of resources.13 14 Schooling can 
help individuals adopt, for instance, disaster preparedness measures by improving their 
knowledge of the relationship between preparedness and disaster risk reduction. Moreover, 
educated individuals may have better understanding of what measures to undertake and can 
make better choices with respect to safe construction practices and location decisions. Recent 
evidence also shows that education change time preferences such that more educated people are 
more patient, more goal-oriented and thus make more investments (e.g., financial, health or 
education investments) for their future.15 16 17 Such forward-looking attitudes can influence 
adoption of mitigation actions or adaptation measures where benefits may only be expected by 
future generations.  
 
Apart from the direct impacts, education may indirectly reduce vulnerability or promote 
mitigation actions through many other means. Firstly, education improves socio-economic status 
as evident that education generally increases earnings. This allows individuals to have command 
over resources such as purchasing costly disaster insurance, living in low risk areas and quality 
housing, installing renewable energy sources at home or willingness to pay carbon taxes. 
Secondly, many empirical studies have shown that people with more years of formal education 
have access to more sources and types of information.18 19 20 The level of education is not only 
highly correlated with access to weather forecasts and warnings but the highly educated are also 
able to understand highly-complex environmental issues such as climate change better than less 
educated counterparts. Knowing where to get information on how to reduce emissions or what 
adaptations to take allow individuals to change behaviour appropriately. Indeed, there is 
evidence that good understanding of climate change or environmental knowledge are associated 
with undertaking of climate change mitigation behaviours such as consumption of climate-
friendly food,21 owning fuel-efficient vehicles,22 and conservation behaviour.23 On top of that, 
more educated individuals also have higher social capital.24 25 A perception of risk and 
motivations to take preventive action can be transferred via social networks while individuals 
who participate regularly in social activities can benefit from an exchange of useful information 
and warnings. Evidently, through increasing socio-economic resources, facilitating access to 
information and enhancing social capital, education can promote vulnerability reduction and 
foster sustainable lifestyle and consumption. 
 
The following figure illustrates the processes through which education can reduce vulnerability 
and contribute to more sustainable production and consumption. 
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Figure C: Flowchart displaying the processes through which education contributes to vulnerability reduction 
3.2.1: To what extent does education help reduce vulnerability to climate change?  
 
3.2.1.1: Evidence on the role of formal education in vulnerability reduction 
There is relatively consistent evidence showing that countries, communities, households and 
individuals with higher level of education experience lower vulnerability to natural disasters.26 
This applies to both developed and less developed countries as well as different dimensions of 
vulnerability including preparedness and responses to disasters, mortality, morbidity, coping 
strategies, recovery from disasters and other relevant outcomes. The evidence discussed below 
are based on multivariate analysis of empirical data taking into account demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics and, in some occasions, contextual factors determining disaster-
related outcomes.  
 
Many studies have established that higher educational attainment enhances disaster preparedness 
– measures taken to prepare for and reduce the impacts of disaster. This includes being prepared 
for earthquakes,27 hurricanes,28 29 30 flood,31 32 tsunami,33 terrorism,34 35 36 and general emergency 
preparedness.37 38 It is hold that better knowledge about the disaster and higher capacity to 
perform effective emergency measures explain why individuals with higher level of education 
have greater disaster preparedness.39 40  There is also empirical evidence showing that the effect of 
education on disaster preparedness is mediated through social capital and risk perception.41  
 
Consequently, better disaster preparedness among more educated individuals can provide 
protective effects when a disaster strikes. It has been found in Indonesia and India that 
individuals with higher educational attainment are more likely to survive from the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami and lower risk of injuries.42 43 Likewise, at the community level, communities 
with higher mean year of schooling were reported to experience lower losses in human lives due 
to floods and landslides in Nepal.44 The evidence extends to the country level where countries 
with higher level of education, even after accounting for income per capita and other 
development indicators, experienced significantly lower mortality from climate-related 
disasters.45 46 47 With respect to morbidity associated with disasters, in general, there is not much 
evidence on the association between education and physical morbidity associated with natural 
hazards. The literature on mental health morbidity however has consistently shown that 
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individuals with higher level of education have lower prevalence of distress, depression and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).48 49 With higher engagement in disaster preparedness and 
mitigation activities as well as better knowledge about where to obtain assistance after disasters, 
education and income facilitate faster recovery from disasters including psychosocial 
dimensions.50 Indeed, the protective role of education on mental health is confirmed in the 
literatures reviewing quantitative studies on risk factors for psychological morbidity after natural 
disasters.51 52 
 
Apart from relatively lower disaster impacts on mortality and morbidity, damages to residential 
property and economic losses are found to be lower among communities and countries with 
higher mean year of schooling or higher literacy rate.53 54 55 It is explained that education 
enhances awareness and knowledge of natural disasters, and educated citizens can make better 
choices related to disaster risk reduction measures such as construction practices and location 
decisions.56 This in turn mitigates disaster risk and reduces vulnerability.   
 
Furthermore, education equips individuals and households with a variety of coping strategies 
following natural shocks. Natural disasters can disrupt livelihoods, destroy crops or damage 
homes and property.  Consequently, households have to employ different mechanisms to smooth 
consumption i.e. maintain the same level of consumption when income is affected by transitory 
shocks. Households or communities with higher educational attainment are better able to 
maintain their welfare and level of consumption after disasters.57 58 59 There is evidence that 
households where household heads have higher level of education have better access to loans 
and credits which facilitates stabilizing and increasing the consumption levels.60 More educated 
heads of households have more salience in staving off poverty and future poverty possibly 
because they have better information regarding aggregate risk and are able to make better 
decisions regarding this risk.61 With a wider coping strategies portfolio, highly educated 
households do not need to opt for coping options which involve disinvestment such as taking 
children out of school or reducing food consumption.62 Note however that while higher 
education attainment corresponds with having better skills, higher incomes and better access to 
credits which facilitate recovery from shocks, households with educated heads may experience 
higher levels of severity and more costly shocks. Therefore, in some cases, educational 
attainment is not associated with faster recovery.63 
 
With respect to adaptation to the changing climate, education is indeed highly relevant since 
individuals with higher level of education are also more likely to have better awareness of 
climate risk.64 Given that climate change is a relatively new form of risk, education facilitates the 
understanding of new ideas and concepts related to climate variability. It is reported that highly 
educated household heads are likely to have a better level of planning and access and 
understanding of early warning information which are relevant for climate variability 
adaptation.65 Education also enhances knowledge of what adaption measures can be taken as 
found that households with higher level of education have higher likelihood of carrying out 
adaptation actions such as changing crop types and planting and harvesting dates, methods of 
farming and using improved type of seed.66 67 Likewise, education also increases options to 
diversify livelihood. For instance, when facing climate pressure, farmers in rural Tanzania with 
higher level of education are more able to switch to non-farm income earning activities.68 Indeed, 
formal education is positively associated with capacity to adapt to the changing climate. 
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3.2.1.2: The role of disaster education in disaster risk reduction 
The importance of participatory disaster risk reduction has increasingly being recognized as 
sustainable strategy to strengthen local disaster prevention, mitigation, response and 
reconstruction capacities. Disaster education includes education on disaster risks, mitigation and 
preparedness strategies, which can consequently raises disaster awareness and enable an 
understanding of risks and options to reduce disaster impacts. Disaster education hence is 
perceived as an important mean to shift the burden of disaster risk reduction from government 
agencies to individuals and communities.69 
 
Indeed, the role of education for disaster risk reduction has been put forward as important 
development agendas as seen in the UN Decade for Education for Sustainable Development 
2005-2014 and the third priority for action of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. 
Current efforts to promote disaster risk reduction education are divided into public education i.e. 
those that target adults e.g. through teaching materials such as brochures, films and booklets, 
media and community disaster training,70 and programmes that target children mainly through 
school education. Following the global campaign “Disaster Risk Reduction Begins at School” 
initiated by the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) Secretariat in 2005 to 
2006, disaster risk reduction was integrated into school curricula in several countries. However, 
there is virtually no scholarly consensus either on what teaching and learning approaches are 
efficient or on how effective disaster education programmes are.71 72 Similarly, evaluation of the 
effects of public education and community disaster training programmes is scarce and has 
yielded mixed results.73 
 
Apart from the limited number of studies evaluating effectiveness of disaster education, scientific 
quality of extant studies are rather poor with methodological and research design limitations or 
weak data collection tools. For instance, Johnson et al. (2014) reviewed 35 published and grey 
literature which offer measurement or evaluation disaster education programmes for children.74 
They concluded that although the majority of these studies reported improved children’s 
knowledge of disaster risks and enhanced positive outcomes such as household preparedness, 
with methodological limitations e.g. small samples and lack of a control group, the results 
obtained are questionable. Other studies of school children based on descriptive statistics in New 
Zealand, Japan and Indonesia reported increases in disaster risk awareness and knowledge 
among children who have received school disaster education but not necessarily actual actions 
for disaster reduction.75 76 77 Indeed, it is difficult to draw a scientific conclusion on the 
effectiveness of disaster education programmes. There remain several gaps in the literature 
including the lack of studies that assessed differential effects by demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics and few studies measure long-term outcomes of disaster education.78 
 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of disaster education for children can vary with teaching method. 
For instance, community and family level of education as well as active learning appeared to 
have more direct influence on disaster preparedness behaviour as compared to school 
education.79 80 In Taiwan, it is found that compared to students who learnt about disaster 
prevention via traditional teaching method, those who learnt via WebQuest (an inquiry-oriented 
online tool for learning) performed better in learning retention test.81 Similarly, providing public 
disaster education can be effective in raising public awareness and preparedness but the success 
of the programme varies with locations and communication methods. For example, while 
brochures and written documents promote the public awareness of earthquakes for residents in 
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California,82 83 in Fukui, Japan, it is found that various educational sources including printing 
materials, broadcasts and meeting work well in enhancing earthquake readiness.84 
 
In sum, while in theory disaster education should raise disaster awareness and preparedness, 
scientific evidence supporting the claim remains inadequate.  This requires more scientific studies 
with sound research designs and methods in order to establish the link between disaster 
education and disaster risk reduction. 
 
3.2.2: What types of education hold the most promise for building resilience and adaptive 
capacity to climate change related risks and coping strategies? 
 
A review of empirical literature on disaster prevention, responses, impacts and recovery in 
different national contexts presents a robust scientific evidence on the relationship between 
formal schooling and vulnerability reduction. While specific disaster education and training may 
prove useful in certain contexts, formal schooling remains a fundamental tool which enables an 
individual to acquire cognitive skills and knowledge, enhance ability to adopt new technologies 
and possess a mean (e.g. economic) to take actions.  
 
Following the adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Action, increasing disaster awareness and 
knowledge and promoting a culture of disaster prevention and resilience are placed as one of the 
priority actions in disaster risk reduction.85 While there is little empirical evidence supporting the 
effectiveness of disaster education, it seems that formal schooling remains a key player in the 
success of disaster education efforts. For instance, there is evidence that formal education 
enhance knowledge of climate change and adaptation. A study of administrative and 
management personnel from governmental departments responsible for climate change 
adaptation planning in China showed that the respondents with higher level of education are less 
likely to mention lack of professional knowledge as a barrier to climate change adaptation 
planning.86 Likewise, after receiving a booklet on disaster preparedness or attending a training 
workshop, it is found that more educated individuals are more likely to prepare for 
emergencies.87  This suggests that investing in universal primary and secondary level of education 
will have a spill over effect on building resilience and adaptive capacity. Indeed, education is key 
to achieve all of the newly endorsed 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) ranging from 
poverty eradication, gender equality, access to clean energy, health, climate actions and so on.  
 
3.2.3: What types of education interventions have been shown to encourage more sustainable 
consumption, lifestyle and production practices? 
 
3.2.3.1: Evidence on the role of formal education in sustainable lifestyle and consumption 
The relationship between education and sustainable lifestyle and consumption is rather complex. 
At the country level, based on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis, it is expected 
that the high levels of education raise environmental awareness and empower citizens to demand 
for higher environmental standards. This consequently contributes to the emergence of an EKC – 
that is an inverted-U-shaped relationship. Originally, the EKC hypothesis describes the 
relationship between various indicators of environmental degradation and income per capita.88 89 
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It is hypothesized that environmental degradation and pollution increase in the early stages of 
economic development, then the trend reverses when income per capita rises beyond a certain 
point. Thus, at high-income levels economic growth, environmental degradation decreases 
leading to environmental improvement. To date, empirical results on the relationship between 
economic growth and environmental quality remains inconclusive depending on a set of 
countries being investigated and both outcome and independent variables being accounted for.90 
91 92 
 
With respect to education, many studies show that better level of education or higher literacy 
rates have positive effects on environmental quality such as lower atmospheric and water 
pollutions (Torras and Boyce 1998), higher percentage of protected area (Bimonte 2002), lower 
rates of deforestation (Bhattarai and Hammig 2004; Ehrhardt-Martinez 1998), environmental 
sustainability (Park et al. 2007) and reduction of municipal solid waste (Arbulú et al. 2015). The 
effects of education found are independent of per capita income. Education contributes to 
environmental quality through many channels both those related to preferences and 
opportunities. Regarding deforestation, for instance, it is explained that improved level of 
education translates into greater opportunity for non-farm wage income, flexibility of labour 
migration and engagement in other employment and economic activities which place less 
demand on land clearing (Wyman and Stein 2010). Likewise, education may raise knowledge 
and access to information about the consequences of environmental damage and consequently 
enhances public participation in better enforcement of laws and regulations as well as willingness 
to pay to protect the environment (Munasinghe 1999). Furthermore, education facilitates 
adoption of improved or cleaner technology. In terms of preferences, education is associated 
with greater concern about the environment or climate change. Accordingly, possibly to due to 
better knowledge and greater purchasing capacity, there is evidence that individuals with higher 
level of education are more likely to translate their concern for the environment into 
consumption reduction actions (Ortega-Egea and de Frutos 2013).  
 
Correspondingly, there is considerable evidence at the individual level regarding the relationship 
between educational attainment and a wide range of pro-environmental behaviour including 
consumption, conservation and lifestyle. In terms of consumption, education is found to be 
associated with food choices that are less damaging to the environment. Consumers with higher 
level of education are more likely to be willing to pay for eco-labeled seafood in China (Xu et al. 
2012),  purchase eco-labeled and organic food products (Blend and van Ravenswaay 1999; 
Lockie et al. 2004; Ngobo 2011), eat less meat (De Backer and Hudders 2015; Graça et al. 2015). 
Likewise, highly educated individuals are also more likely to purchase eco-labeled, higher 
efficiency electrical appliances (Flamm 2009; Ma et al. 2013; Wijaya and Tezuka 2013) and 
adoption of fuel-efficient or alternative fuel vehicles (Mannberg et al. 2014; Potoglou and 
Kanaroglou 2007).   
 
Likewise, in many low and middle income countries especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia where access to modern energy services remain limited, the education level of household 
members is consistently associated with household energy choices. Traditional fuel types do not 
only pose a major threat to health due to smoke from combustion contributing to indoor air 
pollution, but also a threat to environmental sustainability due to high concentration of methane 
and black carbon contributing to CO2 emissions. Households with higher level of education are 
more likely to choose a clean, efficient and modern sources of energy e.g. liquefied petroleum gas 
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and electricity as opposed to kerosene, charcoal or fuelwood in Bhutan, China, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya and India.93 94 95 96 97 98 99 In rural Bangladesh, it is found that installation of solar panels is 
higher among households with better level of education.100 Similarly, in Ethiopia, households 
where household heads have higher educational levels are more likely to adopt biogas 
technology, modern renewable energy system used for electricity production.101 In this context, 
education provides both better knowledge on the benefits of modern fuels usage as well as 
affordability (due to the association between education and economic conditions). 
 
With respect to conservation and lifestyle, generally the relationship with education varies with 
behavioural measurement. On the one hand, empirical studies based on self-reported 
environment related behaviour commonly found the positive relationship between education and 
pro-environmental behaviour. This includes recycling,102 103 104 105 106 energy conserving 
practices,107 water saving behaviours,108 and a wide range of carbon emission reduction actions 
e.g. reducing the use of car, avoiding taking short-haul flights, reducing the consumption of 
disposable items and buying seasonal and local products.109 Moreover, exploiting changes in 
compulsory education laws to correct for the identification problem of endogenous educational 
attainment, a few studies have further shown a substantial causal effect of education on pro-
environmental behaviour.110 111    
 
Nevertheless, studies of pro-environmental behaviour often rely on self-reported behaviour which 
can be subject to social desirability bias, especially when the highly educated are more aware of 
what behaviours will be positively evaluated by others. Indeed, when comparing household 
energy use with self-reported pro-environmental behaviour among Dutch households, 
Gatersleben et al. (2002) revealed that people who reported to act in a more environmentally-
friendly way do not necessarily use less energy.112 In this regard, it is important to also consider 
studies that use objective measures of consumption patterns. 
 
Indeed, while literature that rely on self-reported pro-environmental behaviour commonly report 
the positive effect of education, studies estimating direct and indirect household energy use, 
water consumption and emissions produce differing results.113 114 These studies generally employ 
micro-level data such as household expenditure survey to derive energy use or CO2 emissions. 
On the one hand, a series of studies reported a positive relationship between education and, for 
example, transport emission in the UK,115 total CO2 emissions, indirect emissions and transport 
emissions in the UK even after controlling for income,116 and household embedded carbon 
emissions in China.117 It is explained in one qualitative study that higher consumption and travel 
of people with high education are part of their identity.118 In contrast, many other studies 
reported a negative association between education level and energy consumption or emissions. 
In estimating CO2 emissions based on household sociodemographic characteristics in the UK, 
Baiocchi et al. (2010) find that emissions increase with income but decreased with education.119 
Using household consumption expenditure data, Pachauri (2004) finds that households where 
the head is illiterate has higher per capita energy requirements as compared to the literate head in 
India.120 Distinguishing between household direct and indirect energy use in China, Golley and 
Meng (2012) find that direct emissions is negatively associated with education while the opposite 
is true for indirect emissions.121 The more educated households may adjust their direct energy 
consumption patterns given that they are more aware of the adverse health and environmental 
consequences of certain energy sources, especially coal. However, with respect to indirect 
 54 
 
emissions such as transportation or food, higher consumption associated with lifestyle of the 
more educated contributes to higher indirect emissions.  
 
Since education is also linked with economic affluence, this consequently contributes to potential 
higher demand for energy and unsustainable consumption e.g. increase in meat consumption 
and car ownership. Accordingly, some studies have reported no or negative effects of education 
on the environment. At the country level, the EKC hypothesis is not uniformly supported by the 
literature. For instance, Hill and Magnani (2002) find that education – measured as the average 
number of years of schooling in the population aged 25 – is one key determinant of the level of a 
country’s pollution emissions.122 However, the result is counterintuitive such that higher 
educational levels increase pollution possibly because for low-income countries improvements in 
education levels increase access to polluting technologies such as cars. A similar result is reported 
by Gangadharan and Valenzuela (2001), showing that level of education has a positive 
relationship with environmental stress, especially regarding to commercial energy use and CO2 
emissions.123 In fact, environmental quality depends considerably on policies and regulations.124 
Since highly educated individuals are more likely to be concerned and are more willing to pay to 
protect the environment,125 126 127 128 129it is possible that they will push for “greener” environment 
later after the country has achieved a certain level of economic development.  
 
Furthermore, while consumption tends to increase with education due to income rise, people 
with higher education may have better knowledge and greater capacity to consume in a 
sustainable manner. For instance, while food consumption is found to increase with educational 
level in China, households with higher level of education also produce less food waste.130 
Therefore, overall, we may expect that education is positively associated with sustainable 
lifestyle and consumption. This is because those with higher level of education are likely to have 
greater access to information and better understanding of the benefits of a cleaner environment 
and a reduction in health risks related to environmental pollution.  
 
3.2.3.2: Environmental-related education/intervention 
The IPCC Working Group III: Mitigation has highlighted how changing lifestyle choices are 
crucial for climate policy. Consumption patterns and lifestyles such as those related to 
transportation and residential sectors have direct impact on energy consumption and emissions. 
Consequently, it is commonly held that raising public awareness of their contribution to global 
CO2 emissions through environmental education can promote changing in behaviour.131 
Environmental and climate change education can be integrated in school curricula as well as in 
non-formal education programmes. 
 
3.2.3.3: Formal education programmes 
In terms of formal education programmes, there exist a number of nationwide, whole-school 
initiatives which have implemented a range of innovative approaches to environmental 
education and sustainability. A whole-school approach calls for holistic integration of 
environmental, climate change or sustainability education throughout the formal curriculum, 
rather than being taught on a standalone basis. In this approach, schools are also perceived not 
only as training grounds for sustainable and environmentally friendly practices through 
curriculum but also as a showcase of good environmental management in a community. Some 
scholars believe that pupils (children) can act as mediators of social and environmental change 
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among their parents and other community members through raising students’ concern about the 
environment in the classroom (Ballantyne et al. 2006). While the whole-school approach for 
sustainability and sustainable development education has been promoted by various agencies e.g. 
the European Commissions, UNESCO, UNICEF there is little, high quality, systematic 
evaluation and scientific studies on implementation and effectiveness of these programmes.132 133  
 
Although there has been growing empirical research on environmental knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviours of school children, there are less studies that focus on the outcomes of environmental 
education interventions.134 In particular, there has not been much systematic empirical 
evaluation of the effectiveness of environmental education programmes.135 A comprehensive 
review of 110 empirical studies published in 1993-99 on primary and secondary age students by 
Rickinson (2001) on learners’ environmental knowledge, attitudes and behaviours and learning 
outcomes showed that most evaluation studies are related to special educational programmes 
rather than regular practices and to short-term as opposed to long-term impacts.136 In general, 
there is evidence of significant gains in students’ environmental knowledge, changes in attitudes, 
willingness to plan and take action for the environment at least in the short term. Likewise, it has 
been shown that children who have received environment educational interventions can 
influence their parents’ environmental attitudes and behaviours through intergenerational 
discussion and socio-cognitive interaction. Compared to parents of the control group, parents of 
the programme participants significantly exhibited greater awareness of environmental issues and 
engagement in pro-environmental behaviours.137 138 
 
However, the durability of learning outcomes is questionable. Some studies reported retention of 
pro-environmental attitudes, knowledge and conservation behaviour a few months after the 
education intervention (e.g. Dettmann-Easler and Pease, 1999),139 while others found the level of 
concern about the environment declined after a few weeks, sometimes even below the pre-course 
levels (e.g. Uzzell et al. 1995).140 There is indeed the lack of follow-up study evaluating the 
persistency of the learning outcomes sometime after the educational intervention. In addition, 
intended outcomes are only partially realised in many occasions (Kortland 1997).141 
 
The inconsistencies in the findings are due to many reasons as described below: 
 
1) Sample selection: The criteria for selecting samples of schools and students are often not 
well explained. Further, the sample size of students under evaluation can be as small as 
only ten students making it difficult to generalize the findings to a wider population. 
  
2) Study design and analytical method: Many studies did not have a control group or a pre-
test before intervention. This can lead to Type I errors where a true null hypothesis is 
rejected.142 Generally, questionnaire instruments were not tested for validity and 
reliability nor based on previously used attitude scales. Thus, it is almost impossible to 
compare the findings across studies. Furthermore, most evaluation studies are based on 
descriptive analysis mainly frequency comparison without accounting for relevant 
individual and household characteristics. It is therefore difficult to draw a conclusion 
whether the effectiveness of the education programme is due to selection upon other 
characteristics rather than the treatment effect of the programme itself. 
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3) Type of education programmes: There are not many studies that analyse how and why 
certain programmes are more effective than the others. Most studies commonly report 
whether there is an effect while in fact different programmes e.g. residential field courses 
and school-based initiatives with particular teaching approaches, content areas or skills 
can yield different learning outcomes. 
 
In designing successful environmental education programmes, teachers and policy makers need 
to consult extant evidence base research which share a similar geographical context and target 
age groups. Different intervention strategies e.g. out-of-school visits to public gardens, school-
based programmes including elements of community and parental involvement and 
environmental curricula may work for certain age groups and differential aspects of learning 
outcomes i.e. attitudes, knowledge and behaviours.   
 
3.2.3.4: Informal education programmes 
In general, traditional education programmes and mass media campaigns which simply 
disseminating information to raise pro-environmental knowledge and attitudes often do not 
translate into behavioural change.143 144 145 Environment-related education includes tropical 
conservation education program,  
 
A review of 56 reports on conservation education programs between 1975 and 1990 in different 
world regions by Norris and Jacobson (1998) reported the low rates of inclusion of program 
evaluation in the reports.146 For 30% of the reports where evaluation was available, the success 
rates were low and the program success is correlated with program longevity as well as formative 
or long-term evaluations in the program design. Most program evaluations were carried out in a 
short time frame. Frederiks et al. (2015)147 conduct a comprehensive review of effective 
intervention strategies. Two important points that emerge are to: (1) keep messages simple as 
when faced with uncertainty, people generally rely on simple decision-making heuristics;148 and 
(2) frame pro-environmental behaviour as normative, as there is a lot of evidence demonstrating 
that the conveying of social normative information is effective in promoting pro-social and 
altruistic behaviour, which includes pro-environmental behaviour.149 150 151 152 153 One example is 
that, when given information comparing their own energy use to the energy use of their peers, 
people consumed less energy than households receiving only energy saving guidelines.154 
 
3.3: Education and energy 
 
This section examines the links between education and energy access and consumption, both in 
terms of the role of education in promoting sustainable behaviour and in terms of the important 
contribution of modern energy to children’s schooling.  
 
The notion that, at a given level of income, education has a positive contribution to make to 
sustainable energy consumption patterns is partly based on theoretical considerations. After all, 
“the very nature of ecology with its complex interactions between organisms and environment 
serves to make its subject matter difficult to understand and assimilate” (Maloney et al., 1975, 
p.585, quoted by Diamantopoulos et al. 2003, p.472).155 It stands to reason that effective 
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behavioural change is difficult as long as people do not actually understand where in their 
households the most energy is consumed, for example.  
 
In this context, Zografakis et al. (2008, p. 3227, referring to Newborough et al., 1991) note the 
distinction between “two types of energy education […]: one which focuses on developing 
energy professionals and another which aims at producing a more energy-literate society via 
compulsory primary and secondary education.”156 A similar distinction is made elsewhere in this 
report, when it comes to the dual role of the education system in producing both health 
professionals and promoting healthy behaviours, for example. 
 
This view, that “energy squandering could be better remedied by education and legislation” 
(Newborough and Probert, 1994),157 is strengthened by the long-standing observation that the 
main barrier to greater energy economy is not technological, or even economic, but plainly a 
“lack of knowledge” (Bittle et al., 2009, quoted by deWaters and Powers, 2011).158 Because the 
barriers to greater energy conservation are almost entirely “soft”, education has a role to play in 
overcoming all forms they take, which Weber (1997) identified as institutional, market, 
organizational and behavioural ones. It is noteworthy that the conclusion that “education is one 
of the best ways to transform the human behavior in for the rational use of energy” (Dias et al., 
2004, p. 1339)159 is reached by energy researchers themselves, not just advocated by 
educationalists. Further, what they characterise as good energy education overlaps significantly 
with what is “good education”: interdisciplinary, holistic, inquiry based, experiential, engaging, 
use case studies, project-based, using the campus as a laboratory.160 
 
In terms of individuals’ own behaviour, it is not just the short-term daily patterns that are at stake 
(turning off appliances, optimal use of fridge, use of public transport), but also medium-term 
behaviour (choice of appliances, travel habits), and their contribution to long-term structural 
factors (residential preferences). The question of the acceptance of interventionist energy 
policies/tariffs illustrates that it is not just behaviours that matter, but also attitudes.161 It is 
common in this context to speak of “energy literacy”, comprising of cognitive (knowledge), 
affective (attitudes, values), and behavioral dimensions. The distinction is important, because 
both in settings with low levels of energy literacy162 and high levels of energy literacy,163 there is a 
distinct gap between people’s knowledge and their actions when it comes to energy preservation. 
This gap may contribute to the fact that while some research confirms the anecdotal impression 
that “green” consumers are more likely to be highly educated,164 others have taken a more 
sceptical view in light of more ambiguous findings.165 Diamontopoulos and colleagues note a 
tendency in the literature to find a positive association between general education and 
environmental measures, but found that all socio-demographic predictors only accounted for less 
than six percent of the variation in the outcomes in their own (primary) data. More recently, and 
with an econometric causal analysis, Meyer (2015) does conclude that (general secondary) 
“education causes individuals to be more concerned with social welfare and to accordingly 
behave in a more environmentally friendly manner”, at least in Europe (p.105).166 However, the 
magnitude of the estimated effects are meaningful, but rather moderate. In addition, his 
estimation strategy implies that the results are informative of the effect of an extra year of 
education on the behaviours of individuals on the margin of dropping out of secondary school. 
They do not necessarily indicate the impact of expanding secondary schooling overall. 
 
 58 
 
The evidence is perhaps more encouraging with respect to targeted energy education. In an 
explicit cost-benefit analysis in Brazil in the late 1990s, education and training programmes for 
energy conservation were found to actually be the cheapest interventions by far in terms of cost 
per kWh saved.167 These programmes were not necessarily school-based, but if it is true 
elsewhere that as in Taiwan, “most students reported that school had contributed most to their 
understanding of energy issues and problems” (Lee et al., 2015, p.105),168 it makes sense to build 
on that existing channel. This need not be limited to the transmission of knowledge, but includes, 
for example, the ‘normalisation’ of energy-saving behaviour practised at school. Nor does it only 
reach the children, who are expected to influence their households’ behaviour generally. 
However, “although numerous energy education and information projects are currently taking 
place in Europe, little research has been done in the investigation of their success” (Zografakis et 
al., 2008, p.3227).169 
 
On balance, higher levels of education may be broadly associated with greater energy literacy 
and energy preservation, but the link is relatively weak and contingent. In particular, this means 
that this effect is very unlikely to offset the greater overall level of consumption arising from the 
higher average incomes of the better educated. 
 
Related to the issue of environmentally sustainable behaviour is the type of fuel households use 
for cooking and heating. However, in low-income settings where some households fall back on 
the collection of firewood or dried dung, in other words: where the question is not which form of 
“modern” energy households utilise, but whether they utilise any modern source instead of 
highly inefficient alternatives, even the serious environmental concerns (cooking stoves alone 
account for over half of all anthropogenic emissions in Africa and South Asia (Bond et al., 
2004a, 2013, cited by Rao et al., 2013, p.1122)170 fall back behind the implications for health and 
socioeconomic development, including education. Conversely, adoption of clean cooking stoves 
offers ‘co-benefits’ for both health and the environment. 
 
Indeed, indoor air pollution is one of the greatest health threats in many low-income settings, 
and is projected to cause more premature annual deaths by 2030 than HIV/AIDS and malaria 
combined.171 Women and children especially are even more vulnerable, both because in general 
they spend more time at home and indoors, but also because children’s less-developed 
respiratory system is more vulnerable; Indeed, half of all pneumonia deaths among children 
under five in developing countries are attributed to indoor air pollution. The air pollution from 
pre-modern fuel is not the only detrimental health impact of ‘energy poverty’, the lack of access 
to affordable modern energy. Other negative outcomes include poor nutrition from improperly 
cooked food, the consumption of un-boiled water, and the lack of refrigeration. Moreover, there 
are frequent accidents involving the ingestion of spilled kerosene or fires resulting from a reliance 
on candlelight.172 
 
With respect to the adoption of more efficient, low-emission cooking stoves, education can 
potentially make both a direct and indirect contribution. Ekouevi and Tuntivate (2011) consider 
health education and women’s employment to be key strategies for helping households “move 
up the energy ladder.”173 Their ‘lessons learned’ for what makes household energy programs 
successful include awareness, education, and information regarding inefficient and unhealthy 
stoves. There is a strong positive association between female education and choice of modern 
energy and technologies in a number of studies including this variable.174 Randomized 
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Controlled Trials (RCTs) on stove technology, mainly from the health sector, provide mixed 
evidence on the effectiveness of information campaigns; In particular, increased adoption does 
not necessarily translate into continued use. Moreover, the generally positive association 
between education and adoption of “improved cookstoves (ICS)” does not fully extend to the 
adoption of clean fuel.175 
 
In terms of the effects of cleaner and healthier cooking stoves on children’s educational 
outcomes, a major pathway is a potential reduction in the time children, and especially girls, 
spend collecting firewood or other traditional fuels. The time saving can be considerable, given 
that in rural India, for example, women have been found to spend one or two hours or even 
more on this task every day.176 A reduction in this time investment therefore potentially frees 
significant time for study. Unfortunately, in practice, the time saving is strongly diminished if 
water has to be collected outside the home anyhow.177 178 
 
The link between access to modern energy and schooling is even clearer when it comes to 
electricity. This offers additional potential for releasing girls’ time from household chores, time 
that can instead be spent attending school or studying. This effect is one reason to perhaps expect 
girls’ schooling to benefit even more from access to electricity than that of boys,179 an expectation 
that is not, however, always fulfilled.180 
 
In addition there is the direct benefit of adequate lighting, that can dramatically increase the 
hours available for reading, reducing the need for school children to study under streetlight; a 
familiar scene in many energy-poor neighbourhoods. Indeed, in rural Bangladesh, Khandker and 
colleagues (2009) found children’s education to be one of the “major uses” of electricity at 
home,181 and some estimates find education gains to be among the largest, or even the single 
largest, economic benefit from household electrification (excluding business activity).182 
 
Until relatively recently, research studies183 struggled to uncover unambiguous evidence on the 
actual educational benefits that go beyond the kind of purely correlational evidence such as 
shown by Anderson et al. (2005),184 and concluded that a causal link may be difficult to 
establish.185 However, recent attempts to tackle the question with sophisticated econometric 
estimations have indeed confirmed a positive impact of electrification on schooling.186 A recent 
wide-ranging review of more than ten studies attempting a causal analysis of education impacts 
across African, South Asian, and South-East Asian countries has concluded that improvements 
in education from electrification are “widely and consistently reported” (Pueyo et al., 2013, 
p.54).187 Notably, this applies across various outcome measures: study time (input), enrolment 
(process), and years of schooling (outcome). 
Apart from direct effects, another aspect is that home electrification greatly increases access to 
modern mass media: radio, television, and – more recently – the internet. This potentially offers 
both direct benefits for the opportunity to gain and practice literacy, there is also some evidence 
that the exposure to non-traditional lifestyles can have a considerable effect on women’s 
standing,188 with positive knock-on effects on girls’ schooling.  
 
While wealthier households tend to consume more electricity (no doubt partly because of the 
higher likelihood of owning appliances),189 it is worth noting that traditional energy sources are 
actually more expensive in the long run. One estimate concludes that with respect to the running 
cost of providing 50,000 hours of home lighting, kerosene lamps are an order-of-magnitude more 
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expensive than incandescent electric lights, which in turn are an order-of-magnitude more 
expensive than LEDs.190 This is another example of where poverty creates a double 
disadvantage. 
 
The link between electrification and education is not limited to the household level. At the 
community level, electric street lighting, for example, may increase security out on the street in 
the early morning or evening hours, making it easier for girls in particular to safely attend school. 
A crucial factor is the electrification of schools themselves. The scale of the problem is 
enormous: an estimated 90 percent of students in sub-Saharan Africa attend primary schools that 
lack electricity,191 and taking the schools as the unit of analysis, in most SSA countries, this 
concerns a vast majority of schools.192 Across all developing countries, half of all children attend 
primary schools without electricity,193 with a large urban/rural gradient. The electrification of 
schools offers similar benefits as the electrification of children’s homes, in additional to its own 
specific ones. With respect to the former, in the absence of electricity, school meals prepared 
without the benefit of modern cooking solutions may require students to collect firewood, 
decreasing time for learning (see the Practical Action report for an example from Bolivia).194 
Similarly, electric lighting greatly increases the available time for teaching and learning, space 
heating and cooling (depending on climate and season) create a healthier environment for 
children and teachers to spend their time in, and powered water pumps allow for more hygienic 
sanitation.  
 
In addition, there are specifically pedagogical benefits, such as the possibility of operating tools 
and equipment for vocational training, but also ICT for general learning. The optimistic 
perspective asserts that “perhaps the most transformative impact ICT can have on schooling, 
however, is through the internet […] that serves as one of the best tools for exposing students to a 
broad set of information and experiences that can become central to their education, 
socialization, and future employment” (UNDESA 2014, p. 11),195 or using less demanding 
technology, but nevertheless reliant on electricity: the possibility of creating photocopies, for 
example. Given the plethora of plausible mechanisms for such a linkage, it is unsurprising that 
indeed there is a strong correlation between school electrification and enrolment and/or the 
quality of education.196 In addition, school administration benefits from the possibility of modern 
record keeping, and in the absence of electricity and other modern infrastructure, the problem of 
recruiting and retaining staff for schools, especially in rural areas, is further exacerbated. There 
are, however, numerous challenges to be overcome in order to achieve more widespread school 
electrification, not limited to cost.197  
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Part 4: Prosperity 
 
 
4.1: Inclusive economic growth 
In the economics and development literatures, “inclusive growth” is one of the most frequently 
mentioned terms, yet it lacks a consistent definition agreed to among academicians and experts. 
It is often used interchangeably with “broad-based growth,” “shared growth,” and “pro-poor 
growth”. The main concern of pro-poor perspectives is reducing inequality and improving the 
relative and absolute welfare of the poor, including through income redistribution. With a 
different emphasis, inclusive growth concerns growth which is broad-based across sectors, 
creating productive employment opportunities for the majority of the labour force. In this 
approach, increasing productive employment opportunity is the means to increase mainly the 
absolute, not necessarily the relative, income of the excluded. Moreover, this growth requires 
productivity improvements, technological breakthroughs, and other innovations in order to be 
sustainable.1 2 Thus, both the pace and pattern of growth matter for sustainable, fast economic 
growth, and poverty reduction.3 A report published by the IMF argues that “for growth to be 
inclusive, productivity must be improved and new employment opportunities created. Inclusive 
Growth is about raising the pace of growth and enlarging the size of the economy, while 
levelling the playing field for investment and increasing productive employment opportunities.”4 
Education has a crucial role to play in this respect, both historically and in terms of future 
outlook. 
4.2: Structural transformation, productivity and education 
The importance of sectorial transformation and factor reallocation to fast and sustainable 
economic growth has long been recognized in the development and economics literatures.5 6 7 8 9 
10 The notion of structural change involves the movement of labour from low-productive to 
higher productive sectors and the growth benefit from it is higher, the higher the gap in 
productivity level between sectors.11 Such economic transformations, particularly at the early 
stage of development, makes an  important contribution to broad-based and sustainable 
economic growth by shifting a large share of underemployed labour from the less productive 
agricultural sector to sectors with higher marginal productivity of labour. Historically, almost all 
episodes of rapid economic growths were significantly accompanied by such structural changes.12 
No country has achieved significant economic growth and poverty reduction without a structural 
transformation and economic diversification at some point or period of time.13 Labour 
reallocation explained about 15-25 percent of growth differentials observed, among countries, 
over the period 1960-1990.14 15 Indeed, it has been argued that the slower than average growth 
Prosperity 
We are determined to ensure that all human beings can enjoy prosperous and fulfilling lives 
and that economic, social and technological progress occurs in harmony with nature. 
(UN, 2015, p.3) 
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rate observed in SSA is fully explained by the slower rate of labour reallocation.16 In today’s 
advanced countries, over the 19th and 20th centuries, economic growth rates has been strongly 
associated with a sharp reduction in  both the employment share and the nominal value added 
share of agriculture while employment share and the nominal value added share in services has 
been rising.17 Similarly, the impressive economic growth experienced by some emerging 
economies is at least partially related to rapid labour productivity growth achieved mainly by 
reallocation of large numbers of workers out of less productive agriculture and into more 
productive wage jobs. Crucially, this allowed a large share of the population to take part and 
benefit from the expanding economy. China and India sustainable growth is accompanied by a 
declining employment share for the agricultural sector from 71 percent in 1978 to below 40 
percent and 50 percent, respectively, in 2008.18 19 In China, this reallocation of labour has 
contributed to about one-fourth of growth in output per worker.20 In Vietnam, where more than 
half of the workforce is working outside of agriculture and is increasingly focused on wage 
employment, the reallocation of labour accounted for 2.6 percent of the 4.2 percent of labour 
productivity growth. Moreover, the fast economic growth of Vietnam, averaged of 7.5 percent 
over the last two decades, helped poverty to fall down from about 58 percent in 1993 to below 10 
percent in 2010.21   
 
Despite evidence that in low income countries, migration out of rural area and occupational shift 
out of agriculture have already been a way to escape poverty for many,22  there continues to exist 
a wide residual gap in productivity across sectors which represent the allocative inefficiency that 
persist in the regions. According to national accounts data, labour in developing countries is 4.5 
times more productive outside of agriculture than in it, even 6 times more so in Africa.23 As a 
result, studies frequently attribute a significant loss in aggregate productivity to labour 
misallocation in low-income countries.24 25 Vollarth (2009) has estimated that variation across 
countries in the degree of misallocation accounted for 30-40% of the variation in income per 
capita, and up to 80% of the variation in aggregate total factor productivity across countries.26 
 
Questions of measurement and interpretation aside (even though they are sufficiently severe even 
for the well-studied question of income inequality that there is not even a consensus on the 
direction in which it was changing in developing countries during the period 1990-2010 – see, for 
example, Justino and Moore, 2015),27 the critical issues are, firstly, whether economic returns to 
education are changing, and secondly, whether they are diminishing at higher level of schooling, 
or on the contrary, increasing. With respect to the former, note that even returns that increase 
faster at lower levels do not necessarily decrease inequality. Evidence from India suggests that 
“higher economic returns to education make children’s current schooling more valuable in the 
labor market and thus may cause a poor family to withdraw children from school and put them 
to work”.28 With respect to the latter, for some twenty years, conventional wisdom held that the 
highest returns were associated with primary schooling. While an almost exclusive focus on the 
lowest level to the detriment of secondary, technical and vocational, and higher education was 
roundly criticised by education experts, at least in principle this yielded a complementarity 
between poverty reduction and educational development. More recent evidence has been 
interpreted as calling into question the assumption of decreasing educational returns, and 
suggesting that returns in many settings may be more rapidly increasing, or be higher already, at 
higher levels of schooling (Colclough et al., 2009,29 review a large number of studies), including 
when self-employment and agricultural employment are taken into account.30 
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4.3: Education and the labour market 
Education promotes broad-based, fast economic growth by facilitating factor reallocation as well 
as by boosting with-in sector productivity of capital and labour and creating decent job. Studies 
shows that education-induced economic growth by removing the barriers to efficient allocation 
of inputs and promote a faster reallocation of labour.31 32 33 34 In the USA, the declining education 
costs induce an increasing proportion of the labour force to move out of the agricultural sector 
and into the (skilled) non-agricultural sectors, over the period 1880-1980.35 Similarly, Lee and 
Malin (2009) explained that, in China, educational expansion help to overcome the labour 
market barriers (such as migration regulations) and induced massive reallocations of inputs 
towards their most productive use.36 They further showed that 11 percent of the overall growth in 
output per worker, between 1978 and 2004, is accounted for by increased education with 9 
percent coming through its labour reallocation effect. Yang (2004) also explained that education 
contribute to sustained rural income growth, in China, by raising the allocative efficiency of 
households. In other words, better educated households react more quickly to market equilibria 
and policy changes by devoting more capital and labour to non-agricultural activities which 
yields higher return.37 The economic transformation and the recorded inclusive growth in 
Vietnam was mainly triggered by the rapid universalization of primary education and expanding 
access to higher levels of education. In rural Vietnam, improvement in human capital and 
employment in export sector accounted for 60 percent of probability of households escaping 
poverty in the 1990s.38 Conversely, in low income countries the gap in skill required in more 
productive sectors and skill possessed by agricultural households is one of the barrier for labour 
reallocation.39   
 
Education not only facilitates the structural transformation of the economy but in addition 
increases the effectiveness of the transformation. Labour reallocations that are not backed by 
educational expansions and transformations are less effective. Ferreira et al. (2014) have tried to 
demonstrate the importance of education in channelling labour reallocation to economic growth 
by comparing the different success stories of South Korea and Brazil, both of which experienced 
a massive reallocation of labour from agriculture to service sector over the period 1980-2005.40 
However, the Brazilian economic growth has stagnated after a period of fast economic growth 
from 1960-1980 while the South Koreans enjoyed the fast and sustainable growth over the last 
decades. Ferreira et al. attribute this divergence between two countries with similar pattern of 
labour reallocation to the difference in educational performance. While the proportion of the 
population with no schooling in Brazil, was almost the same as in South Korea in 1960, it was 
more than three times South Korea's level by 2005. In effect, in Brazil, the accumulation of low-
skilled labour in the service sector caused the continuous fall of productivity in the sector and 
stagnation of overall economic growth. In contrast, in Korea, it is the skilled labour which used 
to move to service sector and lift up the growth and productivity of both the service sector and 
the overall economy. 
 
4.3.1: The service sector – trends, main drivers, and future skill- and job demands 
Several demographic, social and economic factors are responsible for the ongoing sectorial shift 
of employment and output. First: the shift in the structure of final demand from goods to services 
due to the low income elasticity of demand for the goods produced by the manufacturing and 
agriculture sector. Second: The stronger increases in labour productivity in industry and 
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agriculture compared to other sectors coupled with the lower demand for its products caused 
employment to get concentrated in service sector. Third: The increased participation of women 
in the labour market and population ageing increased the demand for services in the fields of 
health care, child care and other social assistances. Fourth: changing business models, whereby 
manufacturers outsource services such as logistics, marketing or legal advice to enterprises in the 
service sector, have caused a decline in the employment share for industry and a rise in the 
service sector. Fifth: the continuing liberalization of international trade that has induced a shift 
from the tradable sectors (industry and agriculture) to the non-tradable sectors (construction and 
services). Six: Technological changes automated many routine tasks which were mainly 
performed by the middle-skilled workers in the manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, rapid 
changes in technology demanded for new skills and competencies across most service sectors, 
resulting in the creation of new types of job and make long distance services possible. 
 
4.3.1.1: Health care and social assistance 
In line with the increasing ageing and income of many populations, the associated large number 
of those suffering from chronic disease, the elderly care, health care and social assistance sector 
will certainly continue to expand. In the US alone, health care related jobs are expected to grow 
by more than 25 percent in the coming decade. In the EU, in the health and social work sector, 
1.8 million new jobs are expected to have been created between 2013 and 2015.41  Moreover, in 
the near future, emerging economies such as China, Indonesia, Russia and India are expected to 
face massive health care demands.42 
 
4.3.1.2: Professional, technical, and other business activities 
The drivers of service sector expansions are expected to positively and strongly affect jobs in the 
professional and business services.  Jobs in management, scientific and technical consulting 
services are the main job creators in the near future of Europe and the US.  In the EU, the 
professional service sub-sector is expected to create about 3 million new jobs while jobs as 
technicians and associate professionals (covering highly-skilled occupations such as associate 
professionals in physical and engineering science, life science and health, teaching, finance and 
business sectors, as well as public administration) will expand in all European countries and may 
generate more than 5.2 million jobs up to 2025.43 Similarly, in the US, professional and business 
service employment is expected to grow by 4.7 percent per year and reach 1.6 million by 2020, 
one of the largest and fastest employment increases of all industries.44  
 
4.3.1.3: Computer services 
In the coming decades, industries and other companies are expected to increasingly become 
automated and digitalized and the demand for increased network and computer systems security, 
mobile technologies, and custom programming services will rise. As a result, employment in the 
computer systems design and related services industry is projected to grow in many advancing 
countries. Jobs in this sector are expected to grow by 8.8 percent, in all EU-member countries 
except Germany, while in the US it is projected to add 671,300 jobs up to 2020.45 46 
 
As data usage grows exponentially with cloud computing and other storage needs, the demand 
for data analysts, information managers, cyber-security specialists and many other skilled 
professionals is rising too.47 In line with this, the need for software publishers is also growing for 
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a more secure network. Between 2010 and 2020, employment in the software publishing sector, 
in the US, is projected to grow from 91,800, to reach 351,600.48 
 
4.3.1.4: Hospitality, tourism, and creative sectors 
The ageing population, income growth are contributing to a growing market for tourism and 
related activities.49 The hospitality and tourism industry is one of the largest employer which 
require different skill levels and a relatively low-entry barrier route into the job market for the 
youth, women and migrants. In 2013, it was responsible for the employment of 265 million 
people around the world. In the coming decade, the sector is expected to grow at an average 
annual growth rate of 4.2 percent to create 74.5 million new jobs (WTTC, 2014).50 In the EU-
member countries, jobs in hotel and catering sector are expected to rise by 10.2 percent between 
2013 and 2025, the third fastest growing sub-sector.51 Similarly, in the US, the leisure and 
hospitality sector is expected to gain 1.3 million jobs, to reach nearly 14.4 million, over the 2010-
2020 period.52 
 
The increasing digital revolution and technological transformations in communications will 
create more demand and jobs in the creative sector too, both in the developed and developing 
countries. In the EU the sector accounts for more than 6.7 million jobs in 2013 and expected to 
create more jobs in the future. Similarly in Africa, creative sectors such as Nollywood and other 
formal and private cultural activities are creating immense employment opportunities.53 
 
4.3.2: Future skill gaps and demands in the labour market 
The structural changes outlined above will create an increasing demand for a high-qualified and 
adaptable workforce. Cedefop (2013) indicate that the future skills needs move in the direction of 
higher educated and better skilled workers.54 It projected that, in the EU-member countries, the 
employment share of highly-skilled jobs will increase from 41.9 % in 2010 to 44.1 % in 2025. On 
the other hand, most jobs in non-manual skilled occupations will require highly qualified 
workers and the share for the low skilled would decline to 18 percent.  The future skill and job 
patterns call for more training and skill formation in technical as well as managerial occupations. 
Partnership for 21st Century learning (2011)55 and Trilling and Fadel (2009)56 argue that the three 
most important set of skills to flourish in the future labour markets are “learning and innovation” 
skills, “information, media and technology” skills, and general “life and career” skills. In this 
vision of the future of work, the most important skills will be relatively high-level and 
transferable.  
 
Specifically, these skills include critical thinking and problem solving, communication and 
collaboration, creativity and innovation. Organizing and analysing complex data, understanding 
systems and interactions, and producing novel and innovative solutions are the skills most 
valuable to modern companies. In addition, International experience, cultural awareness and 
communication skills, are likely to be highly valued as global value chains expand. Working 
effectively with large groups of people involves the ability to adapt language and behaviour. 
 
The future labor market requires the ability to manage, understand and interpret large amounts 
of data. There will also be a need for a worker who are able to intelligently engage, access, 
evaluate, apply and manage information as well as high level of digital competence and 
adaptability to new technological developments. Flexibility and adaptability to globalized 
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changes which require new collaborations and new resources demands motivated, self-reliant 
individuals who are capable and comfortable with self-directed initiatives. Similarly, the ability 
to manage diversity and inclusion in in multi-cultural teams will become important. 
 
The major challenges of the future labor market will be the shortage of high skilled labor and the 
need to create enough new jobs often for low and medium skilled labor. To overcome these 
challenges, more integrated and cross-sector collaborations are crucial.57 Moreover, labor market 
polarization will continue to affect many advanced countries.58 Accordingly, there is a need to 
improve flexibility and transparency of the transition between different levels and types of 
education, which could potentially increase the number of students who successfully complete 
their education.59 Vocational education should be strengthened and be provide a path to both 
work and higher education. Moreover, on job training will be provide an option to equip low and 
medium skilled workers with the right skill. This motivates the increased interest in public-
private partnerships.60 61 62 
 
4.3.3: Labour market polarization 
Apart from shifts in sector composition of employment, the ongoing driving forces has been 
affecting the skill composition of workers in advanced economies. New technologies such as ICT 
have been automating routine works and reduce the demand for medium skill works, particularly 
in manufacturing sector, such as bookkeeping and clerical works.  On the other hand, these rapid 
technological changes has been increasing relative demand for non-routine tasks performed by 
high skill workers. Nevertheless, the non-routine manual works that require low-skill workers 
such as cleaning and security have not been affected by the skill biased technological changes.63 64 
65 This again has also caused wage-polarization as technological change increase the demand, 
productivity and wage of the skilled workers while the wage of low-skilled workers remained 
unchanged. For example, In the United States, non-routine cognitive occupations pay on 
average US$33.81, while earnings in routine and non-routine manual occupations pay US$18.78 
and US$14.93, respectively.66 The hollowing out of the medium skilled jobs coupled with the 
wage-polarization has been responsible for the rising inequality in the advanced economies.67 
Similarly, globalization and the rising international trade has increased the relative cost of 
production in developed economies and, thereby, offshoring of certain parts of the production 
process, contributing to the fall in many medium-skilled manufacturing jobs in advanced 
economies.68 Outsourcing of production process are partially explained by the technological 
progress.69 
 
4.4: The informal sector, education, and skills development 
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition, the ‘informal economy’ 
encompasses all economic activities by workers and economic units that are – either in law or in 
practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements.70 Traditionally, the 
informal economy was considered to be a temporary phenomenon, marginal and peripheral, not 
linked to the formal sector, and actively discouraged by policy makers.71 However, more 
recently, the informal sector has been expanding and increasingly recognised as a major source 
of employment and earnings for rapidly growing populations. Estimates show that the non-
agricultural employment share of the informal workforce, between 2005 and 2010, was 58% in 
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Northern Africa, 66% in SSA, 58% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 44-68% in Asia. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, it remain a significant contributor to the GDP of low-income 
countries. Excluding agriculture, the informal sector represents nearly half of non-agricultural 
GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, more than 46 percent in India and nearly one-fourth in Latin 
America.72 
 
The informal economies are generally small, unregulated and have low entry requirements. 
Informal firms employ, on average, only four people, compared to 126 employed in the average 
formal firm.73 A greater share of people employed in the informal sector are self-employed. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, self-employment represents 70% of informal employment, 62% in North 
Africa, 60% in Latin America, and 59% in Asia.74 Being unregulated, it does not necessarily 
comply with regulations concerning registration, tax payment, conditions of employment and 
operating licenses. 
 
Much of the informal segment of the workforce shares a number of common characteristics. It is 
a “low skill, low productivity, low wage, and low investment” sector.75 The sector employs 
labour intensive technologies with little to no capital, generates small and unpredictable incomes, 
and highly unstable employment.76  La Porta and Shleifer (2014) have showed that wages in the 
informal firms, averaging across countries, are roughly one-half of those in small formal firms 
and less than one-third of those in large formal firms and the income of the informal firm 
operators is unpredictable in addition to being low.77 They further showed that the value added 
per employee in the informal sector ranges from 1 percent of the value in the formal sector, in 
Congo to 70 percent in Cape Verde. 
 
While there are numerous other contributing factors, differences in the level of human capital are 
the main source of this productivity differential between formal and informal firms of the same 
size. A world bank Enterprise Survey result showed that about 76 percent of formal firms are 
running by a manager with college degree while only 7 percent of informal firms have manager 
of the same education level.78 Even though the general level of formal education has been rising 
significantly over the past few decades, the vast majority of those in informal employment 
continue to have a low level of education and have received little or no formal training.  In 
Rwanda, for example, about 60 percent of informal sector operators have some primary 
education and the sector employs only 8 percent of those with secondary or higher education.79 
Instead, most of those in informal employment have acquired their skills through self-learning or 
on-the-job training – most likely through traditional apprenticeship.80 
 
Education and trainings affects workers earnings by influencing the with-in sector productivity, 
the type of employment obtained, and by facilitating sectorial mobility. In other words, it can 
enable informal workers to move into more lucrative formal employment. There is ample 
evidence across developing countries that better education level and training participations 
directed to employment in the formal sector and higher earnings within the sector.81 82 83 84 85 
Moreover, even those remaining in informal employment can benefit. World Bank (2013) 
household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa find a strong correlation between education and 
training participation and employment in the formal and informal sectors, as well as earnings 
within each sector, at least at levels beyond primary schooling.86 Lower quality as a result of 
rapid expansion of schools and an over-supply of primary school graduates are considered 
possible explanations for the lack of observable benefit at this level. And while secondary and 
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higher levels of education promise positive returns in both sectors, they still tend to be higher in 
the formal than in the informal sector. For instance, the return to year of schooling in Kenya's 
informal sector is 8.3 percent while it is 18 percent in the formal sector. The existence of market 
segmentations is one explanation for this difference in return to higher education.87 In addition, 
secondary and higher education programs too often underemphasize the non-cognitive skills 
which are vital to success in the informal sector especially, and provide only limited 
opportunities for the application and practice of the theoretical principles taught.88 Though 
traditional apprenticeship are the main source of skill in the informal sector, it is difficult to 
observe a measurable impact on the earnings of those engaging in them. Low level of literacy 
among those who participate in such arrangements, the low skills of the master crafts-person, as 
well as well as an over-reliance on outdated technologies, and poor working conditions are 
barriers to transform skills learned through such apprenticeships into higher productivity. Only 
higher vocational and college certificates are positively associated with earnings of the informal 
sector operators, with the caveat that only a very select subset of them  can boast such 
credentials. 
 
Education and skill development are also a way out to the more productive formal sector.89 
People with more than primary education level are more likely to find jobs in the formal sectors 
and for those in the informal sector it creates an opportunity to participate in higher vocational 
and other training programs which facilitate access to formal sector employment. On the other 
hand, primary schooling is unlikely to open doors to the formal sector. People with no or only 
primary education are more likely to end up in the informal sector.90 91 92 Traditional 
apprenticeships and lower levels of vocational schooling are not passports to formal 
employment. Apprenticeship do often lead to jobs outside of agriculture, but mainly still in the 
informal sector. For workers in the informal sector, higher level of trainings certified with 
diploma or advanced certificates are required to join formal employment. However, since in sub-
Saharan African countries, for example, access to higher level skill trainings is biased to formal 
sector employees,93 this selection is self-reinforcing. 
 
According to Adams et al. (2013), improving the productivity and mobility of workers in the 
informal sector require a comprehensive strategy to remove the numerous barriers to skills 
development:  low baseline education, unequal access to training, the presence of inefficient 
market incentives, the lack of interest in the needs of the informal sector on the part of public 
training providers, and the existence of other market constraints to training for informal sector 
enterprises.94 Pina et al. (2012) also suggest the need for a holistic approaches to fill the skill gaps 
and productivity in the sector.95 It includes reforming school-based programs by redesigning 
curricula to maximize training effectiveness, strengthening collaboration with prospective 
employers, and improving outreach to the informal economy, improving non-school programs 
with efforts such as reforming the traditional apprenticeship system, implementing targeted 
training programs for women and rural populations, and systematically evaluating the impact of 
new initiatives in these areas. 
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Part 5: Peace 
 
5.1: Inequality, insecurity, conflict and education 
According to Luckham (2015, p.28), how people experience insecurity and violence is: 
 
[. . .] shaped by constantly evolving patterns of social 
differentiation, including gender, age, class, locality, religion, 
ethnicity, race, etc. – and by the ways that these are transformed by 
violence itself. Multiple intersecting identities influence how 
people and groups perceive, cope with and mitigate their 
insecurity. The reality is that the benefits of security and the 
burdens of insecurity tend to be unequally shared. Those who feel 
most marginalised tend to lack the quality and substance of 
citizenship, as well as being most exposed to violence.1 
 
In other words, the factors highlighted in Section 2.2 of this review all have implications for 
individuals’ sense and state of security. While a comprehensive analysis of the multiple forms of 
violence that people experience within these constantly evolving patterns of social differentiation 
is beyond the scope of this review, examples of violence(s) experienced by vulnerable groups 
include gender-based violence against women as a weapon of war, the targeting of particular 
religious or ethnic minority groups, racial profiling by police and military, etc. 
 
These multiple intersecting identities also play a role in determining who becomes a perpetrator 
of violence. Given the emergence of the global ‘war on terror’ and what Novelli (2010) has 
referred to as the “militarisation of development”2 in recent years, there has been rising interest 
in the relationship between education and extremism. This research has explored how education 
can be used to radicalise and promote extremist views on the one hand, and how education can 
be used to combat extremism and promote resilience on the other.3 4 5 6 There has been a 
tendency in the public discourse to assume that large youth bulges (particularly young males) are 
associated with political instability and violence, however, Urdal and Hoelscher (2009), 
analysing global data for 1960 to 2006, found that large male youth bulges are not generally 
associated with increased risks of social disturbance (violent or non-violent). They also found 
that other factors to do with higher levels of youth exclusion (for example, failing/absent 
democratic institutions, low levels of economic growth, low levels of secondary education) are 
significantly and robustly associated with social disturbance. 7 Barakat and Urdal (2009) make a 
strong case for broad policy interventions in education to reduce the risk of conflict.8
 
Peace 
We are determined to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and 
violence. There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without 
sustainable development. 
(UN, 2015, p.3) 
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There is an increasing body of literature on the relationship between education and conflict more 
broadly.9 Perhaps the most seminal work on the relationship between education and conflict is 
Bush and Saltarelli (2000), which education has two ‘faces’ when it comes to education and 
conflict. First, it can have a negative face, which has to do with uneven distribution of 
educational opportunity, education as a weapon of repression, denying education as a weapon of 
war, the manipulation of history and textbooks for political purposes, issues around self-worth, 
and segregated education leading to reinforcement of inequality, low esteem, and stereotyping. 
Second, it can have a positive face, which has to do with the conflict-dampening impact of 
educational opportunity, the capacity of education to nurture and sustain an ethnically tolerant 
climate, de-segregation of the mind, tolerance of multiple languages, the cultivation of inclusive 
citizenship, the dismantling of the teaching of history, education for peace, and educational 
practice as an explicit response to state oppression.10 
 
A recent study from Timor-Leste found that the short-term effects of the conflict on education 
are mixed, while in the long term, there was evidence of a significant loss of human capital 
(particularly among boys who had been exposed to peaks of violence during the 25 year 
conflict.11 It is important to note that sometimes schools and other educational institutions are 
deliberately targeted during wars and conflicts.1 According to the Global Coalition to Protect 
Education from Attack, thousands of targeted attacks on education were reported across the 
world between 2009 and 2013: 
 
The vast majority of these attacks involved either the bombing, 
shelling or burning of schools or universities, or the killing, injury, 
kidnapping, abduction or arbitrary arrest of students, teachers and 
academics. Some were carried out by armed forces or security 
forces, others by armed non-state groups or in some cases by 
armed criminal groups. 
 
In addition, education facilities were used as bases, barracks or 
detention centres by armed groups and armed forces. Moreover, 
there was significant evidence of children being recruited for use as 
combatants from schools and some instances of sexual violence by 
military forces and armed groups against students and teachers. 
(GCPEA, 2014, p.41)12 
 
                                                       
1 An in-depth discussion of education in emergencies is beyond the scope of this review. For three 
excellent recent reviews of this topic, please see: 
• Burde, D., Guven, O., Kelcey, J., Lahmann, H. & Al-Abbadi, K. (2015). What works to promote 
children’s educational access, quality of learning, and wellbeing in crisis-affected contexts. 
Education Rigorous Literature Review. DFID; NYU; INEE. Retrieved from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470773/Educ
ation-emergencies-rigorous-review2.pdf  
• Nicolai, S., Hine, S., & Wales, J. (2015). Education in emergencies and protracted crises: Toward 
a strengthened response. London. Retrieved from http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/9714.pdf  
• Nicolai, S., & Hine, S. (2015). Investment for Education in Emergencies. A Review of Evidence. 
London. Retrieved from http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-
opinion-files/9450.pdf  
 87 
 
It is tempting to think about these attacks on schools as restricted to the majority world. 
Certainly, the GCPEA report only looks at majority world countries. However, over the last few 
years, there has been an increase in violent attacks on education in minority world countries. The 
United States has seen a devastating rise in mass school shootings since the high profile 
Columbine incident in 1999. While more of the attacks have happened in secondary schools and 
institutions of higher learning, the tragic attack on Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012, 
where 20 children between the ages of 6 and 7 were among the murdered, demonstrates that no 
age group is immune to this form of violence.13 The murder of 69 participants of a Workers’ 
Youth League summer camp in Norway by far-right terrorist Anders Behring Breivik in 2011 is 
further evidence that the attack on education are a global phenomenon, that requires a global 
response.14 
 
Finally, recent research suggests that for numerous countries, the security agenda is having a 
greater and greater influence on the development agenda,15 with potentially detrimental 
consequences for ‘education aid.’ In contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, education begins to 
be used as an ideological tool to socialise target populations into particular (Western) ways of 
knowing and being as part of counter-insurgency strategies, potentially putting educational 
development practitioners at heightened risk.16 In the following section, we will discuss what the 
literature has to say about protecting education from attack, about minimising the effects of the 
‘negative face’ of education, and maximising the effects of the ‘positive face’ by turning to the 
relationship between education and peacebuilding. 
 
5.2: Education and peacebuilding 
 
Smith et al. (2010) conducted an extensive review of the literature on education and 
peacebuilding.17 They found that there are three discourses which have emerged in the education 
literature in the past decade relating to conflict: 
 
1. Humanitarian response: this discourse prioritises an ‘education in emergencies’ response 
to the negative impacts of conflict on children’s education, and maximises the protection 
of those children. 
2. Conflict-sensitive education: this discourse focuses on education that ‘does no harm’ 
and that looks to preventing conflict. 
3. Education and peacebuilding: this discourse tends to be framed in terms of a 
developmental role for education by reforming the education sector and contributing to 
positive political, economic, and social transformation. 
 
Further, they point out that programme (or grey) literature tends to emphasise protection and 
reconstruction, while academic literature tends to explicitly discuss the need for post-conflict 
transformation, reflecting a gap between theory and practice, and a different degree of 
intervention, as transformation requires a more explicit commitment to social change than 
simple reconstruction. In the last few years, there has been a growing movement to bridge the 
gap, and it is now becoming more common place for academics and practitioners alike to talk 
about ‘building back better.’18 
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5.2.1: Education planning and policies for peace 
According to Smith et al. (2010), most education programming in post-conflict contexts is not 
being planned explicitly from a peacebuilding perspective and that peacebuilding should pay 
more attention to education sector reform than it currently does. There is also a concern that 
transitions from humanitarian to development funding for education during the peace process, if 
not carefully managed, can derail peacebuilding efforts. Dupuy (2008) found that while 
education has been on the minds of some peacemakers since the Cold War ended, there is 
significant variation in the way in which education is addressed and incorporated into peace 
agreements in terms of what is mandated for the education sector post peace-agreement signing, 
what type of education will be provided by and to whom, and how education is perceived in 
these agreements.19 
 
For Kotite (2012), educational planning must consider the unpredictable nature of the world 
today, and be “flexible and rapid in implementation and responsive to local needs” (p.10)20 She 
points out the importance of research and training in sustainable development, and recommends 
capacity development for conflict prevention in the education sector and other ministries, as well 
as analysis of the root causes of conflict and the potential role education has in mitigating 
tensions. Finally, there’s a strong case to be made for conflict-sensitive education policies that 
focus on prevention and on building positive peace. 21 Not only is this form of conflict mitigation 
more sustainable, as it is based on building a more cohesive society, it is also a cost-effective 
option, as preventing conflict is much less expensive than the costs of reconstruction.22 Further, 
there is tentative evidence building to suggest that success in schooling for more people reduces 
the likelihood of armed conflict.23 There is a burgeoning number of resources on how to plan 
education for peace and to support the integration of conflict sensitivity in education policies and 
programmes, for example the INEE Conflict Sensitive Education Pack. 
 
5.2.2: Curriculum reform and education for peace 
While inequitable access to educational opportunity can lead to the outbreak of conflict, what 
happens in the classroom in terms of what is taught and how it is taught has important 
implications in terms of peace. Curricula and textbooks that privilege certain ethnic or religious 
groups can lead to enhanced tensions that may lead to civil conflict.24 Shah (2012) has 
demonstrated how curriculum reform in post-conflict or post-colonial states is often driven by a 
need to construct and legitimise a new national identity.25 However, he argues that, in the case of 
Timor-Leste, certain aspects of the new curriculum have effectively alienated certain population 
groups, in spite of efforts to build a more inclusive, democratic “Timorese” education system. In 
a review of 42 empirical studies from 11 countries, Paulson (2015) explores whether or not recent 
conflict forms part of national curricula and how teaching is approached where it does.26 She 
finds that while young people were taught about recent conflict in all cases reviewed, in some 
cases there is no curricular guidance. There seems to be a reliance on disseminating national 
narratives through a traditional, collective memory approach, narratives that are “top-down and 
ethno-nationalist” and that tend to rely on rhetorical devices such as “mythical past unity” and 
the “exceptionalism of conflict.” Paulson recommends that curriculum reform actors attend to 
recent conflict as an “active past”. 
 
Sinclair (2010) defines curriculum as: 
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the sum total of all the learning experiences that are intended and 
that happen within educational institutions. This includes the 
learning objectives, syllabi, teaching methods, instructional 
materials, methods of assessment, whole school policies, the 
‘hidden’ curriculum (messages that students pick up from the 
school setting), the ‘real’ curriculum (what is actually learned in 
the classroom as distinct from what appears in official curriculum 
documents), and supplementary activities including sports and 
clubs. (p.281)27 
 
She proposes a number of pathways for curriculum and pedagogy renewal as a 
tool for peace: 
 
• Introducing independent assessment of learning to ensure that learners are fairly 
assessed. (The Early Grades Reading Assessment and the Early Grades Mathematics 
Assessment are proposed as possible starting points for independent international 
assessments.) 
• Focusing on replacing rote learning with skill acquisition and comprehension. 
• Moving towards ‘child-friendly’ and ‘rights-respecting’ schools. 
• Relying less on corporal punishment and more on the use of positive discipline. 
• Including conflict resolution in teacher training. 
• Teaching fundamental humanitarian principles, principles of human rights, principles of 
local, national and global citizenship. 
• Teaching skills and values for conflict resolution, peace, and social cohesion. 
• Developing a harmonized curriculum framework for ‘learning to live together’. 
• Using multiple channels of communication. 
• Enhancing monitoring and evaluation and research on young people’s attitudes, values 
and behaviours.28 
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Part 6: Partnership 
 
6.1: Global commitments to education 
Education has been considered a human right since the drafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948. Article 26 of the Declaration reads: 
 
 
Article 26 sets out a powerful vision for education, that brings with it benefits for individuals and 
society as whole. It is important to note the emphasis on elementary education, and the mandate 
for education to be ‘free’ and ‘compulsory’ at this level, suggesting that people are not only 
entitled to elementary education, they are obligated to it. Close inspection of Article 26 reveals a 
number of issues that continue to form part of the international discourse(s) on education today: 
 
→ Elementary education is given priority, and is universal 
→ Access to higher education should be merit-based 
→ Skills-based education (‘technical and professional education’ is an important avenue for 
many people 
→ Education is more than basic literacy and numeracy 
→ Education should contribute to peacebuilding, social cohesion, and respect for and 
promotion of human rights 
→ Parental choice should be prioritised in education provision 
 
There are numerous other international documents that protect the right to education but none 
as close to truly ‘global’ as the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 28 of the CRC 
reads: 
Partnership 
We are determined to mobilize the means required to implement this Agenda through a 
revitalised Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, based on a spirit of strengthened 
global solidarity, focussed in particular on the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable and 
with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people. 
(UN, 2015, p.4) 
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary 
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and 
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, 
and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children. 
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What sets the CRC apart from other rights documents is that every nation in the world (except 
the United States)a has ratified it and agreed to uphold its standards. In other words, every nation 
that has ratified the document is accountable for providing education for its citizens. Further, 
paragraph 3 of Article 28 stipulates that nations should cooperate in matters relating to 
education, though by highlighting “the needs of developing countries”, the CRC reinforces the 
idea of a global dichotomy, suggesting that the problems are to be found in the ‘developing 
world’ and the solutions in the ‘developed world’. In fact, many development agendas and 
commitments (including those related to Education For All, EFA) exhibit similar signs of the 
dominance of so-called developed country interests over so-called developing country interests, 
such that essentially these agendas and commitments are set by wealthier countries for poorer 
countries to follow.1 More broadly, then, when it comes to the transfer of knowledge and 
expertise in terms of education and development, they tend to be transferred from wealthier 
countries to poorer countries, regardless of the relevance of said knowledge and expertise, and 
rarely in the opposite direction.2 3 
 
The language of Article 28 of the CRC is quite different from Article 26 of the UDHR – Article 
28 of the CRC is much more prescriptive and does not appeal to a broader vision of peace and 
humanity (see, for example, the emphasis on ‘eliminating ignorance and illiteracy’ rather than 
‘promoting tolerance, understanding, and friendship’). Article 28 also prioritises ‘free and 
compulsory primary education’, but includes a provision for secondary education, calling for it 
to be diverse, free (where possible), and for financial assistance to be given based on need (note: 
                                                       
a The United States has signed the Convention, but not ratified it as yet. 
1. State Parties recognize the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving 
this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
a. Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
b. Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general 
and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take 
appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering financial 
assistance in case of need; 
c. Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate 
means; 
d. Make educational and vocational information and guidance available and accessible to all 
children; 
e. Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of drop-out 
rates 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is 
administered in a manner consistent with the child’s human dignity and in conformity 
with the present Convention. 
3. States Parties shall promote and encourage international cooperation in matters relating 
to education, in particular with a view to contributing to the elimination of ignorance 
and illiteracy throughout the world and facilitating access to scientific and technical 
knowledge and modern teaching methods. In this regard, particular account shall be 
taken of the needs of developing countries. 
 94 
 
not merit or capacity). The notion of quality is notably absent from Article 28. In fact, a reference 
to attendance and drop-out rates reveals an emphasis on the notion of access, which came to 
dominate the international discussion on education for many years. One final point worth 
mentioning is the emphasis on ‘positive discipline’, ‘scientific and technical knowledge’, and 
‘modern teaching methods’ as these issues have all come to the fore in recent years. 
 
These key rights documents have played a significant role in the shaping of the global education 
narrative and the development of international partnerships for education. However, according 
to King (2015), attempts to come up with some form of global vision for education have been 
made since the early twentieth century.4 Some of the key global declarations/commitments to 
education are listed below: 
 
→ 1960s: major regional conferences on education organised by UNESCO (target year 1980 
for Universal Primary Education, UPE) 
→ 1990: World Conference on Education For All (EFA), Jomtien, Thailand (target year 
2000) 
→ 2000: Millennium Development Goals, Goal 2: UPE (target year 2015) 
→ 2000: World Conference on Education For All (EFA), Dakar, Senegal (target year 2015) 
→ 2015: Sustainable Development Goal 4 (target year 2030) 
 
A discussion of the financial commitments that have been made to achieve the EFA targets is 
beyond the scope of this review, but it is worth mentioning a couple of partnership initiatives 
designed to support financing of these targets: 
 
EFA Fast Track Initiative5 
EFA-FTI was launched in 2002 to help low income countries 'get on the fast track' to EFA. The 
idea was that donor countries would pool the necessary resources and expertise for LICs to 
develop appropriate national education plans in order to reach national educational targets. 
 
The Global Partnership for Education6 
Also established in 2002, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) is made up of 61 so-called 
developing countries, more than 20 donors, international organisations, and other educational 
stakeholders. It takes a collaborative approach, supporting the 61 member countries in designing, 
funding, implementing, and evaluating their education sector plans. GPE prioritises quality basic 
education, particularly for the poorest, most vulnerable, and people in fragile and conflict-
affected countries. 
 
Global Business Coalition for Education7 
The Global Business Coalition for Education was founded in 2012 by 15 international 
businesses. They attempt to mobilise the business community to accelerate progress in delivering 
education for all children and youth around the world. They currently have a membership of 
over 100 brands, and are responsible for a number of current global education initiatives, 
including the #Tech4Ed platform and the Safe Schools Initiative. 
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6.2: The will and capacity of governments to follow through on global 
commitments to education 
6.2.1. Governance 
As has been discussed in the previous section, there is an extensive global framework of rights 
documents, agreements, financial commitments, and partnerships in place to ensure the right to 
education. However, in order for this right to be realised, governments around the world have to 
have the will and capacity to uphold key rights, to follow through on their agreements and 
financial commitments, and to work together with other partners in a cohesive and productive 
manner. We therefore turn to the concept of governance. Governance can be defined as a 
governing body’s “ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of 
whether that [governing body] is democratic or not.”8 
 
The work of developmental psychologist, Urie Bronfenbrenner has proven hugely influential in 
education research and practice and can be useful in helping to build an understanding of the 
relationship between education and governance. His theory of human development is known as 
ecological systems theory.9 This theory proposes that there are different levels of environmental 
influences that impact on a child’s development, from people and institutions immediately 
surrounding the child (e.g. family, school, peers) to historical, cultural, and socio-economic 
forces and laws, as can be seen from the figure below: 
 
Figure D: Bronfenbrenner’s Ecological Model (Moloney et al., 2012)10 
Social ecological models such as Bronfenbrenner’s can prove useful in understanding governance 
and education, because they highlight the multilevel interconnectedness between individuals, 
institutions, and socio-historical forces.11 While many international agencies emphasise 
improving governance at local, national, and global levels, it is important to note that 
authoritarian regimes can be well-governed and democratic regimes can be poorly governed. In 
fact, recent research has demonstrated that better educated countries generally have better 
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governments, which holds for both dictatorships and democracies.12 In other words, building 
education systems that contribute to peaceful, just, and inclusive societies, requires more than 
effective governance: this process requires good governance,13 trust and accountability 
mechanisms between governments and citizens, 14 and democracy at the local level. 15 16 
 
In an increasingly interconnected world, it is important to consider the concept of global 
governance. As with much of the terminology around states and government, global governance 
is a contested term, though very broadly speaking, it can be defined as the constellation of public 
and private authorities, networks, frameworks, regulations, policies, laws, etc. governing 
transnational processes.17 What characterises global governance today is the presence of a range 
of stakeholders beyond national governments and new institutions and mechanisms beyond 
state-led, treaty-based regimes.18 Jang et al. (2016)19 describe the SDGs as an example of a Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) governance structure across all aspects of implementation, involving 
states, UN agencies, NGOs, transnational corporations (TNCs), communities, and a range of 
other actors. While multi-actor global governance configurations expand opportunities to 
broaden policy solutions and share information and knowledge more widely, they also increase 
the probability of fragmentation across different levels of the system and across different 
functional spheres.20 21 
 
Jang et al. (2016) raise important questions about the SDGs in terms of what responsibility the 
international community (as a global governance structure) holds beyond the satisfaction of basic 
needs and who will finance the eradication of “poverty in all its forms everywhere” (which is a 
priority goal on the SDG agenda) and how this is best accomplished. They further point out that 
the focus of global governance actors tends to be on interventions in poor countries because they 
tend to think in narrow terms of short-term stability and security, rather than longer term global 
development issues, likely due in part to the idea of a global dichotomy discussed above. 
According to these authors, though, the nature of global governance systems is changing, which 
will have an enormous impact on transnational processes. One factor shaping the global 
governance systems of the future is individual empowerment, through the rapid growth of 
information technology (IT) and social media, which has given individuals more “information 
power” than they had 50 years ago (ibid., p.4). Through this access to information power, 
individuals are in a better position to hold various institutions and agencies to account. Another 
shaping factors identified by Jang et al. (2016) is a shift in international power, which has seen 
power in the current global governance system become more diffuse and the emergence of so-
called ‘rising powers’. While almost all traditional global governance institutions were initiated 
by ‘countries of the Global North’, the authors expect that, due to the changing power relations 
globally, the voices of actors from the ‘Global South’ will become more prominent within global 
governance mechanism. 
 
Education has a key role to play in the shaping of these new global governance mechanisms for a 
number of reasons. First, given the role of education can play as a ‘driver of change’ that people 
own for themselves (see Introduction), it can help to shift the focus from short-term stability to 
the realisation of longer term global development goals. Second, education can contribute to 
maximising the information power that individuals have, through the teaching of key critical 
thinking skills which allow individuals to interpret, reflect on, and act on the information they 
are able to access through IT and social media. In Bronfenbrenner’s model (above), education 
can help individuals to understand and influence the microsystem, the mesosystem, and macro-
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system in which they exist. Third, education can contribute to the overall economic growth of 
low and middle income countries (LMICs), improving the negotiation capacity of these nations 
at the international table. 
 
6.2.2: Political will, capacity, and fragility 
 
As global commitments and declarations are primarily made between states, and states are key 
players in the current global governance infrastructure, it is important to build a basic 
understanding of how states function in this era of globalisation. According to Kaplan (2014), “A 
state’s ability to navigate its challenges is chiefly determined by two factors: the capacity of its 
population to cooperate and the ability of its institutions (formal and informal) to channel this 
cooperation to meet national challenges” (p.52).22 The following figure illustrates four types of 
political order arising from different degrees of political-identity formation and 
institutionalization in a number of low and middle income countries (LMICs): 
 
Figure E: Four types of political order (Kaplan, 2014, p.55)23 
While it is possible to coerce a population to cooperate (as the figure above suggests), a study of 
horizontal inequalities involving survey data for 55 countries between 1986 and 2003 found that 
a combination of politically and economically inclusive government is necessary for securing 
peace in low and middle income countries (LMICs).24 In other words, the fewer horizontal 
inequalities in a population, and the greater the coherence between the make-up of the 
government and the population, the more likely a country is to be at peace. 
 
With an increasing number of shared global agendas, commitments, and declarations, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that terminology has emerged to describe countries that are not considered 
to be performing ‘well’ globally. One term which gained traction as a buzzword in the 2000s, and 
is still popular in the global discourse today is the term ‘fragile states’, which denotes a lack of 
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political will and/or capacity on the part of governments to perform core state functions. Most 
definitions of this term begin with the phrase “there is no agreed-upon definition” or highlight 
the contested nature of the term in some other way, but this has not prevented many actors 
within the global governance infrastructure (and members of the general public) from using it. 
Many scholars, practitioners and politicians have pointed out several problems with this term, 
including: 
 
→ there is no consensus about what is actually meant by ‘fragility’25 
→ the term does not differentiate between the unique economic and socio-political 
dimensions of states26 
→ it is not an either/or condition, but a continuum27 
→ it is a pejorative and inherently political term28 
 
This final point is worth briefly expanding on, as it raises the question of who controls the 
discourse, and what implications there are for countries who are labelled as fragile. As with the 
issue raised earlier about the setting of agendas by rich countries to be followed by poorer 
countries, the term is not applied consistently, and, more often than not, it is applied to LMICs 
by HICs, and not vice versa.29 Through stereotypical thinking around the term fragile states, 
legitimised by popular usage by development experts, countries labelled as such risk further 
marginalisation in the international community (ibid.). In fact, the g7+ , a group of conflict-
affected countries, working together to address development issues, was formed in 2010 to 
counter this type of thinking. At the inaugural meeting in Timor Leste, they made the following 
statement: “We, the member countries of the g7+, believe fragile states are characterized and 
classified through the lens of the developed rather than through the eyes of the developing.” The 
g7+ argue that this lens is a key reason that development assistance has been less effective than it 
should have been, and believe that solutions lie in learning from one another and in developing a 
deep understanding of individual contexts.  
 
The map below depicts the 2015 Fragile States Index: 
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Figure F: Fragility in the World 2015 (Fund For Peace, 2015)30 
According to the map, Africa is by far the most fragile continent, even though there are 
communities across that continent that are enjoying relative stability and peace, particularly in 
comparison with poorer communities in countries such as the United States and Australia.  
 
One of the major limitations of the fragile states terminology that emerges from a closer 
inspection of the map is that it does not capture the dynamics of the world today, but portrays a 
static image of ‘dangerous’ versus ‘safe’ spaces, where the dangerous and unstable world is the 
so-called ‘developing’ world, and the safe and stable world is the so-called ‘developed’ world. 
The ongoing physical and virtual movements of people today mean that the world’s challenges 
and solutions are also ‘on the move’ and increasingly interconnected.31 The following figure, 
depicting the global flows of people between 2005 and 2010, illustrates how important it is to 
begin to think about the world as dynamic and interconnected, if our major development 
challenges are to be solved at all, let alone by 2030: 
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Figure G: Global Migration Flows 2005-10 (Sander et al. 2014)32 
Discussions continue around these concerns about fragility terminology doing more harm than 
good, though the debate has sparked discussions about how to obtain more nuanced 
understandings of how governments, institutions, and societies interact to better inform policy at 
local, national, regional, and global levels. Kaplan (2015),33 for example, proposes five guiding 
principles for working with states that experience problems with political will and/or capacity: 
 
1. decentralising government 
2. unifying disparate peoples 
3. promoting regionalism 
4. creatively supplementing state capacity 
5. gradually increasing accountability 
 
As it can be (and has been) argued that all states are fragile to a greater or lesser extent, and given 
the increasing interconnectedness of the world’s peoples and institutions, these five principles 
could potentially be used as starting points for improving global governance mechanisms.  
 
When it comes to education and fragility, research (and practice) has tended to focus on the 
relationship between education and fragility and how to go about service delivery in so-called 
fragile states without establishing what fragility is (or indeed, if it exists).34 Interestingly, many 
education in emergencies (EiE) researchers, policymakers, and practitioners recognise the 
significant limitations of fragility terminology, but have chosen to engage with it to ensure that 
education gets ‘a seat at the table’ of the new global development agenda (ibid.). 
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6.2.3: Whose responsibility? 
There are some groups, including refugees, IDPs, asylum-seekers, seasonal labourers, nomadic 
populations, environmental migrants, pastoralists, etc., who seem to exist outside the global 
nation-state infrastructure, and while these groups technically have the same rights as other 
people, questions arise about who should take responsibility for fulfilling those rights, including 
education. In the case of IDPs, while the legal responsibility for education provision sits with 
national governments, few countries have specific policies addressing the special needs of IDPs, 
and fewer still have documented any significant progress towards meeting these needs,35 with the 
exception of Colombia, who mandates the provision of education for IDPs of school-going age.36 
In the case of nomadic and other mobile populations, they often face a range of problems, 
including those to do with irrelevant and/or inappropriate curriculum and pedagogy and 
institutionalised racism and other forms of discrimination, leading to further marginalisation 
within the global system.37 38 
 
In Section 2.2.6 of this review, we discussed the problem of forced migration and the difficulties 
faced by refugees in accessing and participating in quality education opportunities. While certain 
agencies (UNHCR, UNRWA, IDMC, etc.) exist to protect these individuals, in reality the sheer 
numbers of displaced peoples (many of whom have not had the chance to claim asylum) often 
find themselves in an extended state of limbo, in makeshift conditions such as urban settlements 
and camp, and very rarely do they see their rights met, including their right to education. As 
Arendt (1966, cited in Bhabha, 2014, p.238) points out, “the moment human beings lacked their 
own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect 
them and no institution was willing to guarantee them.” In other words, our “supposedly 
inalienable [rights have] proved to be unenforceable” (ibid).39 We will now turn to a brief discussion 
of the coordination of education provision for refugees, as this has become a heightened point of 
concern in today’s global climate. 
 
6.2.3.1: Refugees and asylum-seekers in low and middle income countries 
When it comes to refugees and asylum seekers (non-Palestinian), education is technically the 
responsibility of governments who have signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and/or 1967 
Protocol, UNHCR, and those organisations with a mandate to provide education for forcibly 
displaced people. Further, refugees and asylum seekers themselves often take responsibility for 
initiating education programmes, though they can be limited in their capacity because of lack of 
government (and agency support), finances, and voice. Before the landmark UNHCR Global 
Review of Refugee Education in 2011,40 and the launch and adoption of the UNHCR Education 
Strategy (2012-2016),41 coordination between these various stakeholders was limited, with 
international organisations often acting as “pseudo nation-states”, managing the provision of 
education services for refugees.42 As the global trend is now towards integrating refugees within 
national education systems wherever possible/appropriate, and in consultation with refugees 
themselves (as set out in the UNHCR Strategy), significant improvements have been made in the 
area of coordination: in 2014, 11 of the 14 refugee-hosting priority countries worked towards the 
integration of refugees into their own national system, up from 5 in 2011.43 Prior to 2011, 
UNHCR’s relationships with national Ministries of Education were all informal, but today, 
UNHCR has formal partnerships with almost all Ministries of Education in its countries of 
operation,44 though actual provision of education and the nature of the partnership vary from 
context to context, dependent on each country’s own policies and laws. Finally, it is worth 
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noting that a number of governments who are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and/or 1967 Protocol do still work with partners to ensure protection and education for refugees, 
e.g. the government of Jordan, who have a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR to 
support refugees.45 
 
Around a quarter of the world’s refugees are Palestinian, and fall under the mandate of the 
United Nations Relief & Works Agency (UNRWA). While the formal definition of ‘a refugee’ 
tends to emphasise the legal dimensions of the term, the definition of ‘a Palestinian refugee’ is 
more of an operational one: it exists primarily to identify persons residing in Gaza, West Bank, 
Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, who are eligible for UNRWA services,46 which today include 
education, health, relief & social services, microfinance, infrastructure and camp improvement, 
and emergency response.47 A Palestinian refugee is a person whose residence was Palestine for at 
least two years before losing home and livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict, or a descendant 
of such a person. It is important to note the gendered dimension of this definition: descendants of 
male UNRWA refugees who marry a non-Palestinian inherit the UNRWA title, but descendants 
of female UNRWA refugees who marry a non-Palestinian do not.48 
 
Palestinian refugees are excluded from the UNHCR Statute and protection according to the 1951 
Refugee Convention, because they receive protection or assistance from another UN agency, 
namely UNRWA, though the 1951 Refugee Convention mandates the ipso facto inclusion of 
Palestinians, if protection or assistance from UNRWA should cease. Education for Palestinian 
refugees is the shared responsibility of UNRWA, host governments, and a range of other 
organisations with an educational mandate operating in the area, though the degree of 
coordination and the quality of provision vary depending on the particular context. UNRWA’s 
education programme has always been the agency’s most significant programme,49 with schools 
considered to be “the nucleus” of refugee camps and education the key to a more stable future.50 
In spite of the worsening situation for Palestinian refugees in the last few years, UNRWA has 
managed to make significant progress on its 2011 Education Reform Strategy,51 as described in a 
2014 update on the reform52 and a report by the World Bank on the relative effectiveness of 
UNRWA schools.53 
 
6.2.3.2: Refugees and asylum-seekers in high income countries 
In spite of the unprecedented increase in numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers making their 
way to Europe in the past couple of years, it is important to note that the bulk of the global 
forced migration crisis is borne by LMICs, with estimates suggesting that over 85% of refugees 
remain within their region of origin, adding further strain to national systems that already face 
significant socio-economic challenges.54 
 
Education for refugees and asylum-seekers in HICs is primarily the responsibility of host 
countries, who are all signatories to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 
except the United States, which has only signed the 1967 Protocol. These governments are thus 
responsible for ensuring that all refugees and asylum-seekers of school-going age are allocated 
school places and that detailed education statistics are collected on them.55 UNHCR is active 
only at the invitation of host country governments in HICs, and so adopts more of a diplomatic 
advocacy role in these contexts, unlike in LMICs, where it has both a presence and an 
operational role.56 While most HIC governments have signed the Refugee Convention and/or 
the Protocol (which include provisions for education), and tend to have stronger, more stable 
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institutions than LMICs, a coordinated response to education provision for refugees and asylum 
seekers is lacking, which is troubling, given the increasing numbers of individuals making their 
way to HICs. These individuals end up in local communities and unofficial camps and 
settlements, or they are sent to specific cities or detention centres, to have their asylum claims 
processed. HIC governments tend to adhere to rigid legal definitions of refugees and asylum 
seekers (and to detain asylum seekers, while claims are processed), which means that technically 
they are only responsible for the education of officially recognised refugees. Those identified as 
refugees are generally resettled, and then have better access to social services (including 
education) through the government, though, it should be noted that only a small proportion of 
refugees globally are resettled in HICs.57 58 
 
In HICs with strict mandatory detention policies (i.e. they detain people seeking political asylum, 
or who they consider to be unauthorised arrivals and/or illegal immigrants), there is very little in 
terms of a coordinated response to meeting the educational needs of those who have been 
detained. For example, an observational study of educational facilities for children in detention 
on the Australian territory, Christmas Island, found that the facilities failed to meet Australia’s 
international obligations and political pledges to uphold the right of asylum-seeking children to 
education.59 Asylum-seeking children in the United States also face challenges: the emphasis 
appears to be on processing claims, with no clear roles for providers of health, education, and 
other key services.60 
 
Given the adherence of HICs to rigid, legal definitions of refugees and the current rise in 
populations seeking asylum in HICs, many unofficial camps and settlements of so-called 
‘migrants’ have emerged in France, Greece, etc., where accountability for the provision of 
essential services and the fulfilment of rights, including the right to education, is lacking. As a 
result, conditions in these ‘camps’ are often dire, failing to meet basic standards set out by the 
WHO, UNHCR, and the Sphere Project.61 Further, there have been recent reports indicating that 
there are hundreds of separated or unaccompanied children living in these settlements (or on the 
move across Europe), whose basic human rights (including to education) are not being met.62 
UNHCR does have a policy on and operational educational guidelines for urban refugees, which 
could potentially provide guidance for these types of contexts, these documents explicitly state 
that they do not explore “the challenge of refugee integration or the issue of subsidiary protection 
standards in the industrialized states” (UNHCR, 2009, p.3).63 
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Part 7: Spatial dimensions of education and the sustainable 
development agenda 
 
7.1: Introduction 
Education has an important spatial component. That the educational process is still place-bound 
in general is highlighted by the fact that even when it is not, this is made explicit, as in the term 
“distance (!) education”. This spatial dimension concerns not just the mode of delivery, but also 
the typical characteristics of students, and teachers, as well as their attitudes and expectations, of 
inputs and outcomes, and its interaction with other development challenges that are particular to 
its location. 
 
The consideration of urban, peri-urban, and rural settings is certainly a highly relevant aspect of 
the spatial dimension of education and sustainable development more generally. However, it is 
important in this context not to conflate the related, but distinct, issues of rurality, geographic 
remoteness, and population sparsity. While the definitions of an “urban” area differ considerably 
between countries, key elements are considered to be continuity and density of construction, the 
share of the labour force engaged in the agricultural sector, the presence of key services and 
amenities, administrative classification, and – possibly – absolute population size or density 
within the perimeter. However, even where the population density within the area is one of the 
criteria, it does not follow that “rural” areas are sparsely populated in a way that would affect the 
efficiency or viability of scaled-up education provision. Both Rwanda and Bangladesh, for 
example, combine some of the lowest urbanisation rates in the world with some of the highest 
overall population density. Conversely, an isolated “minimally urban” location may well suffer 
from a lack of educational scale. This example underlines how urban/rural status and density at 
various scales interact with remoteness, which can act as an educational constraint by itself. Here, 
“remote” should be understood in a broad sense to include not only geographic distance, but 
obviously also travel time and/or “difficulty to reach” more generally, as which – perhaps less 
obviously – would include isolation that is due to conflict or political will, for example. 
Moreover, given variation in age structure, the density of the school-age population may differ 
greatly from the overall population density, especially in terms of its dynamic over time. In 
combination with local regulations concerning catchment areas, this means that it is possible for 
schools to close due to lack of demand even in metropolitan cities with millions of inhabitants, 
such as Berlin. This is true even where “competition” of schools for pupils is not part of the 
design of the system. These nuances are not captured by considering “peri-urban” as an 
intermediate category while remaining on a one-dimensional linear scale. In any case, this term 
means rather different things in industrialised and developing countries: in the former, such areas 
are, arguably, not a major separate concern from an education point of view, because they are 
characterised by a small residential population, and strong functional integration with the urban 
centre; in the latter, it is more frequently a transitional state, as rapidly expanding cities encroach 
on what used to be rural communities. 
 
These considerations justify a conceptualisation of the spatial dimension of education and 
sustainable development along the following lines, each of which is elaborated further below: 
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1. One set of challenges concerns areas and localities that are dominated by agricultural 
production and that lack key public services and infrastructure. 
2. Another, overlapping with the above, concerns the educational challenges faced by areas 
and localities that lack the population, within the locality itself and/or even within the 
surrounding area, to sustain educational provision “at scale”. 
3. Again, overlapping with both of the above, are educational challenges associated with 
being on the periphery of the national education system. 
 
These differences matter. For instance, Monk (2007)1 notes, with respect to the US, that teacher 
experience and retention is above the national average in rural schools, but lower in particularly 
small schools. For sub-Saharan Africa, Linard et al. (2012)2 demonstrate that the actual spatial 
distribution in terms of accessibility gives different results compared to simple considerations of 
“urbanization” or even population density, especially in the absence of reliable transport 
systems. As a result, there are large differences among rural populations in terms of their 
agricultural productivity that benefits strongly from proximity to urban markets,3 and their access 
to services such as education or healthcare.4 5 6  
 
These distinctions should be at the back of our minds as we consider, in this section: First, the 
nature and scale of spatial inequalities in education; Second, how general rural development 
challenges contribute to the difficulty of achieving spatial educational equity; Third, the way 
these inequalities, not just in education itself, but also in the opportunity to reap their rewards, 
shape individual (and household) location decisions; Fourth, the way highly productive urban 
economies rely on human capital, but extreme urban growth and density create educational 
challenges of their own. 
 
7.2: Urban-rural educational inequality 
If we accept the premise that “the equity project of public schooling involved seeking to treat not 
simply every child but also every place as the same”,7 we must concern ourselves with spatial 
inequalities in education. This issue has already been discussed elsewhere in this report, in the 
context of education and inequality generally (see Part 1 and Section 2.2 of this review). To 
recall: spatial inequalities are widespread, often substantial, and arise at all levels of the 
educational process and experience, that is, in terms of inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes. 
 
An indication of the difficulty of overcoming spatial inequalities in particular is provided by the 
fact that not only do such inequalities persist even in countries with high overall levels of 
education, but also in countries that are progressing rapidly to join them. For instance, the urban-
rural difference in well-being in China remains large and has been described as the “Difference 
Between Heaven and Earth” (Treiman, 2012),8 despite tremendous advances in raising the 
overall education level. Remarkably, “despite the fact that children of rural-hukou status gained 
relatively more opportunities at junior high school level [due to 9-year compulsory education], 
the rural-urban gap in the likelihood of transition to senior high school level enlarged” during the 
2000s (Wu, 2010, p. 91).9 These persistent urban/rural inequalities occur not only at the resource 
level, but also at the level of legal rights and capabilities.10 The latter are to be understood in 
Sen’s sense, which have been noted to extend to “group capabilities”,11 including those of the 
“rural population” as a group.12 Indeed, hukou status not only affects opportunities, but also the 
returns to education that students can achieve.13 A silver lining is that the gap in the economic 
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returns decreases with increasing education level, so that overall educational expansion tends to 
increase spatial equity. 
 
In Young’s (2013) cross-country analysis, 40 percent of within-country inequality in education 
arises from the between urban and rural populations gap.14 Importantly, a considerably part of 
this gap can be attributed to sorting on human capital and skill on top of differences in provision, 
since the migration flow from urban to rural areas in his analysis is actually of the same 
magnitude as the rural-to-urban flow, despite lower living standards. There is some more recent 
support for this. In India, for example, Chudgar and Quin (2012) found that, in terms of home 
background characteristics, urban Indian children attending public schools are comparable to 
rural children attending private schools.15 Nevertheless the contention remains controversial that 
at this point, the urban-rural gap (as well as educational inequality by socioeconomic status) 
should be of greater concern and policy priority than the gender gap. 
 
While the urban advantage in overall well-being tends to disappear at advanced levels of 
development,16 the disadvantage of rural schools is not limited to developing countries.17 For 
instance, the problem of insufficient scale for efficient provision affects services for students with 
special needs in particular. 
 
Despite such inequalities, it would be a mistake, and counter-productive, to conceptualise 
“rurality” purely from a deficit perspective,18 not least because urban settings bring their own 
disadvantages (see Subsection [tbc] below). Moreover, perceptions matter, and create vicious 
feedback loops, whereby the existing educational urban-rural gap results in different educational 
expectations among urban and rural youth,19 contributing to its further reproduction (as well as 
sorting by migration, see Section 7.4 below). 
 
It is important to note that spatial inequalities in education, and social and economic well-being 
generally, are not merely observed in cross-sectional analysis, but are confirmed by careful 
econometric studies that attempt to account for possible selection effects. For instance, Bocquier 
et al. (2011), in a study of infant and child mortality, find that the mortality levels of rural-to-
urban migrants dropped further following their arrival in urban areas, even after accounting for 
their lower than average levels among the rural population to begin with.20 Crucially, however, 
these differences were almost entirely explainable by differences in access to services and 
economic opportunities. In other words, there is no “mystery” to the urban-rural gap in 
education. Unfortunately, understanding the role that differences in service provision plays in 
maintaining this gap does not by itself make it easier to close it, as the following section 
discusses. 
 
7.3: Constraints to equitable rural education provision 
Spatially equitable provision of schooling is a challenge even in industrialised countries, where 
the issue is frequently framed in terms of efficiency considerations. Even policies intended to 
improve rural education may lead to unintended inequities if the underlying planning 
assumption have an urban bias (e.g. regarding availability of transportation).21 With a focus on 
rural areas in industrialised countries, Barakat (2015)22 offers a short review of the literature 
focusing on the ‘optimal’ school network size, rational site location, and cost-effective 
transportation arrangements,23 24 25 26 and notes the interrelation between physical school network 
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sparsity and the education system’s structure.27 Early tracking into different school types, for 
instance, promotes spatial concentration. Conversely, sparse school networks may encourage 
socioeconomic self-selection at the post-compulsory level. 
 
Research evidence on a lack of local education provision serving as a push factor is rather 
inconclusive.28 While communities whose last school closed are sometimes found to be 
overrepresented among declining locales,29 30  this is not consistently the case.31 32 In addition, 
causal inquiry tends to point to school closures as a consequence, rather than a cause, of 
population decline.33 34 
 
A major constraint in many developing countries for achieving spatial educational equity is the 
supply of teachers. Large urban-rural disparities play a large role in creating the paradox that 
with respect to teachers, there is often a simultaneous surplus and a shortage at the national 
level.35 
 
Rural teachers in sub-Saharan Africa have specific training needs compared to their urban 
counterparts.36 It should be noted, however, that less professional teacher training need not 
necessarily lead to worse outcomes, as shown by Bourdon et al. (2010) in connection with 
contract status, i.e., comparing contract teachers to civil servants.37 While distance education for 
teacher training is appealing in principle as a way to overcome some of these limitations, in 
practice its successful implementation faces a multitude of challenges,38 including a reliance on 
electricity for modern communication (see also Section 3.3 on education and energy). Indeed, 
Mulkeen (2005) reports that in Malawi, teachers may even request a transfer on the basis of a 
lack of electricity if they are engaged in further study.39 More generally, the ‘ICT in education’ 
revolution, such as “has so far been much less ‘revolutionary’ than originally envisaged”,40 
despite some limited success stories in using radio for mass education. It remains to be seen 
whether the potential of widespread access to mobile phones in many developing countries can 
be successfully leveraged for education, to overcome the numerous challenges imposed by 
distance. 
 
Unfortunately, large distance from an urban centre may fail to motivate teachers, or actively 
impede them, in a large number of ways.41 Teachers may start late and/or finish early to 
compensate for a long commute if they live outside the rural community where they teach. If 
they do live locally, they may be entirely absent more frequently in order to travel to collect their 
pay, or to attend training, for example. They are more likely to have to travel for medical 
appointments, or conversely miss more days due to illness if they rely on inadequate local 
healthcare facilities. The remote school is less likely to be visited frequently by 
inspectors/supervisors, and the parents may demand less accountability. 
 
Lack of proficiency in the local language is an obstacle to the social and professional integration 
of teachers if they belong to a different linguistic community.42 At the same time, it cannot be 
assumed that attracting qualified local candidates provides a solution, since the local who 
pursued appropriate qualifications may have done so precisely to facility their own mobility and 
departure from the area. After all, Towse et al. (2002) present empirical evidence that in 
developing countries, as in developed countries, many become teachers simply for lack of other 
opportunities, rather than commitment.43 And those who do become teachers typically express a 
preference for an urban posting. Mulkeen (2005) provides some (dated) references for monetary 
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and non-monetary incentives to deploy in rural areas nevertheless.44 The latter may include free 
or subsidised housing provided by the government or the local community, additional leave 
entitlements, or extra training, for example. However, instead of positive encouragement, a rural 
deployment may also be required of newly-qualified or junior teachers to “pay their dues”, or 
even serve as a punitive measure. At the same time, whole categories of teachers may not be 
available for rural deployment, such as when there is an official policy against making married 
female teachers move to rural areas. 
 
7.4: Education opportunity and location decision-making 
Education generally contributes to internal mobility, by potentially increasing both the 
motivation and the capacity to move. This is not only the case in low-income countries where 
higher educational opportunities may be “few and far between”; Even in a relatively high 
density, moderately sized country with many universities such as the UK, higher education is 
associated with high levels of human capital mobility.45 The spatial redistribution resulting from 
such flows is not random. There is convincing evidence that “the higher educated have a 
preference for urban living” (Dijkstra 2004, cited by van Winden et al. 2007, p. 531).46 This 
conclusion with respect to industrialised countries is mirrored in the evidence on the preferences 
of teachers in developing countries already mentioned. Likewise, Young (2013) offers cross-
country micro-evidence from developing countries that rural-to-urban migrants are better 
educated than rural stayers.47 
 
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts freedom of movement within 
one’s country’s territory, so rural-to-urban migration ought not to be framed as a problem per se 
(and in any case, its contribution to urban challenges may be overstated, as discussed further 
below); the rights challenge is to ensure rural populations are not pushed to leave. Nevertheless, 
the phenomenon of young people especially leaving the countryside is anyhow “one of the most 
dominant demographic trends both over time and across space”.48 In today's industrialised 
countries, productivity gains in agriculture greatly reduced the demand for rural labour during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries.49  More recent rural population losses in these countries are 
related less to declining agricultural employment specifically, which is already minor even in 
highly rural regions, but nevertheless continue to be driven by the pursuit of educational 
opportunities, employment, and an urban lifestyle.50 A sense of isolation and search for 
anonymity drives some rural youth out of the periphery towards urban centres.51 Conversely, 
those feeling a sense of community in their rural community are more likely to stay. 
 
Porter et al. (2010) offer rich ethnographic confirmation of how in rural areas of developing 
countries, education acts as a push and pull factor in similar ways.52 At the same time, “the 
extent to which adults and young people express faith in the transformative power of formal 
education and its potential value as a route to better livelihoods (albeit at the same time 
recognising the inadequacies of local schools) is sadly unrealistic” (p. 1099) for many, who 
therefore remain behind in increased frustration. “Agriculture is regarded as an employer of the 
last resort to young people” (Juma 2007, p. 2, cited by Leavy and Smith 2010),53 due to the 
nature of farm work and the low wages it pays, low status, lack of privacy and entertainment. 
Leavy and Smith (2010) observe that while the remains “a tendency for rural young people’s 
educational expectations to be lower than those of their urban counterparts” (p. 10), the 
aspirations of rural and urban youth are converging, but that “there is an increasing gap between 
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these aspirations and rural young people’s expectations about the style of life and level of 
livelihood that local rural environments and economies can support”.54 However, despite 
indisputable dynamics away from farming, two-thirds of Africa’s population still live and work 
in rural areas, of which two-thirds work in agriculture (ibid.) Aspirations for city-life 
notwithstanding, “agriculture and the rural economy play a substantive role in the lives of many 
millions of young people” (ibid, p. 3). 
 
However, for a nuanced understanding of the potential of education to offer an alternative, it 
must be noted that agricultural activity is not necessarily (strictly) economic, but that 
“involvement with agricultural livelihoods is in many places a strong component of rural social 
customs, with young people engaging in agricultural labour through social institutions such as 
bride service, where a new son-in-law is required to work on his father-in-law’s land” (Leavy and 
Smith 2010, p. 3, referring to Perry 2000).55 This points to the difficulty of affecting rural 
development through education policies in isolation. An additional example of the need for 
integration is provided by You and Annim (2014),56 who review the (mixed) evidence on the 
impact of microfinance on children’s education, and note in particular that positive effects may 
only accrue in the medium to long term. In addition, they note that more emphasis is required on 
lowering (or at least stabilising) educational costs for poor rural households, not just on removing 
credit constraints to meet those costs, and conclude that “microfinance would function better to 
improve welfare for its clients had education policy been designed concurrently” (pp.945-6). 
 
A noteworthy facet of rural-urban migration (both domestic and international) is that it 
potentially affects those staying behind as well as those migrating. Of particular concern to 
educational development is the phenomenon whereby one or both rural parents engage in labour 
migration, but the child(ren) remain in the village in the care of others. A priori: theories that 
emphasize migration’s role in separating children from parents at critical stages of development 
anticipate negative consequences of migration for school entry, performance, and perseverance. 
Those that emphasize the role of migrant remittances and financial transfers in easing household 
budget and liquidity constraints anticipate improved educational progress resulting from two 
pathways: increased investment in the schooling of children, and reduced burdens of household 
and non-household child labour.57 
 
The question is how the potential negative effect of being “left behind” and the potential resource 
benefits balance out. Evidence from countries as varied as Bangladesh, China, and Mexico (but 
excluding sub-Saharan Africa, unfortunately), suggests that – if anything – the benefits tend to 
dominate. In Bangladesh, Kuhn (2006) found a positive overall effect of education of migration, 
including rural-to-urban migration. In China, Chen et al. (2009) found no significant negative 
effect, and fathers’ out-migration specifically had a discernible positive impact.58 In Mexico, 
results have been nuanced, with Kandel and Kao (2001) finding that high levels of temporary 
labour migration to the US improved grades, and lowered aspirations for higher education,59 
while Antman (2012) likewise concluded that remittances outweighed the absence, but that the 
positive education effect was stronger for daughters.60 
 
7.5: Rapid urbanization and education 
A widely-shared concern is that rural-to-urban migration as described above drives 
unsustainable, or at least: unsustainably rapid, urbanisation in many developing countries. 
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Before discussing the very real educational challenges surrounding rapid urban growth, it is 
necessary to put these concerns into proper perspective. A continuing rapid rate of urbanisation 
in sub-Saharan Africa is actually disputed based on satellite imagery, which provides some 
evidence that urbanisation “has slowed or is even stagnating” (Potts, 2012, p. 1382),61 further 
confirming the findings of Beauchemin (2011).62 Additional evidence suggests urban growth is 
actually mostly driven by natural increase rather than rural-to-urban migration. Urbanisation in 
the sense that the urban growth rate exceeds the rural growth rate is partly due to the fact that 
during a transition period, mortality actually tends to be higher in urban areas, so overall health 
improvements boost urban growth more. This effect diminishes by itself over time. Ultimately, 
popular imagery notwithstanding, even in the future, only a small minority of the urban 
population, globally and in developing countries, will be living in ‘mega-cities’. 
 
All this does not detract from the fact that the urban growth that is indeed occurring has complex 
implications for the development challenges faced by low-income countries. In fact, urban 
poverty in developing countries is growing even as rural poverty has begun to decline.63 64 
Arguably, the interaction with urban poverty is crucial. It is not necessarily urban areas or growth 
as such that are a source of concern, but the size and growth of poorly-served populations living 
in informal, low-income settlements, i.e. “slums”. The need for additional research to elaborate 
the role of schools in “slum upgrading” is highlighted by their invisibility in current debates on 
the topic (e.g. in Minnery et al. 2013).65 Indeed, the UN’s World Urbanization Prospects 2014 
Revision fails to mention education entirely, outside of the Introduction. However, it should not 
be assumed that a lack of formal schooling in such neighbourhoods is necessarily an oversight, 
because there may actually be vested interests in the continued existence of slums.66 The 
potential contribution of unrecognised, “low-fee” private schools to fill the gap in public 
education provision remains hotly contested.67 
 
At the individual level, educational attainment is generally recognised as a factor contributing to 
Urban Social Sustainability.68 Li et al. (2009) set the scene with a useful listing of references on 
the increasing recognition that “sustainable urban development” is required to counteract some 
of the negative effects of high urban density, especially in combination with poverty, and of 
policies enacted to promote it.69 This includes “the intention to increase the skills and knowledge 
of residents as a means for human and social development” (Yigitcanlar et al. 2008, p. 8, 
referring to Gonzalez et al. 2005).70 The expectation that education makes a positive contribution 
does have some empirical support. Even after controlling for income, higher education leads to 
households living in dwellings with better structural characteristics;71 Crucially, they also tend to 
exhibit improved behaviour, in terms of waste handling, avoiding stagnant water, potentially 
creating important positive spillovers. Somewhat more limited evidence from industrialised 
countries suggests a potential positive association between higher educational attainment and 
behaviours such as public transport use, or lower violent crime, which contribute to urban 
sustainability. However, while fully a third of the positive effect of the number of college 
graduates on employment growth in cities was attributed to improvements to “quality of life” (as 
opposed to increased productivity) in one study, these seemed to be driven more by a greater 
demand for amenities “rather than from more politically mediated area attributes such as crime, 
schools, and pollution” (Shapiro, 2006, p.334).72 
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7.6: City economies and human capital agglomeration 
Paradoxically, “the replacement of physical commodity production by more abstract forms of 
production (e.g. information, ideas, and knowledge) has [...] reinforced the importance of central 
places (cities) and led to the formation of knowledge cities”.73 However, it is easy to overstate the 
importance of the “knowledge economy” as a separate sector even for most cities in high-income 
countries. While the effects of the knowledge economy are worldwide, the knowledge economy as 
such “can currently be observed only in small parts of the world”.74 
 
It is undisputed that education (and ‘knowledge production’ more generally) itself is one of the 
main economic complexes providing a large share of employment in developed urban regions;75 
Yet, at the city level, connection between knowledge and economic growth has been difficult to 
establish.76 Measurement is one obstacle, since counting R&D establishments may be too 
limited. Taking into account “a more multidimensional measure of the knowledge-base which 
seeks to incorporate tacit knowledge, codified knowledge and knowledge infrastructure”, Lever 
(2002) still only find “some correlation”, and with one specific economic outcome measure, and 
only when Paris and London were excluded from the analysis (on the basis that “agglomeration 
diseconomies of high rents, high wages, high living costs, congestion and the adverse social 
pathologies such as crime have been sufficient to offset the knowledge advantages of the two 
world cities”) (ibid.) In another study (OECD 2004), “data on a number of OECD metropolitan 
regions show that differences in skills explain about 36 per cent of the observed differences in 
productivity”, a weaker link than is expected, perhaps.77 This is mirrored in findings at the 
corporate level, where there is also no strong relationship between R&D and corporate success.78 
 
To the extent that there is a link, it is not necessarily tied to universities or other sites of 
knowledge production specifically. Indeed, it is “obvious that knowledge-intensive industries 
have not, to date, followed a particular spatial logic”, but are “outcome of decisions made for 
whatever reasons and sometimes even centuries ago” (Kunzmann, 2008, p. 298).79 This is partly 
attributable to the fact that “the rationale of guiding urban development and the rationale of 
managing a university are significantly different”, not least because universities are – in many 
countries – directed from a level of governance above the city, such as the state or even the 
federal level. As a result, the presence of universities at most interacts with other city 
characteristics in creating a successful knowledge economy.80 
 
All these results point to the conclusion that for the vast majority of cities, the knowledge 
economy should not be conceived of as a separate sector, but as an economy “that encourages its 
organisations and people to acquire, create, disseminate and use (codified and tacit) knowledge 
more effectively for greater economic and social development” (van Winden et al. 2007, p. 32, 
citing Dahlman and Anderson 2000, emphasis added).81 “An educated and skilled population 
that can create and use knowledge” is an obvious prerequisite. Even if the link with specific 
institution of knowledge production is tenuous, it is clear that the education embodied in the 
population itself, their knowledge, skills, and competence, “matter most to the knowledge-
intensive industries [and] are essential in attracting these industries and investment” (van 
Winden et al. 2007, p. 299).82 This highly-qualified population in turn bases its household 
decisions in no small part on “the existence of good kindergartens and excellent international 
schools, and quality hospitals” (ibid.) 
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Turning to developing economies, there is disagreement among development economists 
whether much of sub-Saharan Africa is “too rural” or “too urban”. The case for preferring 
greater urbanisation is the large productivity gap between the rural and urban economies. This 
gap is not a statistical artefact, and may owe as much to unobserved differences in skills as it does 
to measurable human capital.83 The implication is that that moving more workers from 
agriculture into the urban economies should, in theory, increase aggregate economic output. 
Others note that sub-Saharan Africa is already more urbanised than other regions are or were at 
comparable stages of industrial development.84 Nevertheless, with a view to the future, it is a 
widely-shared assumption that growth in developing countries will be driven by cities.85 
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Challenges & concluding thoughts 
 
In the last two decades, the burgeoning body of research on education in emergencies has been 
used as an important advocacy tool for including education as the fourth pillar of humanitarian 
response, along with healthcare, water and food, and shelter. According to researchers in this 
field, education has a number of important short-term, life-saving benefits, as well as longer-
term, life-sustaining benefits, which complement efforts in other sectors. In the short-term, 
education of good quality is protective – not only does regularly attending school restore a sense 
of normalcy and stability to many, schools can serve as convenient delivery platforms for other 
interventions, and can be used to teach life-saving lessons about health, safety, hygiene, etc. 
However, most of the key benefits of education are longer term, and at times intergenerational. 
In other words, there is a time lag between when education is first ‘applied’ (so to speak), and 
when benefits ‘kick in’. A case in point is maternal education – research has shown that better 
educated girls and women have healthier, better-nourished children than their less educated 
peers, but these differences only manifest after the children have been born, i.e. in the next 
generation. Unfortunately, because of a lack of robust longitudinal studies on education, these 
benefits often go undocumented. 
 
The time pressures of global agendas, including the MDGs and the SDGs, compound this 
problem: there is little incentive to invest in longitudinal studies or interventions which project 
long-term benefits as money needs to be spent now and impact seen by 2030. In the example 
given above, there are girls who are only beginning their formal educational journey today, many 
of whom will be young mothers post-2030 and yet the benefits of their education will not be 
captured in the studies evaluating the SDG agenda in the 2030s. On a related note, there 
continue to be disputes about what should be measured in terms of education benefits. In the 
international community, there has been a preference for collecting quantitative data on 
enrolment, completion, achievement on academic assessments, etc. However, an increasing 
number of researchers have pointed out the problems with relying on narrowly-defined, easily 
quantifiable measures of impact. As it is widely recognised that the purpose of education should 
be defined beyond the transfer of largely academic and/or functional knowledge and skills, to 
include the development of critical thinking and abstraction skills, as well as the tools for social 
cohesion, we need more comprehensive ways of ‘measuring’ the impact of education. Instead, 
we continue to predominantly rely on standardised assessments, including PISA and TIMSS, 
which evaluate student learning outcomes in very narrow terms, and quantitative measures on 
access-related issues. 
 
In a similar vein, many of the benefits of education are indirect, and therefore are often not 
attributed to education (or even measured) by policymakers, administrators, and other 
stakeholders. These benefits are known by education experts as part of the ‘enabling’ effect of 
education, and much of the advocacy work on the right to education is thus framed in terms of 
education as an enabling right, or a right through which other rights can be accessed. Examples 
of this include maternal education, schools serving as delivery platforms for health and nutrition 
interventions, and health education helping to ensure “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” and opportunities to participate in 
a holistic, integrated curriculum helping to ensure “the right of self-determination”, which allows 
individuals to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
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cultural development.”1 It is difficult to measure this enabling effect, particularly when it comes 
to intergenerational transmission, and so determining the ‘value added’ of education is 
challenging, as has been demonstrated throughout this literature review: while we know 
education has an enabling effect, there is a lack of robust research demonstrating how this effect 
functions, particularly over time. 
 
Up until quite recently, international education research and global policy commitments have 
tended to focus on different levels of education, rather than the education system as a whole. A 
case in point is the rate of return research which came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s. 
According to these researchers, rates of return to primary education are higher than secondary 
education, which in turn are higher than higher education.1 Consequently, many donors and 
other key stakeholders began to prioritise primary (or basic) education, often at the cost of other 
education levels. This prioritisation is manifested in the MDG agenda, where MDG 2 calls for 
universal primary education. This failure to understand the education sector as a system led to a 
failure to consider the knock-on effects of investments at different levels of education in 
education planning around the world. Further, with the emphasis being on private (rather than 
social) returns to education, work on how the education sector as a whole could contribute to 
broader societal development and community cohesion fell by the wayside. 
 
Finally, it is important to consider the consequences of the global refugee crisis, highlighted in 
Part 2 and Part 6 of this review. As previously mentioned, there is only one mention of migration 
in the SDGs themselves (SDG 10 target 7), but no guidance on how to do this, nor how to 
achieve the other 168 targets for populations on the move. Further, currently, some donors are 
diverting resources away from longer-term development interventions (with delayed benefits, 
such as education, as discussed above) in order to respond to the immediate impact of the global 
refugee crisis (in terms of short-term security, health, etc.). Such a diversion of resources 
potentially increases the numbers of people on the move (as they attempt to move to a 
[perceived] better place) and puts the overarching development goal of a peaceful, just, inclusive 
global society in significant jeopardy. 
 
  
                                                       
1 Please see the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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1 Tilak, J.B.G. (2007). Rate of return to education: Best practice? NORAG News, 39, pp.83-86. Available at: 
http://www.norrag.org/es/publications/boletin-norrag/online-version/best-practice-in-education-and-
training-hype-or-hope/detail/rate-of-return-to-education-best-practice.html 
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Modelling SDG scenarios for Educational Attainment 
and Development 
The educational attainment projection model 
Summary 
The scenarios of educational expansion underlying the population projections 
presented here result from a further refinement of the education model presented in 
Lutz et al. (2014). In summary, we project the share of the population ever reaching 
or exceeding a given attainment level. This is done seperately by country, and 
gender, but with ‘shrinkage’ within a Bayesian framework (with weakly informative 
priors). The mean expansion trajectories are modelled as random walks with drift 
(and potential mean reversion) and independent noise at a probit-transformed scale. 
The trend parameters are estimated based on reconstructed attainment histories, and 
extrapolated, subject to additional and some exogenously imposed convergence 
within regions and between females and males. Under the target scenarios, SDG 
targets are treated as ‘future data’ (in other words, target trajectories are modeled 
looking back from 2030 under the assumption that the target will have been met), 
with a potential trend break in 2015. 
Limitations shared with all existing global projections of educational development 
include the fact that in the absence of a detailed theoretical basis, they are forced to 
rely heavily on statistical extrapolations. For example, there is little consensus on 
whether “higher education is the new secondary education” (as claimed by Andreas 
Schleicher of OECD), or is fundamentally different from lower levels of schooling 
(e.g. in terms of institutional framework, its role in the life cycle, economic returns. 
In addition, global projections can necessarily not account in a satisfactory manner 
for idiosyncratic policy changes or shocks. In addition, the specific modelling choices 
outlined above imply a number of trade-offs. Using highest school attainment as the 
underlying measure solves many problems associated with historic enrolment data 
by allowing the consistent reconstruction of time series of attainment from relatively 
recent cross-sectional data, but comes with challenges of its own. While nevertheless 
preferable overall, the principal disadvantage of attainment measures deserves 
mention, namely the relatively long time lag with which outcomes can be observed. 
Late attainment is common in many developing countries, so that attainment cannot 
safely be assumed to be ‘final’ until several years above the typical graduation age. 
The model operates on 5-year age groups and in 5-year time steps. While the starting 
(2015) and target (2030) years for the SDGs conveniently line up with this grid, 
typical durations and graduation ages for different attainment levels unfortunately do 
not. The target is interpreted such that the cohort aged 15-19 in 2030 will ultimately 
(not necessarily already at that age, which would be too early for the 15-year-olds 
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with respect to upper secondary) universally attain secondary education. In order to 
ensure that most late attainment is captured, completed primary attainment is 
observed at age 15-19, completed lower secondary at age 20-24, and completed upper 
secondary and post-secondary by 25-29. The latter is likely to underestimate the 
amount of post-secondary attainment somewhat, but an even higher reference age 
would come at the cost of an even greater time lag and less current observational 
data. 
The basic model specifies that the inverse probit of the share attaining a given 
education level or higher among the entire cohort follows a random walk with 
country-specific drift. In principle, the specification also allows for mean-reversion by 
partially backtracking an (estimated) proportion of the random shock of the previous 
period, but in practice no meaningful mean-reversion of this kind was picked up from 
the data. This is not necessarily surprising, given that mean-reversion on a year-on-
year basis will largely be obscured by the 5-yearly data. 
Additional complexity is layered over this basic model. Gender convergence is 
specified such that at each time step, the predicted values for both genders are shifted 
towards their joint average. An additional level of independent errors of small 
magnitude that do not persist in the random walk and do not enter the gender 
convergence is allowed in fitting the observed data, in order to account for 
exogenous errors at the level of data, rather than in the underlying educational 
process. 
The fitted empirical model is adjusted during projection in the following ways. 
(Level and gender specific) country trends linearly converge over six time steps to the 
regional trend. The strength of gender convergence increased in two steps to reach 
twice the past empirical value. The logical inequality relations between the 
participation shares (e.g. that the share attaining secondary or higher must be less 
than the share attaining primary or higher) is enforced by capping participation at the 
higher attainment at the level of the prerequisite attainment. Projected attainment at 
the post-secondary level is rescaled to remain below 90 percent, based on substantive 
reasoning. 
For the target scenario, the above forward projection approach is modified. While it 
would be possible to deterministically calculate the necessary additional drift to reach 
a given point target level by 2030, doing so would be a lost opportunity to gain 
additional insight. Instead, SDG targets are treated as “future observations”. 
Specifically, they enter the likelihood by specifying that the drift resulting in the 
overall upward trend is allowed to increase by whatever amount necessary (with an 
effectively flat prior) to reach the target, starting in 2015. 
Note that this specification of the target scenarios means the target of 97 percent is 
typically exceeded, not just barely met, in contrast to a typical ‘target-achieving path’ 
interpolated deterministically. This behaviour is desired and deliberate. Intuitively, 
assuming a country did meet the targets, these trajectories represent typical paths of 
having got there. Retrospectively, the set of countries that meet the targets will have 
exceeded them on average, given their lack of perfectly exact control over the 
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outcome. An analogy will clarify this: if we invite a group of runners to attempt to 
run 100 m in 11 s, then the successful group will clearly have taken less than 11 s on 
average. Since in addition, the target scenarios have the same probabilistic nature as 
the trend scenario, they allow for arbitrary conditioning. Examples of such 
conditional perspectives include questions related to the probability of different 
countries meeting fixed targets by a certain time, to complement the more 
conventional question of the probability of exceeding certain participation levels in a 
fixed year. While this is fully analysed elsewhere, for present purposes we focus on 
the ‘minimal’ target path traced out by the cross-sectional 0.01 quantile of the target 
paths that only just reaches the SDG target. In addition to sharing their probabilistic 
nature, just like the trend scenario, the target scenarios incorporate the nonlinearity 
of educational expansion as it really occurs. In particular, this includes the likely 
deceleration of expansion as universal participation is approached, as well as the fact 
that countries that meet the targets will necessarily have “overshot”, on average. This 
allows us to quantify the risk of failure associated with attempting to monitor 
whether countries are ‘on track’ according to simple linear plans. 
Fig. 1 displays an illustrative example of a projection for a single country, gender, 
and education level. One hundred of the simulated trajectories are shown, as well as 
a particularly high, particularly low, and middling trajectory. In addition, the dashed 
line connects the cross-sectional medians and represents the ‘median trajectory’ for 
projection purposes. Note that it is smoother (by construction) than any individual 
simulated trajectory. The small amount of uncertainty around the observed points 
regarding the ‘true’ past value is evident in the way the projections do not fully 
coincide at the latest observed point in time. 
4 
Figure 1: Illustrative ensemble of simulated trajectories. One very high, one very low, and one 
middling trajectory are highlighted. Dashed: cross-sectional median trajectory. Dots: observed 
data points. 
The following section discussions some modelling decisions in great technical detail 
and can be skipped by readers more interested in the results. 
Design considerations 
Time and age alignment
The model operates on 5-year age groups and in 5-year time steps. While the starting 
(2015) and target (2030) years for the SDGs conveniently line up with this grid, 
typical durations and graduation ages for different attainment levels unfortunately do 
not. 
The SDG target is interpreted such that the cohort aged 15-19 in 20301 will 
ultimately (not necessarily already at that age, which would be too early for the 15-
                                               
1 For ease of interpretation, no attempt is made at a fractional alignment (that would 
specify that in terms of the age group 15-19, universal upper secondary attainment 
would only be reached in 2031, say, because the 19-year-old cohort in 2030 
graduated upper secondary before 2030). 
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year-olds with respect to upper secondary) universally attain secondary education. In 
order to ensure that most late attainment is captured, completed primary attainment 
is observed at age 15-19, completed lower secondary at age 20-24, and completed 
upper secondary and post-secondary by 25-29. The latter is likely to underestimate 
the amount of post-secondary attainment somewhat, but an even higher reference 
age would come at the cost of an even greater time lag and less current observational 
data. Conversely, while these cut-offs may appear unnecessarily conservative 
(i.e. high), the data clearly show that lowering them by five years would miss 
significant amounts of attainment. Even without delayed entry or repetition, even in 
terms of nominal graduation age, lower secondary is not completed until age 15 or 
16 in some countries, or upper secondary until age 20. In addition, in the German-
speaking countries for instance, higher vocational qualifications that are normally 
acquired in one’s twenties are formally equivalent to upper secondary schooling. As 
can be seen from the results, even the conservative thresholds given above may be 
too low in some countries. Unfortunately, in the absence of a large-scale effort to 
define country-specific thresholds based on a case-by-case analysis of the education 
system and participation behaviour, fixed thresholds for all countries must 
necessarily achieve a compromise between timeliness and completeness with respect 
to late attainment. 
One might be tempted to lower the age thresholds, with the intention of modelling 
timely attainment specifically. In other words: upper secondary attainment, for 
example, that hasn’t been achieved by age 20-24 “doesn’t count”. There are, 
however, at least four problems with this: a) as in the German example above, it is 
possible even for “timely” upper secondary students not to have completed at age 20, 
or for timely lower secondary students not to have completed by age 15, b) for the 
older cohorts, we have only observed their ultimate attainment, not their timely 
attainment, so the time series would be inconsistent, c) all the evidence on the effects 
of educational attainment is for ultimate attainment, not timely attainment, and d) 
since part of the growth in timely attainment may come from reducing late entry and 
delayed progression, it makes no sense to extrapolate that trend, because those are 
finite reservoirs, and ultimately the growth in timely attainment is anyhow bounded 
by the growth in ultimate attainment (once everyone is on time anyway). 
Persistence 
Intuitively, it seems highly plausible to expect some degree of persistence of 
deviations from the long-term trend in educational expansion. In other words, we do 
not necessarily expect the effects of a negative shock in one period to leave 
attainment in the following period unaffected. Indeed, the absence of such 
persistence in the previously used regression specification with independent errors 
has been one of the most frequently voiced criticism we encountered. 
A simple time trend with independent errors (as used by all existing models of 
educational expansion) exhibits no such persistence, while in the alternative 
specification of a random walk, all shocks permanently shift the entire future 
trajectory. In reality, we expect a mixed behaviour. On the one hand, some 
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conditions that would lead to above/below average expansion in one period, such as 
economic crises or conflict, will often affect multiple five-yearly time spans. 
Moreover, the education sector is known for its strong inertia. On the other hand, 
‘excessive’ or ‘insufficient’ growth in one period may be partly compensated by 
deliberate policy and market forces in the next. 
At least two well-established general specifications for capturing such partial 
persistence need to be considered, namely either a secular time trend flanked by 
autocorrelated errors, or a random walk with partial mean reversion at each step. 
Empirically, these two specifications can be notoriously difficult to distinguish, and 
as time series, the seven observations per country make for time series that are too 
short to conclusively point to one or the other specification. The choice is therefore 
based on conceptual considerations. In particular, the autocorrelated error 
specification would imply, in principle, that during a period of stagnation, an ever 
increasing ‘expansion debt’ is built up relative to the expected level. This expectation 
does not match well how we tend to think about educational development. By 
contrast, under the random walk specification, expansion trajectories can always be 
considered to ‘carry on where they left off’. In other words, it is time that is lost 
during periods of stagnation, which corresponds to the development community’s 
language around ‘lost decades’, for example. We therefore prefer the random walk 
specification. 
Note that allowing for persistent shocks leads to more conservative estimated 
variation in country trends, since spells of above/below average growth can more 
easily be attributed to the error component of the model than if the errors were 
assumed to be independent. At the same time, the estimated prediction intervals 
become wider and more uncertain. We consider both of these effects to be an asset, 
especially since the existing regression specifications result in prediction intervals that 
are arguably rather too narrow. 
Limiting educational decline 
One aspect of extrapolating past trends is that slight historical declines may, if 
projected sufficiently far into the future, result in complete collapse of education, 
especially if the non-linear expansion pattern is reversed. There are unfortunately 
many examples of stagnation and set-backs in the history of educational 
development, especially as a result of conflict (Syria providing a drastic recent 
examples). However, there is no precedent for a country permanently going on a 
‘reverse development trajectory’. Projecting such a development is therefore to be 
avoided. 
One way of preventing this is to include some degree of cross-country convergence. 
This relies on the fact that most countries do in fact exhibit positive trends. 
Regardless of whether such convergence is actually estimated, or expected in reality, 
even a slight amount of convergence is sufficient to avoid any country entering a 
projected trajectory of long-term collapse. This approch was followed in the 
education projections underlying Lutz et al. (2014), for example. Here, much 
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stronger convergence at the regional level is assumed, reflecting normative 
expectations of the educational development community. 
Moreover, the random walk specification itself also tends to reduce the risk of the 
country-specific drift being estimated to be negative. This is because a sustained 
period of stagnation can be accounted for by a sequence of negative shocks that are 
all on the order of magnitude of the drift. By contrast, under a simple regression 
model, ever-increasing negative errors would have to be assumed to reconcile 
sustained stagnation with a ‘true’ positive drift. 
Cross-country convergence 
The decision to include cross-country convergence leaves room for a wide variety of 
specifications. In particular, this includes the question whether to converge to the 
regional, global, or some other kind of average, and following what function over 
time. 
Note that it is the drift parameters that converge, not the attainments as such. Here, 
we converge the country-specific drifts simply by reducing the scale parameter that 
determines their variation around the regional average. In particular, the scale is 
shrunk to zero linearly over 6 steps (i.e. thirty years). Such a relatively slow 
convergence avoids abruptly stopping the rapid expansion among the frontrunners. 
This approach implies that convergence is to an unweighted regional mean. Whether 
this is appropriate for regional ‘heavyweights’ such as China and India, but perhaps 
also Nigeria, for example, is a matter for debate. We have chosen to model 
education systems as the unit of analysis. 
The regional groupings are derived from the GEMR regions, with Australia and 
New Zealand combined with North America and Europe for purposes of 
convergence. 
Gender convergence 
Unlike cross-country convergence, that is only applied to the projection, because its 
justification is partly normative, the degree of gender convergence present 
historically is empirically estimated as part of the model fitting. Again, based on 
normative expectations this is then ‘boosted’ during the projection period. Another 
reason for doing so is that — as already mentioned — the completed attainment data 
may not fully reflect the most recent developments during the EFA period 2000-2015 
and may therefore underestimate the amount of gender-convergence. 
In particular, gender convergence is specified such that at each step, the gender-
specific outcome is shrunk towards the average across both males and females, with 
an estimated shrinkage parameter. This parameter is allowed to differ across 
education levels and countries, but is constant across time. During the projection 
period, this parameter is increased proportionately up to twice times its historical 
value (with multiplication factors increasing linearly over two time steps), capped at 
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0.5. This increase was calibrated to avoid actual declines in the outcomes of the 
higher group as it is shrunk towards the average. 
Another reason why gender convergence is specified in terms of levels rather than 
rates is that if the lagging unit is actually expanding more rapidly, strong 
convergence in rates actually delays convergence in levels. In principle, this applies 
equally to cross-country convergence, however it is a greater concern with respect to 
gender convergence because: a) the above situation is very common (female 
education often lags behind, but is actually growing faster), and b) the assumed 
convergence is stronger. 
Post-secondary ceiling 
Substantively, we do not expect post-secondary attainment to become fully universal 
at any point. To account for this, we impose a ceiling of 90 percent to this level. This 
is somewhat arbitrary, but reflects the fact that in the most advanced countries, post-
secondary participation is already approaching 80 percent. A ceiling much below 90 
percent would therefore require a very sudden expansion stop, or even the baseless 
assumption that this current levels already represent an ‘overshoot’. 
In principle, an attempt could be made to estimate the saturation level. However, for 
post-secondary, the vast majority of observations are well below the inflection point 
of the s-curve of expansion. Estimating the maximum level on these data would 
require excessive confidence in the accuracy of the functional specification. A prior 
could be put on the saturation level, so that, effectively, some runs would converge to 
a ceiling of 90 percent, others to 95 or 85 percent, for example. However, again this 
would then be transformed to a posterior that based on data that may not actually be 
informative. The alternative is to add uncertainty to the ceiling post-hoc, but doing 
so would risk ‘over-engineering’ this adjustment. 
Trend Break 
In reality, the transition onto a new, target-achieving, trajectory would be expected to 
occur gradually. While in general it would be feasible to ‘phase in’ a new drift, in the 
case of the SDGs, with a target horizon of only 15 years, any trajectory actually 
reaching the target will have to reach full speed sufficiently rapidly so that in terms of 
5-year time steps it can be treated as applying immediately. 
The start of the trend break is adjusted by attainment level, since the cohort aged 15-
19 in 2010, for example, will already eventually benefit from increased post-
secondary participation during the period 2015-2030. Conversely, changes starting in 
2015 were largely too late to affect the primary attainment of those already aged 15-
19 in 2020. 
Target specification 
Several components contribute to the justification for such uncertainty around the 
target. All presume agreement that insisting on a point target of exactly 100 percent is 
unreasonable in practice. Point targets below 100 percent are not meaningful, since 
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no country would be judged to have ‘failed’ the SDG target operationalised as 98 
percent participation if it overachieved and reached 99 percent instead. With this in 
mind, uncertainty around the model target arises from the following three sources. 
Firstly, even if ‘universal’ is operationalised by a target range below 100 percent, 
there may be reasonable disagreement about the exact value the lower threshold 
should take, i.e. how close to universal is ‘close enough’. A threshold of 97 percent 
has been used by Unesco in the past, for example, but there is clearly no objective 
reason why another entity should prefer this over 97.5 percent, 98 percent, or 99 
percent, say. 
Secondly, given a lower threshold for ‘true’ participation to be sufficiently close to 
universal, some allowance must be made for measurement error. This works both as 
an argument for having a target range in the first place, but, importantly, also as an 
argument to raise the lower threshold with respect to the achievement as 
measured/observed. In other words, even if we agreed that having 97 percent of 
children in fact complete secondary school means the target has been met, we may 
only be sufficiently confident this really is the case if the measured share is somewhat 
higher, say 98 percent, to account for the possibility this is in overestimate. 
Thirdly, even if we accepted nominal 97 percent as sufficient, countries do not, of 
course, have perfect control over the process. Not only does this suggest that 
countries need to aim to ‘overshoot’ if their aim is to cross the threshold. It also 
means that even if all countries aim squarely at the minimal 97 percent regardless, 
then post-hoc conditioning on having succeeded will still lead to an average 
‘overachievement’ among the successful countries. This is perfectly intuitive in other 
contexts. All sprinters taking ten seconds or less over a 100 m dash will on average 
take strictly less than ten seconds. 
While the latter two points are related, in the sense that measurement error is itself a 
form of ‘lack of perfect control’ over the measuremed outcome on the part of 
countries, it is worth a separate observation this argument applies even if we take all 
observed indicators at face value. Because of these multiple reasons for it, no attempt 
was made to endogenise uncertainty around the target, by making it a function of the 
estimated magnitude of the shocks, for example. In this sense, the target of ‘universal’ 
participation is more complicated to handle than a simple point target of some other 
fixed percentage. In that latter case, it would be possible to simply treat the target 
exactly as any real observation for purposes of conditioning on its achievement, with 
the exact same likelihood contribution. 
In the present case, for the reasons just discussed, a different specification should be 
chosen. For the present projections, the aim is a ‘fuzzy’ target distribution at the 
original scale that is practically flat over a couple of percentage points from 97 
percent to 99 percent, but drops off rapidly in either direction. A discontinuous cut-
off below 97 percent is undesirable for computational reasons, because the implied 
zero gradient in the likelihood would fail to guide the algorithm towards the target 
region. In any case, ‘meeting the target’ is not a perfectly sharp concept in the policy 
domain either, even once it has been operationalised with a numeric threshold. 
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In order to achieve the above pattern at the original scale, an exponentially modified 
Gaussian distribution (with mean corresponding to 0.97 at the untransformed scale 
and sigma = 0.05, lambda = 0.5) is specified around the target at the transformed 
scale. The reason for excluding values very close to true unity at the scale of 
participation shares is that these would translate to values at the transformed scale 
that diverge to infinity, requiring an unbounded speed-up of expansion. 
While the above approach is more meaningful in a probabilistic framework than 
assuming that ‘meeting the target’ means all countries reach exactly 98 percent in 
2030, say, it does represent a communication challenge. The target are extremely 
challenging as it is, and country representatives are likely to complain if they are 
deemed to have failed to stay on ‘the’ target track if the representative target path 
significantly overshoots the minimum threshold, as both the trace of cross-sectional 
means and medians do under the above approach. In order not to stray too far from 
established practice, we therefore identify the 0.01 quantile, i.e. the ‘minimal’ path, 
as the benchmark for progress towards the target. The full uncertainty range across 
target trajectories is employed merely as a pedagogical device to raise awareness of 
the fact that there is unlikely to be widespread success if everyone merely shoots for 
the minimum. 
Unfortunately, solving one communication problem immediately creates another, 
because at the beginning of the projection period, the lowes percentile of the target-
attaining trajectories naturally lies below the median of the baseline trend. Displaying 
the former as ‘the target path’ and the latter as ‘the trend path’ therefore creates the 
absurd impression that in order to reach a highly ambitious target, we ‘ought’ to start 
by slowing down. This leads to the - admittedly ad-hoc - solution of using the trend 
path as a lower cap for the target path, which therefore effectively deviates from the 
former not immediately in 2015, but with a delay. In the absence of an established 
statistical approach to summarising probabilistic target scenarios together with their 
necessary overshoot, it is not clear how else to deal with the very real 
communication challenge. 
A second subtlety created by the desire to estimate target-driven scenarios 
probabilistically within a Bayesian setting deserves additional attention. Recall that 
the proposed set-up corresponds to treating the target as a ‘future observation’, and 
effectively selecting target-achieving trajectories by conditioning on the target being 
achieved. One implication is that, even though these trajectories may make use of a 
trend-break, the historical trend may also be estimated differently in the target 
scenario. Technically, this is, of course, perfectly correct. By conditioning on target-
achievement, we are effectively answering the question: supposing the target is 
reached, how did we get there? And it is indeed both correct and statistically intuitive 
that among universes where Thailand, say, reaches universal secondary participation 
by 2030, those will be over-represented where, historically, Thailand actually has a 
higher ‘intrinsic’ expansion rate than historical evidence suggests, and it has to date 
been underperforming relative to its capabilities. However correct it may be, this 
implication creates a communication problem, since it is likely to be considered 
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counter-intuitive by a policy audience that the inclusion of a fictitious target should 
affect our estimates of historical dynamics. 
This problem is avoided here simply by putting a uniform prior on the amount of 
trend acceleration, so that it does not affect the marginal distributions of historical 
parameters. This approach at the same time solves another problem. If acceleration 
were not ‘free’ in likelihood terms, the estimation of the random shocks would 
inevitably be estimated upwards. In words, the results would be shifted towards 
considering part of the target-attainment to be literally due to luck. The fact that 
under the current set-up, this effect is avoided, at the same time creates the technical 
convenience of being able to use the very same simulated sequence of future shocks 
for different scenarios. Otherwise, doing so would risk creating a spurious upward 
‘spike’ in 2030 even in the ‘business-as-usual’ trend trajectory. 
While it is ‘safe’ with respect to these problems to impose an improper or proper 
uniform prior on the amount of trend acceleration necessary to reach the target, and 
this solution is adequate with respect to modelling SDG target trajectories that are in 
any case entirely unrealistic (see results section below), this issue deserves additional 
research in general, since it makes it difficult to include real information on the 
magnitude of the effects of plausible policy changes in the form of informative priors. 
Spill-over effects between education levels 
In addition, the target scenarios make explicit that accelerating expansion at one 
level of the education system will not leave other levels unaffected. In particular, 
some degree of ‘spill-over’ to the levels above is to be expected. This effect is 
modelled by exposing the attainment level above the target level, and the level above 
that (if any), to an increase in trend drift (at the transformed scale) that is 50 percent 
respectively 10 percent as large as required at the target level to meet the target. 
This can be interpreted as an approximation to cutting the log-odds ratio of 
transitioning from secondary to post-secondary of the target relative to trend scenario 
in half for the ‘additional’ secondary school graduates under the target-achieving 
trend, and maintaining those new odds into the future. If the model were specified in 
terms of a logit curve instead of a probit curve, this interpretation would be exact. 
Parenthetically, as already mentioned above, the reason the model is in fact specified 
in terms of probits is because this extends more naturally to model elaborations 
where an underlying Gaussian latent propensity for education is assumed at the 
individual level. Also recall the preceding discussion concerning the ceiling for post-
secondary attainment that maintaining constant transition rates from secondary to 
post-secondary are not an attractive alternative, because they would imply limiting 
ultimate post-secondary participation to the level of the current transition rate. 
The amount of 50 percent spill-over at the transformed scale was chosen for 
substantive reasons: there is no reason to expect a targeted boost at one level would 
actually increase growth at the level above more than the target level itself 
(suggesting the spill-over should remain below 100 percent), but it seems plausible to 
expect some upward pressure on post-secondary participation if the pool of eligible 
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upper secondary graduates increases. The reason the spill-over is not specified 
proportionally to the transition rate from secondary to post-secondary is that doing 
so would cap a country’s long-term participation in post-secondary at the level of the 
current transition rate, which will often be unreasonably low. If the current transition 
rate from secondary to post-secondary is 30 percent, for example, and this were held 
constant, then universal upper secondary attainment would imply merely 30 percent 
participation at post-secondary, and no further growth or convergence with other 
countries. 
In principle, an attempt could be made to utilise estimated correlations between the 
drifts at different levels in order to ‘endogenise’ the amount of spill-over. However, 
since each country only has one past secondary drift and post-secondary drift, these 
can only be correlated across sets of countries. But the spill-over effect will strongly 
depend on context, and questions such as whether funding for secondary expansion 
comes at the expense of funding for the post-secondary sector or not. It is not at all 
clear what the appropriate contextual country sets in terms of spill-over behaviour 
would be. More importantly, it is clear that the additional secondary expansion 
associated with a focused effort to universalise that level would be qualitatively 
different from the past general trend and would not at all represent “business as 
usual”. It is therefore questionable whether the past association between levels could 
sensibly be extrapolated. It seems preferable, therefore, to make the simple, but 
transparent, assumptions discussed at the beginning of this section. 
As a side note, the same argument explains why there are no secular period effects 
(‘year dummies’) included in the model: It is not at all clear that such positive or 
negative shocks affecting all countries in a single five-year period even exist. This 
would beg the question whether period effects should not rather be defined at the 
regional level, for example. At worst, there is a loss of efficiency, as correlation 
between the idiosyncratic country shocks is not exploited in the estimation. 
However, from this perspective also, there is no clear reason to expect period effects 
to be the most important source of such correlation. 
Limitations/Constraints 
While the above model in many advances the state-of-the-art in long-term education 
projections, there remain a number of incidental and fundamental limitations. 
While most countries of the world are included in the baseline data and the 
estimation, representing well over 95 percent of the world population, there are some 
gaps in country coverage. More importantly, these gaps are not random. One 
category of countries that is difficult to include, but ultimately not consequential in 
terms of the projections, are small island states. More problematic is the fact that, 
since the baseline data build on censuses and large-scale surveys, a minimum level of 
security and state capacity is normally required for countries to be included. 
Conversely, this means that ‘failed states’ and countries suffering from violent 
conflict are underrepresented in the data. Assuming these countries also exhibit 
below-average rates of educational expansion, this means that overall and regional 
trends are biased upwards to some extent in their absence. Alternatively, the 
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estimates may be interpreted as being unbiased, but conceptually restricted to 
representing the range of ‘non-catastrophic’ scenarios, the same way that even the 
‘low’ projections of global population by the UN do not take into account the 
possibility of catastrophic disease pandemics. 
Another data-related constraint has already been discussed, namely the unavoidable 
time lag associated with completed attainment. In the present context, this limitation 
is highlighted further because with baseline data from 2000 to 2010, the inability to 
pick up on the most recent trends in enrolments potentially underestimates the 
contribution of EFA and MDG related educational expansion to long-term trends. 
However, the verdict is still out to what extent such a contribution actually occurred 
at all. While there certainly were cases of strong enrolment growth during that 
period, the present projections show that significant growth was anyhow to be 
expected. Indeed, at the aggregate level, our results are broadly consistent with 
existing extrapolations based on enrolment/attendance, suggesting that, in practice, 
the time lag of attainment is not particularly problematic. 
Perhaps the biggest conceptual constraint is that attainment contains no measure of 
quality. Neither does enrolment or attendance, of course, and measuring quality is 
generally recognised as one of the single greatest unsolved challenges in international 
education statistics, matched only, perhaps, by the challenge of measuring equity. To 
some extent, this is therefore a data problem, that cannot currently be resolved. 
Existing efforts to derive general quality indices from international assessments are 
not without problems, and in any case are currently too limited to country coverage 
to provide a comprehensive solution. More generalisable perhaps, but even further 
removed from educational conceptions of quality, are efforts to estimate quality by 
differences in economic returns to nominally equivalent attainment levels that 
immigrants from different countries command in the US labour market, for instance. 
In any case, the challenge of modelling and projecting educational quality cannot 
feasibly be overcome within the scope of the present exercise. Instead, it is proposed 
that some sense of the potential impact of quality can be gained from the impact 
projections. This is discussed further below. 
Implementation 
Formal Description 
 
Formally, the core model can be cast in a formula as: 𝑦!,!,! = 𝛷(𝜆!,!,! + 𝜖!,!,!) 
  𝜆!,!,! = 𝜆!,!!!,! + 𝜏!,! + 𝑢!,!,! − 𝜃𝑢!,!!!,!, 
where 𝑦!,!,! is the share between zero and one reaching a given attainment level 
(index omitted) in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡 among gender 𝑔, 𝜆!,!,! is the predictor of 𝑦 at 
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the transfored scale, the 𝜖 are the ‘data error’ layer, and the 𝑢 the random ‘shocks’ to 
attainment. The 𝜆 follow a random walk, starting from the last position at each step, 
but potentially retracing a share 𝜃 of the previous period’s shock. The key parameter 
of interest for our purposes is 𝜏, capturing the country-specific drift (or ‘trend’). 
The above basic model is complicated further by the presence of gender convergence, 
which is defined through the expression: 𝜆′!,!,!!! = 𝜈!,!×𝜆′!,!,!!! + (1− 𝜈!,!)×𝜆′!,!,!!!! , 
 and replacing 𝜆 with 𝜆′ in the definition of 𝑦. 
In target scenarios, 𝜏!,! is replaced by 𝜏′!,!,! = 𝜏!,!, if  𝑡 ≤ 𝑡′𝜏!,! + 𝛿!,!, if  𝑡 > 𝑡′, 
where 𝑡′ is the ‘take-off’ time for the target scenario (e.g. 2015 for the SDGs) — 
suitably shifted to account for the age group actually modeled, as described above — 
and 𝛿 is the unconstrained ‘boost’ required to achieve the target (which is treated as a 
‘future observation’). 
Priors and Hyperpriors 
In terms of prior distributions, vague priors are specified that only incorporate 
knowledge of the order-of-magnitude of various effects, as well as logical bounds. 
The mean-reversion effect 𝜃 has a Beta(1.5, 1.5) prior in the interval (0, 1). The 
empirical gender convergence factor 𝜈 is level and country specific, with prior Beta(1, 
5), to ensure a value in the interval (0, 1), strongly skewed towards smaller values. 
True initial levels are given conceptually uninformative ‘flat’ priors, but restricted to 
the interval (-4, 4) to ensure a proper posterior. The idiosyncratic shocks at the probit 
scale, i.e. the gender, level, year, and country specific epsilons, are i.i.d. draws from a 
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard error 𝜎!. The additional errors 
stem from a Gaussian N(0, 0.05) distribution. The (gender, level, and country 
specific) drift parameters have Gaussian priors centred on regional means 
(themselves drawn from a Gaussian N(0, 1) distribution), with standard error 𝜎!"#$%. 
The hyper-priors on variance parameters 𝜎! and 𝜎!"#$% are Gaussian with mean zero 
and variance 0.2. 
Computational Details 
The model was implemented in the ‘Stan’ software package and posteriors samples 
generated through MCMC sampling. Chains converge consistently in around 100 
iterations, and a total of 500 samples was kept from four chains after discarding burn-
in and checking Gelman’s ‘R hat’ split-chain convergence criterion. The number of 
posterior samples is constrained not only by computation time, but also by the large 
number of scenario-time-country-level-gender-specific parameters (163 countries, 2 
genders, 5 education levels, 2 scenarios, 28 time steps). For each scenario, storage of 
  15 
the results requires more than 5 MB per iteration. However, even 500 samples in fact 
results in projection quantiles that are sufficiently smooth. 
Baseline Data 
The empirical historic expansion patterns are estimated on a recent set of global 
reconstructed time series of completed educational attainment (Lutz et al. 2014). 
These are disaggregated by country, year in the range 1970-2010, gender, 5-year age 
groups, and six education levels: none, incomplete primary, primary, lower 
secondary, upper secondary, post-secondary. The latter is an aggregate category that 
includes, but is explicitly not limited to, tertiary education. These time series were 
reconstructed from the most recent available large-scale cross-sectional baseline data. 
In most cases, that means either censuses or standard international household 
surveys, such as the DHS. The consolidated and harmonised baseline data were 
backprojected along cohort lines, accounting for educational mortality differentials. 
As an illustration of the basic principle, and ignoring said mortality selection, the 
share of 50-year-olds with at least upper secondary education in the year 2000 
informs us of the likely share of 40-year-olds in 1990. Where possible, these 
backprojections were validated against historic data sources. 
In the present exercise, 163 countries were included that could be nested within 
GEMR world regions and World Bank income groups. These cover a vast majority 
of the global population, and most exclusions are small (island) states. 
The key advantage of this dataset is firstly its large coverage, that is not limited to 
countries with historic time series data, and secondly consistency, since all 
attainment statuses are determined at the same point in time, thus avoiding as much 
as possible the problem of changing definitions over time. Differences in definitions 
between countries are harmonised through the ISCED classification scheme and 
case-by-case validation. 
The main disadvantage of this approach is the relatively large time lag. Firstly, the 
baseline data itself (with censuses normally only conducted every ten years). 
Secondly, because formal educational attainment can only be assumed to be 
essentially completed at ages adult ages (depending on the specific level), the effect of 
very recent or ongoing changes in enrolment trends are not reflected. 
Attainment projection results 
This section presents the results of the educational attainment projection model 
described above. In all of the following, the reference group in each year are the 15-
19-year-olds and their ultimate attainment. 
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Scenarios 
The focus in the previous section was on how to handle target scenarios in the 
projection. Here, we define what the scenarios modelled actually assume in terms of 
attainment dynamics. 
The baseline scenario, also called Global Education Trend (GET), has no target, and 
simply extrapolates the historic country-specific drift. Since the projections are 
stochastic, this actually represents an ensemble of projected trajectories. We use the 
path connecting the cross-sectional median values as the single representation of this 
scenario for visualisation, and to feed into the impact projections in the next section. 
The full distribution is, however, exploited in some of the analyses below, such as the 
estimated probabilities of reaching the target under the trend scenario. 
The SDG scenario assumes that upper secondary education is essentially universal 
(i.e. exceeds 97 percent) by 2030. In addition, spill-over to post-secondary is 
assumed, as specified in the model description above. 
The ‘slow’ scenario relaxes the time constraint of the SDG scenario. In other words, 
it assumes universal upper secondary attainment by 2040, ten years after the SDG 
target. Note that this also approximately matches a proposed generous interpretation 
of the SDG target as specifying that in 2030, the expected attainment should be at least 
upper secondary. In other words, that all transitions up to upper secondary are 
universal by that year. This means that upper secondary attainment would be 
universal among the cohort entering school in 2030, not necessarily the cohorts 
already in school at that time. Since upper secondary schooling typically takes 
around 12 years, this corresponds approximately to the ‘slow’ scenario, given our 
five-year aggregation of ages. 
The ‘low’ scenario relaxes the SDG scenario in terms of the target level, by assuming 
that lower secondary attainment is universal by 2030. This is of interest not only in 
light of the expectation that the literal SDG target will be unfeasible, but also reflects 
the fact that until late in the process of negotiating the SDGs, the attainment target 
was ambiguous as to whether it referred to upper or lower secondary school. 
 
Aggregate results 
Before examining the results for selected countries in the following sub-section 
(detailed results for all countries are available in an online appendix), we may gain 
an overall sense of what to expect from aggregate numbers at the global (Fig. 2) and 
regional (Fig. 3) levels, as well by income group (Fig. 4). 
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Figure 2: Global projection results. Ultimate attainment of the cohort aged 15–19 at the time 
shown. 
Figure 3: Regional aggregate projection results. Ultimate attainment of the cohort aged 15–19 
at the time shown. 
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Figure 4: Income group aggregate projection results. Ultimate attainment of the cohort aged 
15–19 at the time shown. 
We see that—at this scale—the ‘slow’ and ‘low’ SDG target variants have fairly 
similar implications at the lower secondary level, but that the ‘slow’ scenario is much 
closer to the literal SDG scenario at upper secondary. This is not entirely surprising, 
as the ‘low’ scenario only gives a boost to upper secondary expansion due to the 
assumed spill-over effect. However, while this spill-over may seem restrained, note 
that it is in fact structurally equivalent to the effect of the SDG target scenario on 
post-secondary expansion, which can be seen to be quite substantial. 
What is also evident is that the literal SDG scenario requires additional expansion 
that sets in immediately, but combined with the expected levelling-off towards the 
top-end, deviates significantly from a linear ‘straight line towards the target’. This 
will be explored in more detail below. 
In terms of the overall magnitude of the challenge, note that under prevailing trends 
without a sprint towards the targets, not even the old MDG goal of universal primary 
is likely to have been achieved by 2030. Accordingly, the trajectory necessary to meet 
the secondary school targets of the SDGs involves a decisive break with past trends, 
else meeting this target is a lifetime into the future. 
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With respect to the high-income countries that are essentially already ‘on track’ to 
universal secondary education, it is worth emphasising once more that just because a 
given milestone lies in the path of the trend trajectory, this does not mean that 
achieving it is in any way ‘automatic’. A significant policy effort will still be required. 
The message is merely that such a policy effort would not be unexpected in a country 
in that situation. More generally, in all of the following, the estimated ‘probabilities’ 
should not be interpreted as factual statements about the state of the world, but as 
‘shares of simulated futures’ (which, incidentally, is also the correct interpretation of 
the ‘probabilities’ issued in the context of weather forecasts). In other words, they are 
probabilities conditional on countries following future trajectories that are 
structurally consistent with past behaviour, and neither collapsing into failed states, 
nor abolishing formal schooling altogether in favour of technology-driven ‘on 
demand’ education, which both may have non-zero real-life probability of occurring. 
As such, a statement such as ‘Country A has an x percent probability of reaching the 
target under current trends’ is correctly interpreted simply as a measure of the degree 
to which the target deviates from the trend that can be compared across countries. 
Moreover, the model does not and cannot account for the probability of countries 
actually adopting additional SDG-motivated expansion policies, or the likelihood of 
success or failure of such policies. The trend assumes no such additional efforts 
beyond what would be expected based on past record, and the target scenarios 
assume that the target was indeed attained. Attempted and partial success is not 
modelled. 
As mentioned, attaining a target of universal participation is operationalised as 
exceeding 97 percent participation. While such ‘slack’ in the definition is anyhow 
unavoidable simply because the monitoring indicators are not observed without 
error, it is clearly problematic from a rights perspective. At some level, it explicitly 
states that the most marginalised and hardest-to-reach literally ‘do not count’. 
However, apart from the fact that there is no alternative at the level of statistical 
modelling, a tentative answer to this concern is that at that point, the policy focus 
should perhaps switch from seeing the very hardest-to-reach as a residual, to focusing 
on the positive identification of those excluded. 
Returing to the question of missing even the 97 percent threshold, this can occur in 
rather different ways. Consider a country with 90 percent upper secondary 
participation that is edging very slowly upwards. It might spend a few decades within 
a few percentage points of the target. The other extreme is illustrated by a country 
that somehow manages to go from zero to universal upper secondary participation 
between 2015 and 2035, but that in 2030 is still ‘only’ at 80 percent. In other words, 
there are potentially large differences between a perspective focused on the outcome 
gap in 2030 relative to the target, versus a perspective focused on the time gap between 
2030 and actually reaching universal secondary participation.  
Regional means (population-weighted, see below) of: 
(1) probability of universal upper secondary by 2030. 
(2) probability of exceeding 80% upper secondary by 2030. 
(3) median gap to universal upper secondary in 2030. 
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(4) probability of universal upper secondary by 2040. 
(5) median year of universal upper secondary. 
(6) probability of universal lower secondary by 2030. 
(7) probability of exceeding 80% lower secondary by 2030. 
(8) median gap to universal lower secondary in 2030. 
(9) probability of universal lower secondary by 2040. 
(10) median year of universal lower secondary. 
region (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Caucasus & C 
Asia 
58.1 98.0 3.5 71.6 2020 90.3 99.9 0.7 95.1 1976 
E & SE Asia 9.1 33.8 24.5 11.8 2054 71.8 98.2 2.7 85.6 2017 
Europe & N 
America 
60.5 97.3 3.4 76.1 2020 94.7 100.0 0.6 97.6 1991 
Latin A & 
Caribbean 
0.5 34.6 26.3 2.2 2066 12.0 88.5 9.5 33.5 2039 
N Africa & W 
Asia 
3.1 49.7 23.0 12.8 2055 26.5 74.0 12.8 46.0 2038 
S Asia 0.1 32.5 26.4 1.6 2058 6.7 82.5 11.1 31.2 2041 
SSA 0.0 5.9 57.5 0.2 2085 2.6 32.4 37.6 6.2 2079 
Income group means (population-weighted, see below). 
income group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
High income 48.3 91.5 5.9 62.9 2028 85.2 99.3 1.3 91.3 1996 
Upper middle 
income 
2.2 29.5 25.9 4.4 2059 66.0 97.7 3.2 78.8 2021 
Lower middle 
income 
2.6 33.5 27.1 5.7 2059 9.8 79.4 12.2 32.3 2041 
Low income 0.0 3.9 69.6 0.2 2092 0.7 12.3 50.3 3.3 2095 
Note that in the above, the aggregate figures for groups of countries do not represent 
the results for the ‘pooled’ populations directly, but instead are weighted averages of 
the country results in those regions. One issue this creates is the choice of country 
weights to use in calculating the weighted averages. Different, equally reasonable, 
answers may be possible with respect to whether to base the weights on the total or 
school-age population, and which reference year to use. In the above, the average 
total population during the period 2010–2030 was used. Note that other summaries 
or syntheses of our results may prefer alternative weighting schemes, with marginally 
different numeric results. Projected years of target attainment are more sensitive to 
this than attainment levels and associated probabilities. 
Projected probability of universal upper/lower secondary by 2030 
A first indication of which countries face the greatest challenge is to examine the 
probability of meeting the target under prevailing historic trends. For upper 
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secondary, these figures contain few surprises. Moving through the regions in the 
(alphabetical) order shown: Many former socialist republics are already ‘on track’ to 
universal upper secondary participation, with females outpacing males. In East and 
South-East Asia, the frontrunners South Korea, Singapore, and Japan will surprise 
no-one with their square aim at meeting the target. Females in Mongolia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines follow far behind this group, but are still fairly well-placed 
compared to other middle-income countries in the Global South. With the exception 
of Canada, the top of the list for Europe and North America is dominated by former 
socialist countries, with traditionally high educational participation. In Latin 
America & the Caribbean, only Puerto Rico stands a reasonable chance of meeting 
the target without a historic amount of effort. In North Africa and Western Asia, it is 
noteworthy that—under current trends—the target is much more likely to be met for 
females than for males, reflecting the rapid ‘catch-up’ for females in the last few 
decades, and that there are very large differences between the Gulf countries, that are 
similar in many other relevant respects, such as income. Finally, in South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, there is practically no chance even for the regional front-runners 
to achieve the target unless a clear break from past trends is achieved. 
With respect to the less ambitious target of universal lower secondary, one might say 
that ‘lower secondary is to South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa what upper 
secondary is to Latin America and the Middle East’, that is: distinctly in the realm of 
possibility for the frontrunners, but no-one else. Noteworthy rank reversals are that 
Jamaica, Tunisia, and South Africa rank much higher on lower than on upper 
secondary in their respective regions. 
Projected probability of upper/lower secondary exceeding 80 percent 
by 2030 
It could be that the above paints an excessively pessimistic picture if there are many 
cases where countries would—under current trends—not quite make the target, but 
get reasonably close. This column is structurally the same as the previous ones, but 
with respect to reaching 80 percent of lower secondary attainment instead of 
universal. In this case, many fewer cases have a probability below 1 percent. 
On this measure, with respect to upper secondary, the comparison is enlightening 
between Latin America & the Caribbean, as well as North Africa & Western Asia on 
the one hand, and South Asia as well as Sub-Saharan Africa on the other. In the 
former regions, outside of a handful of frontrunners, the projected probability of fully 
achieving the SDG target of universal upper secondary was marginal, and only 
marginally higher than for countries in the latter group of regions. However, many 
countries in the former regions are likely to get close to universal upper secondary 
than in the latter regions. Also worth highlighting, in light of the global aggregate 
figures, is that India would actually be expected to make great strides towards mass 
upper secondary attainment irrespective of the SDGs, and even though the most 
recent policy efforts in this direction were not even part of the baseline data. 
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Considering lower secondary results in a strikingly different picture. Clearly, mass 
participation (if not quite universal) at this level is vastly more achievable for many 
developing countries. 
Median projected upper/lower secondary attainment gap remaining 
by 2030 
A different way of looking at countries that do not quite reach the target is to 
examine no the probability of meeting some lower threshold as above, but the actual 
projected gap. While this gives a similar ranking in many cases, it does not 
necessarily do so, and even when the top countries are the same, conveys a different 
piece of information. 
In effect, for both lower and upper secondary this column changes little, with almost 
identical rankings. It does, nevertheless, put the projected probabilities for fully 
meeting the SDG target into perspective more clearly, if we consider particular 
examples. For females in Jordan, say, while the projected 12.8 percent probability of 
meeting the target seems small, the figure in this column shows that this group is 
actually expected to get within striking distance of the target even under prevailing 
trends and without additional SDG-inspired drive. 
Conversely, the large expected gaps provides a sense of the magnitude of effort 
required in the most challenging settings. There are no big surprises here, perhaps 
apart from the fact that the largest gaps to be bridged in Europe would still be among 
the largest in South Asia, or North Africa & Western Asia. While this might be 
interpreted as a success in defining targets that are still relevant to relatively high-
income countries, this comes at the cost of a target that leaves demoralising gaps to 
what would otherwise be expected to happen in many SSA countries. 
Projected probability of universal upper/lower secondary by 2040 
It is possible for a country on a rapid expansion path to be quite far below 100 
percent in the target year 2030, but to be not very far behind in the time dimension. 
We therefore consider the projected median probability of meeting the lower 
secondary target by 2040 instead of 2030. 
For upper secondary, this perspective mostly results in a more optimistic view on the 
Middle East, were several countries that were shown above to have limited prospects 
of meeting the SDG target outright are actually merely lagging in time. This 
contrasts sharply with South Asia or SSA, where an extended target date makes little 
practical difference to making the target more achievable without massive trend 
breaks. 
Similar conclusions apply to lower secondary. We can see that many countries in 
Latin America & the Caribbean, as well as in North Africa & Western Asia, are 
currently merely somewhat ‘too slow’ rather than ‘too low’ to universalise lower 
secondary by 2030. And again, South Asia and SSA are ‘one schooling level behind’, 
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in that their position with respect to lower secondary is comparable to that of the 
aforementioned regions with respect to upper secondary. 
Absolute growth 
While we mostly analyse relative changes, at least at the global aggregate level, it is 
worthwhile to consider the implications of the SDG targets in terms of the absolute 
educational expansion required. fig. 5 shows the total number of 15-19-year-olds that 
would complete the stated school level in each year, relative to the year 2010. Note 
the logarithmic scale. 
Figure 5: Growth required relative to 2010 baseline in absolute number of graduates per 5-year 
cohort a the level shown. 
Most striking is clearly the extent to which Sub-Saharan Africa faces challenges in 
terms of capacity expansion that are utterly unprecendented. In every other world 
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region, by the time mass participation in secondary had become part of the policy 
agenda, the average number of children had already dropped significantly. 
Combined with low starting levels of secondary participation in many SSA countries, 
we see that a five-fold capacity increase would be required at lower secondary, and a 
tenfold increase at upper secondary. By contrast, even in North Africa and the 
Middle East, as well as in South Asia, at most a doubling of secondary school 
numbers would be required. In Central, East, and South-East Asia, even universal 
participation can no longer offset shrinking cohort sizes, and secondary schooling is 
practically certain to contract in the medium term, at least in terms of the number of 
students. 
Notably, while the SDG targets, however interpreted, certainly demand even greater 
absolute growth from SSA, even the trend scenario implies a multifold increase. 
Recalling the interpretation of the trend, this means that SSA faces a large capacity 
challenge just to maintain its position relative to other regions. Conversely, this 
means that unless upper secondary numbers are increased by a factor of five by 2030, 
SSA will fall even further behind, even if countries everywhere effectively ignore the 
SDG targets. Nevertheless, although quantitative expansion similar to the SDG 
scenario is assumed to occur under the trend scenario eventually, a tenfold increase 
over 40-50 years (trend) is a very different proposition than a tenfold increase over 
10-15 years. 
Careful readers may also notice that in the long run, the ‘slow’ and ‘low’ scenarios 
actually require higher absolute capacity than the more ambitious SDG scenario. 
That is because by 2060, the latter is already likely to have resulted in smaller birth 
cohorts. 
Country-level results 
Graphs of the country-specific trajectories for each scenario are shown in the online 
appendix. 
As mentioned above, different age thresholds are applied at each level for 
determining which age groups are included in the estimation of past trends. In 
addition, the most recent observed attainment of the 15-19 age group is plotted for 
complete/incomplete primary level, but not included in the estimation. These data 
points clearly show two counter-acting effects, depending on whether they are clearly 
below or above the otherwise consistent trend, namely late attainment on the one 
hand, and accelerating improvement in the youngest cohorts that perhaps benefited 
from EFA on the other. Unfortunately, since both do occur in the data, this age 
group really does need to be excluded. This fails to capture some recent 
improvements, but including them would result in too many artificial declines. As a 
matter of fact, it seems that even the 20-24 suffers such problems at secondary level 
in some countries, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia region, but also in 
some European countries. 
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Benchmarking against regional front-runners 
As is evident, the acceleration that would be required of some countries to actually 
meet the SDG target of universal secondary education is entirely unprecedented. 
One simple way of assessing what order-of-magnitude of progress could reasonably 
be expected. 
Obviously this completely disregards differences in income, institutions, tradition, 
governance, and policy in different countries. Countries within a region are not 
necessarily ‘similar’ in the relevant aspects. Even if they were, what worked in a 
similar country cannot necessarily be successfully replicated elsewhere. We pay 
attention to these caveats by focusing on the ‘negative’ interpretation. This 
interpretation is that the estimates in Table 3 provide further evidence that the SDG 
education targets are unrealistically ambitious: for the vast majority of countries that 
are far from the goal, even expanding at the fastest average pace any country in their 
region has ever done would not be sufficient to meet the SDG education target. This 
is true even for many industrialised countries, and for every single country in South 
Asia and SSA. In short, the expansion required to meet the SDG target is literally 
unprecedented. Universalising lower secondary schooling instead is much more 
achievable in South Asia in relation to historic benchmarks, but in SSA even this less 
ambitious goal would require unprecedented expansion. 
Percentage of countries in each region for which matching the highest rate of educational 
expansion previously achieved in their region would be sufficient to meet the stated target. 
region 
universal 
upper 
secondary 
by 2030 
universal 
upper 
secondary 
by 2040 
universal 
lower 
secondary 
by 2030 
Caucasus and Central Asia 11 18 22 
Eastern and South-Eastern 
Asia 
3 5 14 
Europe and Northern 
America 
9 16 27 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
0 1 7 
Northern Africa and Western 
Asia 
1 4 14 
Southern Asia 0 0 3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 1 
Note that both here and in the following section, the results are with respect to the 
simulated paths towards the targets that result in 2030 attainment levels spread over 
the range from 97 to 100 percent, as would be expected across all countries if even 
the slowest expanding succeed in crossing the 97 percent threshold. With a more 
forgiving interpretation, specifically if the probabilities of each country barely 
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reaching the 97 percent threshold are considered instead, the numbers would be 
somewhat higher, especially in higher-income regions. However, the qualitative 
conclusion that the historic benchmark is insufficient for practicually all countries in 
South Asia and SSA remains unchanged. These alternative figures are available on 
request. 
Nonlinear expansion and intermediate targets 
As discussed above, a deliberate choice was made to model the path towards the 
SDG target variants as ‘organic’ expansion trajectories that are accelerated, but in 
terms of their general pattern nevertheless match typical past experience. In other 
words, we examine what it would look like if countries, on their way to achieving the 
target, expand education the way rapidly-expanding countries do, in fact, expand. In 
particular, this includes a ‘levelling-off’ as universal participation is approached, 
whereby the ‘last few percent’ become more and more difficult to reach. In addition 
ta matching past empirical patterns, this also fits well with general expectations. This 
issue of nonlinear expansion is important, because ignoring it potentially results in 
misleading policy assessments. In particular, determining whether countries are ‘on 
track’ to achieving the target based on whether they have — so far — followed a 
linear path towards the target is likely to overestimate their chances of actually 
reaching the target on time, since such intermediate progress leaves no room for later 
deceleration. 
This effect is quantified in the following table, that shows the share of simulated 
target-achieving trajectories that passed within 2 percentage points of linearly-
interpolated milestones at 5 and 10 years into tho SDG time horizon. As is evident, 
outside of the high-attainment regions, and including such a relatively advanced 
region as Latin America, reaching the linear milestones for universal secondary 
education does not at all indicate that a country is ‘on track’ to reach the target. On 
the contrary, countries that pass these milestones are already so far behind that it is 
already extremely unlikely they can reach the target without even further 
acceleration beyond whatever speed-up they already achieved during the initial part 
of the SDG period. This also applies to a marginally lesser degree to the target of 
universal lower secondary. 
Moreover, the differences between the regions imply that the least advantaged 
regions are potentially disadvantaged further by the application of linear milestones, 
because when they are judged to be ‘on track’ according to the linear milestones and 
perhaps therefore less in need of additional support, they are actually still less likely 
to actually reach the target. 
Share of target-reaching trajectories in each region that exceed by at most 2 points the linearly 
interpolated “stepping stones” between starting point and target. 
region 
5-year linear 
stepping 
stone 
towards 
10-year linear 
stepping 
stone 
towards 
5-year linear 
stepping 
stone 
towards 
10-year linear 
stepping 
stone 
towards 
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universal 
upper 
secondary 
by 2030 
universal 
upper 
secondary 
by 2030 
universal 
lower 
secondary 
by 2030 
universal 
lower 
secondary 
by 2030 
Caucasus and 
Central Asia 
38 35 78 77 
Eastern and South-
Eastern Asia 
15 14 31 29 
Europe and Northern 
America 
22 21 81 79 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
1 1 12 11 
Northern Africa and 
Western Asia 
1 2 12 10 
Southern Asia 0 0 5 4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 1 1 
As noted in the preceding section, these probabilities are with respect to the 
interpretation that a group of countries reaching the target means their attainment 
levels will be spread over the range from 97 to 100 percent, rather than every country 
barely crossing the lower threshold, but even the latter, laxer, specification would not 
change the substantive conclusions. 
 
Summary 
We can observe that at the country level, just as at the regional level already shown, 
the extent to which meeting the SDGs, however interpreted, requires a deviation 
from past trends varies considerably. This ranges from getting close to meeting the 
target being almost expected based on past trends in many OECD countries, to 
requiring a noticeable, but perhaps not infeasible push in Indonesia or Iran, for 
instance, to requiring trend changes, as in Mexico, that perhaps strain credibility but 
are not entirely without precedent, to ‘scenarios’ that at best serve to bring into stark 
relief the utter implausibility of universalising upper secondary education in Chad, 
say, within 15 years. 
At the risk of over-simplification, we might say that in Latin America & the 
Caribbean, as well as in North Africa & Western Asia, the main challenge is to 
accelerate existing dynamics, by contrast with large parts of South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa, where the challenge is better framed in terms of raising the level. 
With respect to these two groups of regions, we also note that a ‘more level playing 
field’ that respects different starting levels would be to aim for universal upper 
secondary in the former, but universal lower secondary in the latter. 
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It is nevertheless of interest to gain a sense of what the contribution of educational 
expansion to other SDG goals could be, because even partial progress towards the 
education target may be worthwhile (including in purely economic terms) even from 
a purely instrumental perspective. 
Projections of other development dimensions conditional on 
education 
As the review in the first part of this report showed, education has strong linkages 
with virtually all other dimensions of sustainable development, both direct and 
indirect. Most (though not all) of these are positive reinforcements. Accordingly, 
trajectories of educational progress towards the SDG’s education targets are not only 
of interest on their own terms (as analysed in the preceding chapter), but also in 
terms of their implications for other development outcomes, which is the focus of 
this chapter. 
 
Modelling educational development impacts 
Second-stage models selected 
As outlined at the end of the literature review, not all development dimensions are 
equally suited to be analysed from the perspective of the potential contribution of 
educational expansion. 
Firstly, goals and targets associated with well-defined indicators are required for a 
quantitative model of the relationship with educational attainment. Secondly, the 
existence of strong theoretical arguments and evidence for a relationship with 
education makes for more meaningful analyses, and takes us closer to a causal 
interpretation. Thirdly, there must be some amount of historic data on which the 
quantitative strength of the relationship with education can be estimated. Finally, in 
supporting the overall argument that education is strongly-connected within the 
‘network’ of SDG interactions, it is desirable to model outcomes drawn from 
different dimensions of sustainable development. 
These criteria justify the selection of the following outcomes. Two of these, namely 
health and economics, are areas where the effect of education is well-known in 
principle, but the specific difference that achieving the education SDGs could make 
has not been known until now. The third, disaster vulnerability, is an area where a 
strong relationship with education can be identified, but there remains little 
understood among actors in that field. 
Specifically, in the following we present model results for how infant and child 
mortality (relating to SDG 3.2), specifically survival to age 5, differs according to 
education scenario, as well as adult life expectancy (reflecting SDGs 3.3 and 3.4). In 
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the economic dimension, we do the same for aggregate national economic growth 
(relating to SDGs 8.1 and 8.2), the absolute extreme poverty headcount rate (SDG 
1.1), and — more tentatively — the relative position of the ‘bottom 40 percent’ (SDG 
10.1). Finally, we move to modelling disaster deaths (relating to SDGs 1.5, 13.1, and 
11.5). 
The domain-specific models of the relationship between education and these 
outcomes are discussed in the respective sections that follow. 
Not explicitly modelled are other SDG targets that fully meeting the SDG education 
target of universal secondary education would contribute to or even achieve ‘by 
definition’ even though they are outside of ‘the education SDG 4’, such as SDG 8.6, 
calling for a substantial reduction in the proportion of youth not in employment, 
education or training. 
Notable exclusions 
The selection according to these criteria clearly does not amount to a judgement on 
the relative ‘importance’ of different SDGs. This follows immediately from the very 
first criterion above, quantifiability, which is a necessary requirement for modelling, 
but most definitely not a measure of importance. 
Notable exclusions of outcomes that would be desirable to model in principle include 
health impacts in terms of Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALY), for example, but 
also the contribution of rising educational attainment to climate change itself, either 
in the form of carbon emissions, or even at the scale of degrees centigrade directly. 
Unfortunately, explicit numeric estimates of the contribution of an SDG education 
scenario to these outcomes is infeasibly, or not prudent, for different reasons. 
With respect to DALYs, which are based on disease-specific prevalences, data on 
education differentials is unfortunately only available for very few specific diseases. 
Moreover, the way ‘DALYs saved’ are conventionally calculated is partly already 
based on projections of how disease-specific morbidity/mortality rates will develop in 
the future. This implicitly already accounts for expected improvements to education, 
and applying education differentials on top of the published DALY rates, in 
combination with compositional change in terms of attainment, would effectively be 
‘double-counting’ the education effect. Even if this issue were ignored (and it appears 
to be routinely ignored in estimates of the benefit of technological progress in terms 
of DALYs, which strictly speaking suffers a similar problem), education is likely to 
have quite different effects on morbidity and mortality. This means such a model 
would be highly complex and is not feasible as one outcome study among several. 
Obtaining a customised estimates of the effect of SDG-driven educational expansion 
(through income and consumption) in terms of numeric increases in global average 
temperature is not feasible because, at the time of writing, it would require running 
the entire chain of IPCC models. 
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Education ‘quality’ as strength of association with outcomes 
It would be desirable to be able to investigate the potential impact of education 
quality on other development outcomes. However, it is not practicable to model this 
explicitly. To begin with, there is a lack of agreement on what exactly ‘educational 
quality’ is, and how to measure it. For any particular measure, data coverage across 
countries and time is severely limited. It is unsound to assume that the quality of the 
education today’s 50-year-olds in some country received as children is equal to 
whatever quality measure is — at best — available for a recent year. Time series of 
quality indicators would therefore definitely be required that are simply not 
forthcoming. It is also not at all clear that the same quality markers would be 
relevant for different development outcomes. 
Some sense of the role of education quality can arguably be gained within the 
existing framework, by examining the strength of the association between education 
and other development outcomes as a proxy for quality. Intuitively, if education 
makes us live longer, then better education should make us live even longer. 
For impact models that simply use educational attainment as a regression input, and 
where the strength of the education effect is a single number, such as the disaster 
deaths model further below, this is straightforward to implement by varying the 
magnitude of the relevant regression coefficient. 
Unfortunately, this approach is not always possible when each attainment level has 
its own coefficient, especially when these are defined in dependence on each other 
and underly a time trend. The way the association between a mother’s attainment 
and child mortality is currently modelled in the Wittgenstein Centre population 
projections, for example, is such that the effect of different attainment levels is 
defined relative to the effect of upper secondary, which in turn follows a defined 
trend. If the reference level were ‘no education’, it would be possible to vary the 
strength of ‘the effect of education’ as a proxy for education quality, simply by 
proportionately re-scaling the coefficients associated with higher attainment levels. 
However, similarly reducing the education differential by reducing the size of the 
coefficients when the reference level is secondary education would effectively raise up 
the health outcomes of the less educated, rather than diminish the health premium of 
those with secondary schooling. At the same time, redefining the reference level is 
complicated by the fact that the secular trend is specified in terms of the upper 
secondary baseline. As a result, varying the strength of the education effect in the 
desired way involves recalculating the secular mortality trend. 
However, in such situations where varying the education coefficient is not 
straightforward or impracticable, the comparison between the different attainment 
scenarios may serve as an indication of the role of quality instead. For instance, if the 
full SDG scenario is met at the expense of making upper secondary only as good as 
lower secondary is now, then that impact has already been estimated by the ‘low’ 
scenario. And conversely, if super-quality lower secondary conferred the same 
advantage in the future as upper secondary does now, this is already estimated by the 
‘sdg’ scenario. This interpretation would suggest that the potential role of quality is 
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of a similar magnitude as the quantity: SDG with deteriorating quality could easily 
halve the benefits, generaling from the comparisons between the universal upper 
(‘sgd’) and universal lower (‘low’) secondary scenarios explored below. 
Health 
Health is a crucial dimension of sustainable development, and health goals are 
prominent among the SDGs. In addition, the relationship between education and 
health is known to be robust, and is relatively well-studied. This is reflected in the 
fact that, unlike the link with economic outcomes and disaster vulnerability discussed 
further below, mortality differentials by education are an intrinsic component our 
population projections, rather than being modeled post-hoc. Accordingly, the 
differences in the simulated outcomes include interactions such as the fact that the 
education-induced improvements in average under-5-mortality are attenuated by 
lower average fertility of the more educated mothers. The exact assumptions 
included in the model, and the evidence based on which they rest, are fully 
documented in Lutz et al. (2014). Note that a general SDG population scenario 
would take into account the implications of the health goals, for instance. Here, the 
‘SDG scenario’ deliberately maintains existing trend assumptions for fertility and 
mortality, in order to isolate the potential contribution of educational expansion. 
With infant and child mortality in mind, we first examine how the education profile 
of women of child-bearing age develops over time under the SDG scenario for 
education compared to the trend Fig. 6. The most important difference for the issue 
at hand is the complete disappearance of women with very low education under the 
SDG scenario. The impact is greatest in SSA, where the largest share of women with 
little education would otherwise be expected to remain under the trend. As 
mentioned, the education profiles of mothers is likely to improve less rapidly, due to 
the higher average fertility of the less-educated. However, there is also some evidence 
that child health also benefits from community-level effects and the general diffusion 
of healthy practices and behaviours. Such effects in turn would suggest that the 
benefits would be greater than suggested by the changing education distribution of 
individual women. 
Figure 6: Change in attainment profile of females aged 20–29 over time. 
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In terms of the outcomes in the form of non-survival to age 5, fig. 7 displays the 
estimated impacts at the same two period cross-sections: once in 2030, and for 2050. 
The rationale for an extended time horizon is that the later ‘SDG cohorts’ who 
complete their schooling close to 2030 will have most of their children some time 
after that. Indeed, it is evident that the education effect continues to grow betwene 
2030 and 2050 even in absolute terms, despite the fact that the overall mortality 
levels are significantly lower at the latter time. We see the first evidence of a 
recurring theme, namely that the benefits of universal lower secondary schooling are 
roughly half of those of universal upper secondary either. Achieving either can be 
expected to make a meaningful contribution to reducing infant and child mortality. 
This includes even regions with relatively low overall child mortality, such as East & 
Southeast Asia, where even a numerically small average difference of 1–2 deaths per 
1,000 represent a 10–20 percent difference amounting to tens of thousands of 
avoided deaths. 
Figure 7: Under-5 mortality by region and scenario. 
Nevertheless, it is the high-mortality settings that are our greatest concern, and fig. 8 
shows the trajectories for those in greater detail, and in terms of relative changes 
compared to the baseline in 2015. Up to 10 percentage points in the drop of under-5-
mortality may be added by achieving the SDG education target of universal upper 
secondary schooling, even by 2030, before all the beneficiaries have actually begun 
their childbearing. Moreover, in SSA, the decline in child mortality may well begin 
to slow down in the absence of additional educational expansion. 
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Figure 8: Under-5 mortality over time for highest-mortality regions. 
While these effects may be considered to be only moderate, it is important to note 
that they represent the differences between SDG scenarios and a baseline that in 
itself assumes quite significant educational expansion based on existing trends. 
Moreover, much of the additional expansion implied by the SDG targets occurs at 
upper levels of education, while the most dramatic gains in terms of child health 
occur at the bottom end of the education ladder. 
A direct comparison with the estimates of the historical contribution of education to 
declining child mortality of Gakidou et al. (2010) is not possible, because their 
analysis concerns years of schooling rather than attainment, and is benchmarked 
against no educational improvement. With these caveats in mind, the additional 
benefit of the SDG scenario over and above prevailing trends estimated here for SSA 
is similar in magnitude to the contribution of educational expansion during the 
period 1990 to 2010 estimated by Gakidou et al., at around 15 per 1,000 child deaths 
less. 
In terms of the potential contribution of the education SDG to improving adult 
health, fig. 9 displays modelled trajectories of average remaining life-expectancy at 
age 15 in SSA. In other regions the impact is marginal. Despite significant 
differences in attainment-specific life expectancy even in high income countries, it is 
unsurprising that the change to overall life expectancy is very modest, given the 
relatively short time horizon and modest increases to the stock of total population 
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attainment. Even in SSA, the cohort benefitting from the SDG scenarios have not 
reached ages of high mortality even by 2050. Extending the time horizon further 
does not provide additional insight, because in the very long run, convergence 
assumptions drown out most of the education differentials. 
 
Figure 9: Projected adult life expectancy (remaining life expectancy at age 15) by scenario, for 
highest-mortality regions. 
Economic growth and poverty reduction 
The economic effects of human capital expansion are among the most widely-
studied, and have already been commented on in the literature review. However, 
only relatively recently has this literature become sufficiently sensitive to the 
importance of accounting for age structure in determining the expected economic 
benefits of educational expansion. Of particular interest in light of the SDG goals, 
and also in terms of readily-available models which can be applied to our education 
scenarios, are aggregate economic growth, and extreme ‘dollar a day’ poverty 
(currently defined as USD 1.25 at 2005 PPP, or equivalently at USD 1.9 in 2011 
PPP). 
In the following, national income projections are obtained using the model by 
Crespo Cuaresma (2015). The income projection framework combines population 
projections by age and educational attainment level with an aggregate production 
function estimated using historical data. Human capital dynamics are assumed to 
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have two distinct effects on income per capita. On the one hand, improvements in 
educational attainment affect labour productivity. On the other hand, total factor 
productivity is also affected by human capital through its effect on technology 
creation and adoption. The results of applying this model to our SDG education 
scenarios are shown in fig. 10. While the main scale is in logged GDP per capita 
relative to its level in the year 2000, the difference between the trend and SDG 
scenarios in 2050 is additionally translated into straightforward percentages. 
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Figure 10: Projected GDP growth by scenario. 
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Because the individuals benefitting from educational expansion during the period 
2015–2030 have to enter the labour force in significant numbers before being able to 
make much of an impact, it is unsurprising that meaningful growth effects are 
delayed until long after the SDG target year of 2030. Indeed, in high and upper-
middle income countries, the additional growth expected from SDG-driven 
educational expansion is minimal. Not because education does not matter, but 
because many of these countries anyhow have high and increasing levels of 
secondary participation even under the trend scenario, so that the SDG effect is at 
most marginal. 
This plays out rather differently in low-income countries. While universalising upper 
secondary education would in principle be expected to make a large difference to 
their growth prospects in the long run, to the tune of an additional 75 percent by 
2050, these countries are of course also farthest from realising this goal. However, 
even universal secondary education may actualise around half of this gain. Again, 
this understates the contribution of educational expansion as such, because 
significant educational growth is expected even under the trend scenario that 
provides the baseline here. 
Arguably of greater importance in terms of the SDGs than overall economic growth 
is the goal of poverty reduction. Poverty impacts here are approximated by 
combining the growth rates of the above model to with the economic growth 
elasticities for poverty obtained by Ravallion (2012, AER). The underlying 
assumptions is that (mean) income per capita growth leads to poverty reduction, but 
that poverty itself has an effect on the elasticity of poverty to economic growth. This 
implies that econometric models for poverty change should include an interaction 
term of (lagged) poverty and income growth in addition to the standard income per 
capita growth variable. The results are shown in fig. 11. Only the lowest two income 
groups are shown here, because ‘dollar a day’ poverty is rare in higher income 
countries almost by definition. 
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Figure 11: Projected absolute extreme poverty by scenario. 
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Assuming the overall pattern stays the same, it seems that while accelerated 
educational expansion can be expected to make a sizeable contribution to overall 
growth, given the lag time, the education SDG might be ‘too late’ to contribute much 
to eliminating extreme poverty in terms of an absolute threshold, other than in the 
very poorest and currently least-educated countries. In those, however, the SDG 
scenario could ‘save 10 years’ in poverty elimination. That alone is nevertheless 
insufficient to ‘eliminate’ extreme poverty by 2030. Because the main constraint on 
education making a larger contribution to this goal appears to be timing, no analysis 
based on varying the strength of the relationship as a proxy for education quality was 
attempted. 
To put these results into perspective, however, note that by 2030, the current 
absolute extreme poverty threshold will become increasingly irrelevant, and the 
question whether accelerated educational expansion can still contribute to raising 
large numbers of people to higher income levels becomes increasingly important. 
Indeed, the current target can be criticised as far too minimalist, as living on even 
two or three dollars a day amounts to dire poverty, all the more so by 2030 when 
average incomes are likely to have increased substantially. Estimating the effect on 
arbitrary poverty thresholds would, unfortunately, no longer be able to draw on the 
existing published research on the elasticities between growth and the current 
threshold. 
In important side note concerns the question to what extent the above effects are due 
to the assumed spill-over to post-secondary attainment, rather than due to the 
achievement of the literal SDG target as such. While the spill-over effect should 
indeed be included in principle, its specific magnitude as included in the model is an 
assumptions that is to some extent arbitrary. It is prudent, therefore, to investigate 
the sensitivity of the results to this assumption. This is was done by performing 
additional estimations where the growth contribution of the post-secondary 
graduates attributable to the spill-over effect was reduced to that of upper-secondary 
graduates. The general conclusions stated above still hold for these more 
conservative estimates. In other words, most of the difference is in fact accounted for 
by secondary attainment. 
An explicit analysis of economic inequality is not feasible here. As the literature 
review demonstrated, the relationhsip between educational expansion and inequality 
is highly contingent on institutional arrangements, and does not lend itself to 
modeling an ‘average effect’. As a proxy, it is possible, however, to changes in 
education itself from the perspective of the ‘bottom 40 percent’. The rationale is that 
the bottom 40 percent in terms of income must be at least as well educated as the 
bottom 40 percent in terms of education. Improvements in the latter therefore 
provide a sense of the extent to which the ‘rising educational tide’ contributes to 
improving the relative position of the economic bottom 40 percent. For example, if 
in the future, only 20 percent of adults have only primary attainment or less, then at 
least half of the income bottom 40 percent must have completed lower secondary 
school at least. 
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To shed some light on this question, we have analysed the improvement in 
educational attainment in the ‘top 60 percent’ and ‘bottom 40 percent’ of the 
education distribution under the SDG scenario compared to the trend. Specifically, 
we model the probability for a random individual (at a given time, scenario, region) 
in the bottom/top group to have a strictly higher level of education than a random 
individual from the corresponding group in 2015. The reason this is not 50 percent in 
2015 itself is because of ties. So if half have no education and half have primary, the 
probability in question is 25 percent. These results are summarised in fig. 13. 
Figure 12: Attainment profile of the `bottom 40%’ of the education distribution. 
Figure 13: Probability of a random individual in the group (bottom 40 / top 60) & year strictly 
exceeding the attainment of a random individual from the same group in the baseline year. See 
main text for details. 
We see that the bottom 40 percent are becoming much better educated, in the sense 
of a high probability of ‘out-attaining’ the baseline. For example, while a random 
member of the bottom 40 percent in 2020 in South Asia in terms of educational 
attainment has only a 25 percent chance of possessing strictly higher attainment than 
a member of the bottom 40 percent in 2015, this probability rises to almost 75 
percent by 2050 under current trends. 
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In addition to this rise against the 2015 baseline, we see that the projected 
educational expansion can be interpreted as being moderately inequality-reducing, in 
that the bottom group improves more rapidly on this measure than the top 60 
percent. However, the SDG target scenario is actually slightly less inequality-reducing 
than the baseline trend. This is to be expected, because the extra push compared to 
the baseline trend is stronger at a higher level, namely upper secondary. 
Returning to the motivating question of economic inequality, given that in the above 
sense the bottom 40 percent are likely to see larger improvements than the top 60 
percent in terms of education, we may be tentatively optimistic that educational 
growth may contribute to promoting above-average income group for the bottom 40 
percent also. This is not clear from the above results alone, however, as the picture 
may well be different in terms of the gains in years of schooling, rather than the 
probability of reaching a higher attainment level. 
 
Disaster deaths 
As was demonstrated in the review in the first part of this report, there are strong 
linkages between education and climate change. On the one hand, this concerns both 
the ambivalent relationship between higher education and higher incomes and 
consumption, that potentially increase emissions overall, even if the more educated 
may be more supportive of institutional reforms and interventions aimed at climate 
change mitigation. On the other hand, there is evidence that higher education levels 
make a positive contribution to reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience to 
natural disasters generally. 
While there is a notion that natural disasters strike ‘indiscriminately’, this contradicts 
the basic assumption underlying Disaster Risk Reduction, namely that information 
and preparedness can make a difference to survival and/or loss of assets and 
livelihoods. Unfortunately, information on educational characteristics of affected 
populations is often not collected in disaster-response situations. However, where it 
is available, the data suggest that the more educated do indeed tend to exhibit a 
greater awareness of risks, of appropriate preparation and response, and suffer 
smaller average losses in case of actual disaster. This justifies the expectation that 
vulnerability vis-a-vis climate-change induced disasters in the future may benefit 
similarly. This is of particular interest because ‘combatting climate change and its 
impacts’ is an important addition to the SDG agenda in comparison to previous 
development frameworks, and because this topic is among the least-well studied. 
The potential positive contribution of education (and future educational expansion) 
to reducing vulnerability to climate disasters has been found both at the micro-level 
and in aggregate data. The following model and the study on which it is based fall in 
the latter category. Nevertheless, the fact that the findings fit well with corresponding 
micro-level evidence, and that the causal mechanisms outlined above are plausible, it 
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may serve to at least illustrate the potential magnitude of the contribution education 
can make. 
In this simulation, the predicted decadal numbers of deaths from natural 
catastrophes (storms, floods, droughts, landslides, and extreme temperature events) 
are obtained from the model presented in Lutz et al. (2014). This model uses past 
information on the relationship between human capital and disaster deaths (as 
available from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT 2010)) controlling for 
other relevant covariates to project the impact of climate change in terms of future 
vulnerability according to the different Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP). For 
the present purposes, the SDGs were simply added as another narrative of future 
adaptive capacity to the set of SSPs and several different scenarios were calculated 
for future environmental hazard. In the first scenario, the future number of disasters 
experienced within a country over a decade was assumed to remain what it was 
during the 2000-2010 period over the entire 21st century. This is then contrasted with 
a climate change scenarios assuming a 20 percent increase in the decadal number of 
disasters in comparison to the previous decade, respectively. The uncertainty ranges 
around the predictions indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 
This figure is obtained from the panel regression model with time fixed effects 
predicting the log of disaster deaths by climate-related disasters i.e. hydro-
meteorological hazards such as floods, droughts, storms and extreme temperature. 
The estimated results are then transformed into predicted number of disaster deaths 
(measured as the logged number of deaths per million of population) according to 
different socioeconomic development pathways (SSPs) which are highly relevant for 
population dynamics and composition, and different climate change scenarios. For 
climate change scenarios, we make an assumption of an increase in hydro-
meteorological extreme events of an average 10% and 20% per decade respectively. 
Although this is a rather simple assumption, even among the climate modelling 
community, there has not yet been a consensus on how climate change-induced 
extreme weather events would look like (Schleussner et al. 2015). However, the 
IPPC report and other scientific papers have confirmed that the current increase in 
the frequency, intensity and severity of extreme climate events observed today is due 
to anthropogenic climate change and these events are likely to rise in the future. The 
IPCC is particularly highly certain about the increase of longer and/or more intense 
heat waves, heavy precipitation events and increased incidence and/or magnitude of 
extreme high sea level (IPCC 2014). 
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Projected annual deaths from hydro-meteorological disasters by scenario. 
In terms of the general pattern, the convexity in the expected number of disaster 
deaths over time is explained by the fact that some mitigating factors, including the 
diffusion of secondary education, become saturated while severe disasters are still 
becoming more common. With respect to the strength of the estimated linkage with 
education, this is large relative to the overall prediction range for a given climate 
scenario. For example, the median predicted outcome in 2040 under the SDG 
education scenario is close to the lower 2.5 percentile under the trend scenario. In 
absolute terms, the predicted number of annual disaster deaths is some 10–20 
thousand lower under the SDG education scenario in the medium term, at constant 
disaster frequency and severity. Under a climate change scenario of more frequent 
disasters, the difference between the education scenarios widens to some 30–50 
thousand annual disaster deaths. 
From the perspective of the potential contribution of educational expansion to off-
setting climate change with respect to its disaster toll, note that even under the more 
severe climate change scenario, baseline educational expansion may contribute to 
keeping the actual number of disaster deaths approximately constant well into the 
second half of the century. Educational expansion as envisaged by the SDGs would 
even keep the predicted value under the severe climate change scenario within the 
expected range under a no-change climate scenario until 2040 or so. 
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In this particular study, the effect of education is modeled as a coefficient on the 
share of the adult population with at least lower secondary education. Accordingly, 
the SDG, ‘low’, and ‘slow’ education scenarios essentially coincide in this case. Only 
the SDG scenario is shown, therefore. 
In terms of regional variation, because these are absolute numbers of deaths, the 
global pattern is strongly dominated by the experience of Asia, which is not only 
home to some of the largest populations, especially coastal, but at the same time the 
locus of many disasters. 
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